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Part I 
The Elements of 
Migration Analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      
     
     
Introduction 
 
The four chapters in the first part of this book develop a general framework 
for the analysis of the determinants of migration behavior. Each of the first 
three chapters contributes substantially to the understanding of the role of 
income in the migration decision calculus. In addition, each of these first 
three chapters highlights certain other types of variables that are important 
in the migration calculus. Taken as a group, chapters 1 through 3 set the 
stage for the rigorous migration model constructed in chapter 4. 
Most researchers analyzing the causes of geographic mobility assume 
that individuals seek to maximize their economic well- being when making 
migration decisions. Historically, the crucial factor thought to reflect the 
migrant's economic well-being has been the level of income. Orthodox 
migration theory has argued that people in general migrate to those areas 
where income (wage) levels are the highest. 
Within the context of two different analytical models, chapter 1 takes 
issue with orthodox migration theory. Specifically, chapter l formally 
demonstrates that, once the costs associated with geographic mobility are 
accounted for, (1) persistent interregional wage (income) differentials are 
entirely compatible with rational labor market behavior; (2) there is likely to 
exist a rather substantial range  o f interregional wage (income) 
differentials that will not elicit interregional migration; and (3) there is 
likely to exist a rather substantial degree of indeterminacy in interregional  
wage-rate (income) analysis. 
The essence of the theoretical analysis in chapter l is that interregional 
wage-rate differentials must be adequately large to compensate labor units 
for the costs associated with mobility if the conventionally expected rela- 
tionship between wage-rate differentials and human migration is to be 
observed. 
Assuming that population and labor flows can be regarded as identical, 
orthodox economic theory predicts that the higher the income level in a 
state, the greater the net migration to that state, ceteris paribus. As modi- 
fied by chapter 1 of this book, however, such theory clearly implies that 
individuals living in states with either extremely high or extremely low 
income levels will be more responsive to interstate income differentials than 
those living in states with income levels near the general average for the 
economy. 
In order to test this basic hypothesis empirically, chapter 2 investigates 
the relationship between net interstate population migration and income 
levels for the 1965-1970 time period. The forty-eight contiguous states are 
divided into three different groups: one including the twelve states with the 
highest wage levels, one including the twelve states with the lowest wage 
levels, and another containing the other twenty-four states. 
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The regression results in chapter 2 offer very strong empirical support 
for the theoretical analysis in chapter 1. Among other things, the findings in 
chapter 2 suggest that there exists an interregional wage "range" in the 
United States. Hence, both in specifying migration models and in interpret- 
ing empirical results, it is necessary to be extremely meticulous. 
The next chapter examines the role of income in the migration decision 
from a very different perspective. In particular, chapter 3 examines how 
interregional income differentials can have very different effects on differ- 
ent groups of migrants. The focus in this chapter is on the very widespread 
finding that nonwhite migrants tend, on the average, to be more responsive 
to interregional income differentials than do white migrants. 
Chapter 3 examines several hypotheses for this apparent difference in 
the responsiveness of white and nonwhite migrants to geographic income 
differentials. It is ultimately suggested that nonwhites may be more sensitive 
than whites to interregional income differentials in formulating their migra- 
tion decisions because of the fact that, on the average, nonwhites are poorer 
than whites. The reasoning here is that since nonwhites (on the average) 
have lower incomes than whites, the process of moving from one area to 
another and receiving the prevailing income there would yield considerably 
greater benefits (relatively speaking) for nonwhites than for whites. 
With chapters 1 through 3 as background, chapter 4 develops a rigor- 
ous model of human migration. This model basically treats the migration 
decision as an investment decision. The individual's investment decision is 
argued to be a function of three sets of factors: expected real income bene- 
fits, expected amenity benefits, and expected real benefits from state and 
local government policies. The chapter initially develops a model of individ- 
ual migration, in which the individual is expected to migrate from one area 
to another only if the total expected net benefits from the move are positive. 
Building upon the model of individual migration, the chapter also develops 
a model of aggregate migration. The latter model assumes a form that is 
amenable to direct empirical testing with conventional regression tech- 
niques. 
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A Theory of 
Interregional Migration 
and Wage-Rate 
Analysis 
Introduction 
 
The issue of the determinants of migration has long been of concern to 
policy makers, demographers, economists, political scientists, and other 
researchers. In principle, the theory of labor mobility is generally regarded 
as an extension of the theory of resource allocation. As Sjaastad (1962, p. 
80) notes, migration is a means for ". . . promoting efficient resource allo- 
cation and . . . is an activity which (itself) requires resources." In effect, 
most researchers dealing with geographic migration assume that individuals 
seek to maximize their "differential economic advantage" (Hicks 1940) 
when making migration decisions. 
Historically, the critical factor thought to reflect (represent) the differ- 
ential economic advantage has been the wage-rate differential. Numerous 
studies dealing with labor mobility and wage differentials have investigated 
the extent to which labor market forces have operated over time to equalize 
interfirm, interindustry, or interregional wage rates. 1 
Along this line, it was argued some years ago by Lester (1952, p. 500) 
that, among its basic assumptions, wage-rate theory should include the fol- 
lowing concept: 
 
. . . that a range of indeterminancy is natural, so that genuine wage differ- 
entials are to be expected and, within limits, are (actually) normal . . . . 
 
Given this argument, the primary objective of this chapter is to afford 
the reader a basic understanding of the migration process by developing two 
simple analytical models of interregional migration and wage-rate determi- 
nation, each of which formally derives, rather than simply assumes, the 
existence of this range referred to by Lester. Furthermore, this chapter seeks 
to demonstrate, first, that once the costs associated with mobility are 
accounted for, persistent wage-rate differentials are entirely consistent with 
conventional wage-rate (labor-market) theory, and, second, the existence 
of geographic mobility (movement) costs tends to introduce a definite 
degree of indeterminacy into wage-rate analyses. 
 
A Two-Region Economy with Perfect Factor Mobility 
 
To begin our analysis, let us assume an economy consisting of two regions: 
region A and region B. In each of these two regions, the firms are assumed 
          5 
        
to employ a single, perfectly homogeneous labor input, which is purchased 
under purely competitive labor market conditions. 
The short-run labor supply curve in a region is defined as the number 
of units of labor  forthcoming from within the region in response to 
changes in that region's wage rate. In this initial model, we assume (for 
simplicity) that the short-run labor supply curve is perfectly vertical, that 
is, perfectly wage-rate inelastic. In the model developed towards the end 
of this chapter, this assumption is relaxed.2 
The long-run labor supply locus is defined, for the objectives and 
purposes of this chapter, as allowing for labor migration between the 
regions (A and B) in response to interregional wage-rate differentials. 
At the very outset, we shall assume that regions A and B both have per- 
fectly identical labor demand curves and perfectly identical short-run labor 
supply curves. In addition, all exogenously introduced demand changes are 
assumed to have a source (hereafter called the foreign sector) outside the 
regions and to be direct-able (perhaps because of a factor such as transport- 
cost considerations) at either region alone. 
To facilitate the analysis, the long-run labor supply locus is first 
derived under conditions of "perfect mobility"; by "perfect mobility," it is 
meant that labor units will move between regions in response to any inter-
regional differential in wage rates.5 It is assumed here that regions A and 
B both have the same initial long-run equilibrium employment and wage 
levels. Region A's labor market is represented in figure 1-1, with the 
employment level OS and the wage rate Se determined at the intersection of 
labor demand curve DD and short-run labor supply curve SS' . 
Let us now assume that the demand for labor units in region A 
increases to D1D1, possibly because of an increase in demand from the for- 
eign sector for commodities produced in region A. In the short run, the 
wage in region A rises from Se to Sa. Given the assumption of perfect 
mobility, the higher wage rate induces migration of labor units from region 
B to region A. The short-run supply curve of labor in A begins shifting to 
the right and the wage falls from Sa along D1D1. With the out-migration of 
labor units from region B, the wage rate in B rises up along the labor 
demand curve (B's short-run labor supply curve shifts to the left), and the 
interregional labor flow continues until the wage-rate differential is elimi- 
nated.6 Wage-rate equalization occurs at S1 b, when the number of labor 
units in A have increased by S1 - S units (and in B, decreased in like 
amount). Hence, point b defines one point on region A's long-run labor 
supply locus, whereas S1 S is the new short-run supply curve of labor in 
region A. Note that, although figure l-1 represents the labor market in 
region A, it also can be used, under these particular conditions, to indicate 
the wage in region B. In region B, the number of labor units has fallen by 
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Figure 1-1. Perfect Interregional Factor Mobility 
 
the amount S2 - S, and the intersection of the unchanged labor demand 
curve and new short-run labor supply curves is a point on another (shifted) 
long-run labor supply locus for region B, with wage rate S1 b. 
Yet more long-run equilibria can be derived by simply varying the 
demand for labor in region A while holding the demand for labor in region 
B unchanged (such as a decline in labor demand to D2D2, resulting in point f, 
with wage S2 and employment level OS1).
7 The locus of all such points is the 
long-run labor supply locus (curve) in region A and is shown as curve gh, 
which curve is compatible with any increase or decrease in the demand for 
labor in region A. If labor demand in region A falls from D1D1 back to 
DD, the equilibrium wage and employment levels in region A fall to the 
original values of Se and OS, respectively. One should also observe that the 
curve gh indicates the wage in region B for every long-run equilibrium wage 
or employment in region A. 
 
The Model after Allowing for Mobility Costs 
 
The next phase in this analysis is to impose a mobility cost constraint on the 
labor units, that is, to allow for the various possible costs associated with 
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geographic mobility. As Sjaastad (1962, p. 81) observes, there are two 
major types of private costs of migration: 
 
The private costs can be broken down into money and non-money costs. 
The former include the out-of-pocket expenses of movement, while the 
latter include foregone earnings and the "psychic" costs of changing one's 
environment. 
 
For the purposes of this analysis, it is assumed that all such costs can be 
translated into pecuniary terms and hence can be translated into an absolute 
interregional wage differential, which must be overcome before any migra- 
tion between the regions will take place. 
Let us assume that the mobility cost constraint can be represented in 
figure 1-1 by the distance de on the initial short-run supply curve SS'. No 
movement from region B into region A will occur until the wage differential 
between the regions is greater than the amount ec; no movement out of 
region A into region B will take place until the wage-rate differential is 
greater than the amount de. The value of the mobility cost constraint is 
assumed to remain constant throughout this analysis (although, as a practi- 
cal matter, it is likely to change over time due to such factors as technologi- 
cal advances and increased educational achievement). 
The mobility cost constraint is also represented in figure 1-2, where the 
same initial equilibrium as in figure 1-1 is assumed. Once again, let the 
demand for labor in region A be increased from level DD to level D
1
D
1
, 
with a resulting wage increase from Se to Sa. Labor units move in response 
to the interregional wage differential, but now the movement ceases when 
region A's wage reaches S
3 
j, with the labor employment level at OS
3 
• This 
is due to the existence of the mobility cost constraint. As region A's wage 
rate declines along curve D1D1 , Region B's wage rate rises along the gh 
curve. When the wage rates in regions A and B are S3j and S3’j, the 
wage-rate differential at which no migration flow transpires is once again 
attained (xj is equal to ec ). S’S; is the new short-run labor supply curve in 
region A. Thus, in response to this specific increase in labor demand, the 
labor migration is S
3 
- S rather than S
1 
- S  as was the case with perfect 
mobility. Point j, not point b, is one point on the long-run labor supply 
locus of region A; the locus of such points derived from successive hypothe- 
sized increases in region A's labor demand from DD yields the long-run 
supply curve segment ck. Furthermore, successive decreases in labor 
demand from DD would yield the long-run supply segment dl. At this point 
in the analysis, the long-run supply curve of labor in region A appears to be 
the kinked locus ldck in figure 1-2. As before, given the assumption that the 
labor demand in region B remains unchanged, the curve gh indicates the 
wage in region B for any given long-run equilibrium in region A, once the 
mobility cost constraint is overcome. 
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Figure 1-2. Mobility with Moving Costs 
 
Of course, in order for the locus ldck to be region A's long-run locus, it 
must be consistent with all shifts in the demand for labor in region A. If 
labor demand in figure 1-2 falls from D1D1 to DD, the wage and employ- 
ment levels in A will not fall back to Se and OS. There will be no out-migra- 
tion from region A until A's wage level falls below S
3 
v. If the wage in 
region A falls to S3 x, it will be equal to that found in B. Hence, under the 
hypothesized conditions, the wage rate falls from S
3
 to S
3
v, but the 
employment level remains unchanged at OS
3  
units. Hence, point v must be 
a point on the long-run labor supply locus in region A, as must every other 
point on segment vj along the short-run labor supply curve S
3 
S
3
', since 
each of these points represents a potential long-run equilibrium position. 
The consequences of such adjustments are illustrated in figure 1-3. 
 
 
The Long-Run Labor Supply Range 
 
Refer now to figure 1-3. If the demand for labor units in region A 
had increased from DD to D3D3, the in-migration adjustments would have 
led to a new equilibrium wage of S
5 
n and a new equilibrium employment 
level of OS
5 
in region A (and a wage rate of S
5 
y in region B). On the other 
hand, if the demand for labor in region A were to decline to D
1
D
1
, the wage 
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Figure 1  -3. Long-Run Labor Supply 
 
would decline to S5 t, with no out-migration at all occurring. Observe again 
that point t represents a potential long-run equilibrium and that any labor 
demand decrease between D3 D3 and D1D1 would have resulted in a long- 
run equilibrium somewhere along the segment nt. If a further fall in labor 
demand is then allowed, say to DD, the short-run wage level declines to 
S
5 
u, which overcomes the cost constraint on out-migration. Out-migration 
occurs and continues until the wage in region A rises to S 
3 
v (and falls to S
3
x 
in B) where the mobility cost constraint differential is once again attained. 
All points derived in this fashion would yield the segment dq. The very same 
procedure in figure 1-3 may be applied to rises in demand from D4 D4 to 
obtain the segment pc. 
Clearly, this analysis implies the existence of a range of potential long- 
run combinations of equilibrium employment levels and wage rates. Hence, 
this analysis implies the existence of a long-run supply range of labor units 
rather than a long-run supply curve of labor units. In figure 1-3, the long- 
run supply range is represented by area lpkq. The boundaries of this range 
are determined by the value of the mobility cost constraint. Clearly, under 
the posited conditions, any combination of the employment level and wage 
rate within or on the range is entirely compatible with long-run labor- 
market equilibrium in the region. 
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Conclusions 
 
The model analyzed above clearly indicates that persistent interregional 
wage differentials can be completely compatible with conventional wage 
theory once there is an allowance made for the costs associated with migra- 
tion.8 In point of fact, interregional wage-rate differentials seem more likely 
to exist than interregional wage-rate equality, as Gallaway and Cebula 
(1972) have argued elsewhere in a different context. Also, the existence of 
a long-run supply range rather than a curve introduces an element of 
indeterminacy into wage analysis. Empirical studies that attempt to explain 
why a particular wage differential exists may reach rather different 
conclusions, depending upon whether or not the wage rates examined lie 
within or on the boundaries of the range.9 In addition, the actual location 
within or on the range boundaries may influence the conclusions of studies 
that attempt to determine the migration responsiveness of labor to wage 
changes. Labor can be expected to respond quite differently if wage-rate 
changes start from a location on one of the boundaries of the range rather 
than from a location within the boundaries. In the former case, labor might 
appear to be extremely mobile, whereas in the latter case, labor might 
appear to be extremely immobile.10 
 
An Alternative Model 
 
The conclusions derived from the analysis above can be obtained without 
the assumption that the short-run labor supply curve is perfectly vertical. 
We once again deal with a two-region economy (regions A and B). Regions 
A and B are assumed to have identical initial labor demand and short-run 
labor supply curves. In contrast to the preceding analysis, however, the 
short-run labor supply curves are positively sloped, reflecting a direct rela- 
tionship between the quantity of labor supplied within a region and that 
region's wage rate. 1 1 
In figure 1-4, region A's labor market is shown in panel (a), whereas 
region B's labor market is shown in panel (b). Given the initially identical 
curves for both regions, there is an initial interregional wage-rate equality. 
Let us now postulate an exogenous rise in the demand for labor in 
region A, from D1D" to D2 D2.  The money wage rate in region A rises 
above that in region B, and thus migrants flow out of region B into region 
A. This shifts the short-run labor supply curve in region A to the right and 
the short-run labor supply curve in region B to the left. These shifts in turn 
reduce the increase in A's wage rate and cause the wage rate in B to rise. 
Ultimately, there is interregional wage-rate equality between A and B. In 
addition, in region A, the labor market has moved from point a to point c.12 
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Figure 1-4. Perfect Factor Mobility 
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Thus, points a and c in figure 1-4 are two points on region A's long- run 
labor supply locus (curve). 
Had labor demand in region A shifted down, say from D1 D1 to D3D3  
the wage rate in A would have declined below that in B. Out-migration 
from A to B would have shifted the short-run labor supply curve in A to the 
left and the short-run labor supply curve in B to the right. Ultimately, 
region A would have ended up in equilibrium at a lower wage (as would 
region B). The new equilibrium point for region A is shown by point d in 
figure 1-4, at the intersection of D3D3   and S3 S3. Thus, points a, c, and d 
are three points along region A's Jong-run labor supply curve. Repeating 
this procedure will result in the long-run labor supply locus (curve) lm (in 
figure 1-4). Note that, as in figure 1-1, under conditions of perfect mobil- 
ity, the region faces a long-run labor supply curve. 
The discussion up to this point has assumed costless interregional 
migration flows. However, as noted earlier, it is reasonable to assume that 
there are cost barriers to the free flow of labor between regions. We once 
again assume that all such costs of movement between regions A and B can 
be translated into a pecuniary equivalent and thus into an absolute interre- 
gional wage-rate differential that must be overcome before any interre- 
gional migration will take place. Consider figure 1-5, where curves D1D1, 
S 
1
S1,,D2 D2 , and S1S1 from figure 1-4 are reproduced. Using the points a 
and g as the initial equilibrium positions, we assume that the mobility cost 
constraint is given in figure 1-5 by the distance su ( = st ). The interpretation 
here is quite simple. No movement of labor from A to B will occur until 
the wage rate in region A falls by more than the amount su (given the wage 
rate in B). Similarly, no movement of labor from B to A will occur 
until the wage in A rises by more than the amount st. Restating it 
somewhat differently, no labor movement from A to B will take place 
until the wage-rate differential exceeds the amount su; and no such 
movement to A from B will take place until the differential exceeds the 
amount st. 
Now let labor demand in A rise from D1D1 to D2D2 ,  holding B's 
labor demand curve constant. Equilibrium A will then move to point b. 
Since the wage-rate differential does not overcome the mobility cost con- 
straint, A's short-run supply of labor curve remains at S 
1
S
1 
• Thus, points a 
and b lie on A's long-run supply of labor curve. Similarly, if A's demand 
curve had shifted from D1 D1 to D3 D3 , another point (point c) on A's 
long-run supply of labor curve is derived, one which does not bring 
about any interregional flows of labor. Consequently, the short-run 
supply of labor curve in B remains at S '1 S '1. 
Now let labor demand in region A rise from D1 D1 to D4 D4 • Initially, 
the wage rate in A will rise toward point d, and since the interregional wage- 
rate differential exceeds the amount of the mobility cost constraint,  labor 
will flow from region B to region A. This shifts A's short-run supply of 
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Figure 1-5. Migration with Moving Costs 
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labor curve to the right (and B's to the left). Labor units will continue to 
flow from B to A until an interregional wage-rate differential equal in 
amount to st is established at some points such as e in region A and h in 
region B. Point e is another point on the long-run supply of labor locus in 
region A. 
With the equilibrium at point e, once again a mobility cost constraint is 
identified. Now consider a decline in demand in region A, after the estab- 
lishment of equilibrium point e. The wage rate in A will have to decline 
below that in B by an amount greater in magnitude than st before any labor 
will flow from A to B. In figure 1-5, the marginal point below which an 
interregional flow of labor from A to B will now take place is given by point 
f. 
 
 
Summary 
 
This chapter has developed two alternative models of interregional migra- 
tion and wage-rate determination. There are important implications that 
follow from both models. First, there is likely to be a substantial range of 
interregional wage-rate differentials that will not elicit interregional migra- 
tion flows.1 3. Second, persistent interregional wage-rate differentials are 
entirely compatible with conventional wage-rate analysis-once geographic 
movement costs have been allowed for. Third, there is likely to be a sub- 
stantial degree of indeterminacy in interregional wage-rate analysis. 
One final observation can now be made. The models presented here 
suggest that the sensitivity of interregional migration to interregional wage- 
rate differentials may depend upon the presence or absence of systematic 
labor demand shifts in one direction in one region. That is, if in figure 1-5, 
labor demand in region A continues to shift rightwards, interregional 
migration into region A will take place pari passu. However, should the 
labor demand shifting reverse direction, reverse migration from A to B may 
very well not occur, and the apparent sensitivity of migration to interre- 
gional wage-rate differentials may thus disappear. This suggests that where 
there is not a systematic growth in labor demand in one region vis-a-vis 
another, interregional migration may display an apparent insensitivity to 
wage-rate differentials. 
 
Notes 
 
1. See, for example,  Benham, Maurizi,  and Reder (1968), Bunting 
(1961), Cebula, Kohn,  and Vedder  (1973),  Cebula  and  Vedder  (1973), 
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Chapin, Vedder, and Gallaway (1970), Fuchs (1967), Fuchs and Perlman 
(1960), Gallaway (1967), Gallaway and Cebula (1972), Gallaway and Ved- 
der (1971), Gatons and Cebula (1972), Greenwood (1969), Greenwood and 
Sweetland (1972), Krueger (1968), Lampman (1956), Raimon (1962), Rot- 
tenberg (1956), Sjaastad (1962), Vanderkamp (1971), and Ziegler (1976). 
2. Thus, if LA is the number of internally supplied units of labor in 
region A and is the money wage rate in region A, we are assuming ini- 
tially that: 
 
    ∂LA/∂WA = 0 
 
 
Later on in this chapter, we shall relax this assumption so that 
 
     ∂LA/∂WA > 0 
 
 
 
 
3. This section essentially combines and expands the analyses in 
Lester (1952), Sjaastad (1962), Nourse (1968), Gatons and Cebula (1972), 
and Gallaway (1969). 
4. For simplicity and to facilitate this exposition, we assume that (a) 
the total labor force in the economy (regions A and B combined) is fixed 
(initially) and (b) that there is no technological change, embodied or dis- 
embodied. Thus, our definition of the long-run labor supply locus arbitrar- 
ily excludes quantitative and qualitative changes in the labor force of 
regions A and B combined so as to focus on the crucial variables of the 
analysis. Absolute wage differentials, rather than relative wage differen- 
tials, are used here only to simplify the analysis. The basic concepts and 
conclusions of the model do not change with the use of relative wage differ- 
entials. Assumption (a) is relaxed later on in the chapter. 
5. See Lerner (1952), Nourse (1968), or Samuelson (1948). 
6. See Lerner (1952), Nourse (1968), or Samuelson (1948). 
7. In places where the models developed in this chapter use a 
decrease in labor demand and decrease in absolute wage rates, it is merely to 
simplify the derivation of the long-run labor supply curve. In real world 
situations, it seems quite likely that wage differentials would result from 
differential increases in labor demand between regions. 
8. Sjaastad (1962). 
9. Regarding the causes of such differentials, the reader is referred to 
Gallaway and Cebula (1972) and Scully (1969) and (1971). 
10. Obviously,  the terms mobile and immobile refer to the sizes of 
dLA / dWB   and  dLB/ dWA. 
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Although it is assumed in figures 1-4 and 1-5 that 
 
∂2LA/∂W2A= 0 
 
as in Nourse (1968), the analysis could be easily extended to allow 
 
∂2LA/∂W2A >< 0 
 
 
11. Although the wage rate in region A initially was approaching point b, 
the interregional migration from B to A shifted the short-run supply curve 
rightwards from S
1 
S1  to an ultimate location of S2 S2 • 
12. Note that this range was logically derived, not simply assumed. 
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Differentials and 
Indeterminacies in 
Interregional Wage- 
Rate Analysis 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Chapter 1 develops two analytical models, each of which formally derives, 
rather than assumes, the wage-rate range discussed by Lester (1952). More- 
over, both of the models constructed in chapter 1 demonstrate, first, that 
once the costs associated with mobility are accounted for, persistent 
interregional wage-rate differentials are entirely consistent with 
conventional wage-rate theory and, second, the existence of movement 
costs tends to introduce a definite degree of indeterminacy into wage-rate 
analysis. 
The crux of the analysis in chapter 1 is that interregional wage-rate dif- 
ferentials must be adequately large to compensate labor units for the costs 
associated with mobility if the conventionally expected relationship between 
wage-rate differentials and human migration is to be observed. In other 
words, it can be argued that empirical studies that attempt to explain why a 
particular wage differential exists may reach rather different conclusions, 
depending upon whether or not the wage rates examined lie within or on the 
boundaries of the range. Going further, it is argued that the actual location 
within or on the range boundaries may profoundly influence the conclu- 
sions of studies that attempt to determine the migration responsiveness of 
labor to wage-rate changes. Labor can be expected to respond quite differ- 
ently if wage-rate changes start from a location on one of the boundaries of 
the range rather than from a location within the boundaries of the range. In 
the former case, labor might appear extremely mobile, whereas in the latter 
case, labor might appear extremely immobile. The present chapter is 
directed explicitly at evaluating the empirical validity of these arguments. 
In order to test these hypotheses, this chapter proposes to investigate 
the empirical relationship between net population migration and income 
(wage) levels, by state, within the United States. The analysis deals with the 
1965-1970 time period. 
Assuming that population and labor flows can be regarded as identical 
in this context, orthodox economic theory predicts that the higher the wage- 
rate (income) level in a state, the greater the net migration to that state, 
ceteris paribus. Furthermore, such theory, as modified by chapter I of this 
book, clearly implies that individuals living in states with either extremely 
high or extremely low wage rates will be more responsive to interstate wage 
differentials than those living in states with wage levels near the general 
average for the economy. This suggests that if only states with very high or 
very low wage levels are considered, the empirical relationship between net 
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migration and wages should be much stronger than among states with inter- 
mediate wage levels. For that reason, we have divided the forty-eight cont- 
iguous states into three different groups: one including the twelve states 
with the highest wage levels; one including the twelve states with the lowest 
wage levels; and another containing the other twenty-four states. If the 
hypothesis is valid, we should observe a greater sensitivity of net migration 
to wage differentials in the groups with extremely high or low income 
levels.1 
 
The Basic Model 
 
In order to carry out the empirical testing of the basic hypothesis formu- 
lated in chapter 1, we first consider the following model of net out-migra- 
tion: 
 
Mi = Mi (Yi, QOLi) (2.1) 
where Mi = a measure of net migration out of area (state) i 
                        Yi = a measure of the average income level in area (state) i 
QOLi = an indicator of the quality of life in area (state) i 
 
At the outset, we observe that this analysis is concerned solely with net 
(as opposed to gross) migration patterns. The reasoning here is quite simple. 
Namely, as Liu (1975, p. 329) notes, most empirical migration analyses are 
expressly 
 
…concerned with a gross migration, and they always agree that employ- 
ment or income consideration dominates other factors in making loca- 
tional decisions among migrants. However, it should be noted that it is… 
net migration… that directly affects…labor force growth and, conse- 
quently, regional growth. 
 
Next, also following Liu (1975), we acknowledge the need in our analy- 
sis to include quality-of-life considerations when trying to analyze migra- 
tion patterns. To provide some measure of the quality-of-life variable, 
QOL, we introduce two dummy variables, DW and DA, where: 
 
DW = a dummy variable to indicate a "western" state; if a state is 
classified as western, the variable takes on a value of one, and 
if a state is not classified as western, the variable assumes a 
value of zero. 
DA = a dummy variable to indicate a "warm weather" state; if a 
state is classified as being warm weather, the variable assumes 
a value of one, and if a state is not classified as being warm 
weather, the variable takes on a value of zero. 
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Let us now hypothesize signs for ∂ M i / ∂DWi, and ∂ M i / ∂ DAi. 
As Liu (1975) has argued, people generally view location in the West as 
desirable because they perceive the general quality of life (amenities of all 
sorts) as being superior in the West. 
Hence, other things being equal, we expect that 
 
     ∂ M i / ∂ DWi < 0   (2.2) 
 
 
Next, following Cebula and Vedder (1973), Greenwood (1969), Liu (1975), 
and others, it is argued here that people, on the average, prefer locations in 
warmer or more moderate climates. Hence, we would expect, ceteris pari- 
bus, that 
 
     ∂ M i / ∂ DWi < 0   (2.3) 
                                                            
Thus, people are hypothesized here as being quite reluctant to migrate from 
western or from warm weather states. 
The states classified as western states and as warm weather states are 
listed in table 2-1. As shown, it is entirely possible for a given state to be 
classified as both a warm weather and a western state (witness, for example, 
the case of Arizona). 
 
Table 2-1 
Classifications of States 
 
The Western States The Warm Weather States 
 
 
Montana 
Wyoming 
Colorado 
New Mexico 
Idaho 
Utah 
Nevada 
Arizona 
Washington 
Oregon 
California 
Maryland 
Virginia 
North Carolina 
South Carolina 
Georgia 
Florida 
Kentucky 
Tennessee 
Alabama 
Mississippi 
Arkansas 
Louisiana 
Texas 
New Mexico 
Arizona 
California 
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that 
According to the basic hypothesis from chapter 1, it is expected here 
 
  |∂Mi/∂Yi| for high or low income states > 
 
  |∂Mi/∂Yi| for intermediate income states        (2.4) 
 
In other words, those states having very high or very low income levels will 
probably not lie within the boundaries of the interregional wage range; con- 
sequently, migration should in these cases appear to be (empirically speak- 
ing) highly sensitive to income differentials. On the other hand, states that 
have more intermediate (average) income levels will tend to lie within the 
boundaries of the range; thus, in these cases, migration will tend to exhibit a 
relative insensitivity to income differentials. 
 
 
 
Empirical Analysis 
 
In order to test the hypothesis in equation 2.4 empirically, we rewrite equa- 
tion 2.1 in the following linear regression form: 
 
  Mi = a0 + a1 Yi + a2 DWi + a3 DAi + µ     (2.5) 
                               
where    a
0  
= constant 
Mi = net interstate migration out of state i, 1965-1970, expressed 
as a percent of state i' s total population 
Yi = 1965 per capita income in state i 
DWi, DAi = as above, in equations 2.2 and 2.3 
µ = error term 
 
The income variable pertains to the beginning of the period consid- 
ered here. The reasoning for this derives from Greenwood's argument 
(1975, p. 519) that simultaneity bias can be encountered in studies that use 
variables “…defined for the end of the period…to explain migration that 
occurred over the period." 
Equations 2.2 and 2.3 imply here, for all state groupings, that 
 
a2, a3 < 0      (2.6) 
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; 
; 
From inequality 2.4, it is expected that |a1| for high or low income states 
> |a1| for intermediate income states        (2.7)
Estimating equation 2.5 by ordinary least squares for the three sets of states 
yields the following results: 
 
For high income states: 
 
Mi  = + 28.75609 - 0.01310 Yi**   
(+0.003)
- 3.045  DWi*    -     5.43  DAi** 
                        (+1.301)          (+1.53) 
 
DF = 8 R2   = 0.84 F = 13.69**  (2.8) 
For low income states: 
Mi = + 15.96611 - 0.00701 Y i * 
(+ 0.003) 
 
- 5 .2651 DAi*  
(+0.738)          
 
DF = 9 R2 = 0.85 F = 25.43**                  (2.9) 
For intermediate income states: 
 
Mi = + 10.20421 - 0.00501 Y i 
(+0.006) 
 
- 2.1581 DWi - 9.88 DAi** 
(+1.734) (+ 2.139) 
 
DF = 20 R2   = 0.56 F = 8.366"                   (2.10) 
 
Those variables marked with a single asterisk are statistically significant 
at the 0.05 level, while a double asterisk indicates statistical significance at 
the 0.01 level, where terms in parentheses are standard errors.2 
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To aid the reader in interpreting the results in equations 2.8, 2.9, and 
2.10 of this chapter, Tables 2-2 and 2-3 are provided. Table 2-2 indicates 
the means and standard deviations for each of the exogenous variables in 
each of the estimated equations. Table 2-3, in turn, indicates the contribu- 
tion to R2 attributable to each exogenous variable in each of the three esti- 
mated equations. 
Overall, the results in equations 2.8 through 2.10 are very encouraging. 
All eight of the estimated coefficients had the correct signs. In addition, six 
of these eight coefficients were statistically significant at the 0.05 level or 
beyond. Moreover, the F-ratios were all statistically significant at the 0.01 
level or beyond. Finally, the R 2 values in equations 2.8 and 2.9 were 0.84 
and 0.85, respectively, so that the model explains the vast majority of the 
net out-migration from high- and low-income states; in fact, the model 
even explains a majority of the net out-migration from the intermediate 
income states. 
Before commenting on the income variable, we observe that the quality 
of life, as reflected in the dummy variables (DW and DA) was a basically 
 
 
Table 2-2 
Means and Standard Deviations by State Grouping 
 
 
State Grouping Variable Mean Standard Deviation 
 
High Income Y, 2,245.75 188.39 
 DW, 0.25 0.45 
 DA, 0.17 0.39 
Intermediate Y; 1,706.92 149.31 
Income DW, 0.33 0.48 
 DA , 0.2! 0.41 
Low income Y; 
DA , 
1,272.17 
0.75 
11l.06 
OAS 
 
Table 2-3 
Change i11 R 
2 
Attributable lo Selected Variables 
 
State Grouping 
 
High income 
Variable 
 
Y 
Change in R 2 
 
0.213 
 DW 0.367 
 DA 0.257 
Intermediate income Y 0.013 
 DW 0.063 
 DA 0.481 
Low income Y 0.081 
 DA, 0.768 
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very important determinant of human migration. This is entirely consistent 
with a number of earlier studies, including Cebula and Vedder (1973), 
Greenwood (1969), and Liu (1975). 
Now we consider the results on the income variable. In equations 2.8 
and 2.9, the coefficient for income is statistically significant at the 0.01 and 
0.05 levels, respectively. In addition, as table 2-3 indicates, the income vari- 
able contributes an R 2 of 0.213 and 0.081 to equations 2.8 and 2.9, respec- 
tively. Thus, we conclude that net out-migration from high-income states 
on the one hand and from low-income states on the other are both signifi- 
cantly affected by income. By constrast, as equation 2.10 and table 2-3 both 
reveal, income was not a significant determinant of net out-migration from 
intermediate income states.3 • 4 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The empirical analysis in this chapter constitutes strong evidence in support 
of the analytical models developed in chapter 1.5 We may, among other 
things, thus conclude that an interregional wage-rate range does exist in the 
real world. Furthermore, in practical reality, we might then expect that 
studies which attempt to explain why a particular interregional wage-rate 
differential exists may reach rather different conclusions, depending upon 
whether or not the wage rates examined lie within or on the boundaries of 
this range. As shown in equations 2.8 through 2.10, migrants can be 
expected to react quite differently if wage-rate changes start from a location 
on one of the boundaries of the range rather than from a location within the 
boundaries of the range. Hence, we must be very cautious, both in specify- 
ing migration models and in interpreting regression results. 
 
 
Notes 
 
1. The states of Alaska and Hawaii are excluded from this analysis. 
Washington, D.C., is excluded as well. 
2. It should be observed, as equation 2.9 implies, that none of the low 
income states in the year 1965 fell into the western state category. 
3. We might also observe here that the income coefficients in equations 
2.8 and 2.9 were both larger than that in equation 2.10. 
4. Results somewhat analogous to those in regressions 2.8 through 2.10 
were obtained in the analysis of interregional capital flows in the recent 
study be Cebula and Zaharoff (1974). 
5. This chapter also provides direct support for the conceptual analysis 
developed by Sjaastad (1962). 
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Introduction 
Race and the 
Sensitivity of Migration 
to Income Differentials 
 
As the two preceding chapters indicate, migration rates can refer to the flow 
of all migrant types combined. In point of fact, historically, most studies 
have taken this form. It has, however, become increasingly prevalent in 
recent years for the literature to examine migration patterns which are dis- 
aggregated according to race, that is, white and nonwhite (Bowles 1970, 
Chao and Renas 1976, Delong and Donnelly 1973, Kau and Sirmans 1976). 
Along these lines, we may observe that one of the more interesting results 
reported by researchers studying the causes of human migration in the 
United States is that nonwhites appear, on the average, to be relatively more 
sensitive (responsive) than whites to interregional income differentials in 
formulating their migration decisions (Greenwood 1976, Pack 1973, Som- 
mers and Suits 1973-at least for the years 1960-1970). This chapter seeks 
to provide the reader with insights into the possible reasons for these empir- 
ical results. 
 
 
A Hypothesis 
 
One of the leading American scholars in the field of migration, Professor 
Michael Greenwood, has offered a hypothesis to explain the apparent dif- 
ferences in the responsiveness of white and nonwhite migrants to geo- 
graphic income differentials. Specifically, Greenwood (1976) has suggested 
that the level and availability of welfare benefits are both likely to be of 
great concern to low-income people and, consequently, to nonwhites. 
Greenwood (1976, p. 11) also notes that the 
 
...level of per capita welfare benefits is significantly more highly correlated 
with the level of nonwhite income than with the level of white income.... 
Hence, for nonwhites, the destination income level may serve as a better 
proxy for the availability of welfare benefits of various sorts. 
 
Greenwood thus holds that the nonwhite income level represents more than 
just income to nonwhites and hence is likely to influence nonwhites more 
than white income would influence whites. 
The purpose of this particular chapter is to investigate formally the poss- 
ible reasons for the differential white-nonwhite migration flow sensitivity 
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to geographic income differentials. Initially, the analysis focuses on the 
hypothesis of Greenwood (1976); ultimately, however, it will turn to a brief 
discussion of various possible alternatives to the Greenwood hypothesis. 
 
 
Empirical Analysis 
 
To examine Greenwood's hypothesis, we turn to a rather simple empirical 
model of migration. Given that this chapter is not attempting to explain as 
much migration behavior as possible, it does not include all the 
variables which have been shown elsewhere to affect the migration 
calculus. The basic model, which consists of a separate equation each for 
white migration and black migration, is given by the following: 
 
 ( + ) ( + ) ( + )  
Mi
ww 
= M  ( Y  , DW , Warm) (3.1) 
 
 ( + ) ( + ) ( + )  
Mi = M  ( Y  , DW , Warm) (3.2) 
 
  = net number of white (black) migrants into state       
between 1965 and 1970, expressed as a percentage 
of that state's white (black) population in 19701 
     =   median family income in state i, in 1969, for 
whites (blacks) 2 , 
                             Westi     = a western location dummy, taking on the value  
of one when the state is located in the West and taking 
on the value of zero otherwise 
                                             =  average January temperatures for state i3  
 
 
The figures used in this chapter to estimate the equations are for some 
forty-eight states for which sufficient data were available. The expected 
signs of the coefficients to be estimated are found in parentheses over each 
of the respective explanatory variables in the equations. The sign for Y is 
expected to be positive on the grounds that people are likely to be attracted 
to and not so likely to leave a state where family income is relatively higher. 4 
The hypothesized sign for the variable DW is positive. It is expected that 
people have a preference for location in the western United States, due to 
quality-of-life considerations (Gallaway and Cebula 1973 or Liu 1975).5 
The hypothesized sign for the variable Warm is also positive, suggesting 
that people tend to prefer locating in areas that have comparatively warmer 
or more moderate climates (Cebula and Vedder 1973, Graves 1976, or Liu 
1975). 
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Empirical results from the ordinary least squares estimations of 3.1 and 
3.2 are presented in equations 3.3 and 3.4, respectively: 
 
Mi   = -13.92633 + 0.00096 Yi***  
(+ 3 .20) 
 
+ 0.53675DWi 
(+ 0.54) 
+ 0.14011 Warmi
***
 
(+ 4.24) 
 
R2 = 0.38 DF = 44 (3.3) 
 
 
M   = -26.1923 + 0.00294 Yi***  
             (+ 3 .23) 
 
+ 0.1123 DWi 
(+ 0.54) 
+ 0.1846 Warmi
***
 
(+ 4.24) 
 
R2 = 0.19 DF = 44 (3 .4) 
 
A single asterisk indicates significance at the 0.10 level, a double asterisk 
significance at the 0.05 level, and a triple asterisk significance at the 0.01 
level, where terms in parentheses are t-values. 
In both regressions, all the estimated coefficients have the hypothesized 
signs. Coefficients for two of the three variables in each regression, Y and 
Warm, are statistically significant at the 0.05 level or better. Most relevant 
for this analysis is the result that the magnitude of the estimated coefficient 
for Y in the black regression, 0.00294, is over three times the magnitude of 
the estimated coefficient for Y in the white regression, 0.00096. Thus, in 
terms of the white-nonwhite (black) differential in the income sensitivity of 
migration flows, these findings are entirely compatible with those in Green- 
wood (1976), Pack (1973), and Sommers and Suits (1973) (for the 1960- 
1970 period). 
In order to test empirically Greenwood's hypothesis that the differen- 
tial income sensitivity of migration between whites and nonwhites (blacks) 
is a consequence of welfare considerations, we replace Yw (Yb) in the white 
(black) equation with two new variables, E 
 
 and AFDC. Ew(Eb) is the value 
of median earnings of employed whites (blacks) in state i in 1969.6 
AFDC; is the average monthly payment per family under the Aid to Fami- 
lies with Dependent Children Program, in state i, in 1970. The expected 
sign for E in both equations is positive, since people of both races 
presumably would prefer a state where earnings are higher to a state where 
earnings are lower, ceteris paribus. For the variable AFDC, we hypothesize 
a positive coefficient in the black regression and a negative coefficient in the 
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white regression. Since blacks are relatively poor and many lack marketable 
skills, we would expect that they would be attracted to states offering rela- 
tively high welfare benefits.8 Whites, on the other hand, who (on the 
average) have higher incomes than blacks, may view a state in which welfare 
benefits are relatively high as unattractive since high welfare benefits may 
indicate a fiscal system that places great emphasis on redistributing income 
from those who have to those who have not (Aronson and Schwartz 1973). 
By replacing Y w (Y b ) and AFDC, we decompose income received into an 
earned component and an unearned income component (welfare). 9 If 
Greenwood is correct in his argument that the income received variable is 
more important for nonwhites (blacks) than for whites because income 
received is picking up the effects of the welfare factor, then we should 
expect the coefficient of E w in the white regression equation to be approxi- 
mately equal to the coefficient of E B in the black regression equation. 
The ordinary least squares are given by equations 3.5 and 3.6 below: 
 
Mi = -13.14279 + 0.00143 Ei*** 
(+ 2.65) 
 
- 0.0053 AFDCi + 0.27386 DWi 
 (-0.56) (+ 0.26) 
 
+ 0.12972 
(+3.33) 
 
Warmi*** 
 
R2 = 0.35 DF = 43 (3.5) 
 
Mi = - 22.69286 + 0.0037 Ei*** 
(+3.97) 
 
+ 0.0041 AFDCi + 2.437 DWi     
(+0.20) (+1.08) 
+ 0.1 107 Warmi * 
( +1.32) 
 
R 2 = 0.32 DF = 43 (3.6) 
 
Once again, all of the coefficients exhibit the hypothesized signs. Two of the 
variables in each equation, E and Warm, have coefficients that are statistic- 
ally significant at the 0.10 level or better. The coefficient for the welfare vari- 
able is not statistically different from zero in either equation. Most pertinent 
for the present analysis is a comparison of the coefficients of the earnings 
variables. The size of the coefficient of EB in the black regression equation, 
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0.00373, is (once again) nearly three times the size of the coefficient of E w in 
the white regression equation, 0.00143. Hence, it would appear that Green- 
wood's hypothesis that the observed white-nonwhite (black) differential in 
the income sensitivity of migration is a consequence of welfare benefit con- 
siderations is in fact unsubstantiated by the actual empirical results. 
 
Data Sources 
 
Given the extreme importance in this particular study of the distinction 
between earnings on the one hand and income received on the other, it may be 
helpful to the reader to know the precise data sources used in this study. 
These are listed in the Notes section of this chapter. 
 
 
Alternative Hypotheses 
 
The observed disparity of white-nonwhite migration sensitivities to 
geographic income differentials appears to be the result of some factor(s) 
other than welfare. One possible explanation may be that given by Pack 
(1973) that simply because nonwhites (blacks), on the average, are relatively 
poorer than whites, they may be more sensitive to interregional income dif- 
ferentials in formulating their migration decisions. The reasoning here is that 
since nonwhites on the average have lower incomes than whites, the process 
of moving from one area to another and receiving the prevailing income there 
would yield considerably greater benefits (relatively speaking) for nonwhites 
than for whites. Another possible explanation involves skill-level differ- 
entials that exist between the races. Whites may be more likely than 
nonwhites (blacks) to migrate as a result of a job transfer or a new job offer. 
Given that whites, on the average, possess more specialized skills than non- 
whites (blacks), there in fact may be a smaller number of employers who 
could utilize the services of whites. Thus, it would be fairly risky for many 
whites to migrate in response to interregional income differentials and, once 
in the new location, then to search for employment. Since nonwhites 
(blacks), however, tend on the average to possess less specialized skill, the 
risks would be considerably less for them. 
Clearly, although this chapter has helped to clarify the basic issue here, 
the issue nevertheless remains fundamentally unresolved. Perhaps future 
research may yield more positive insight. 
 
 
Notes 
 
1. Data source for M: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of the 
Population: 1970, Subject Reports, Final Report PC (2)-2B, Mobility for 
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States and the Nation, Washington, D.C., 1972, Table 58 and U.S. Bureau of 
the Census, Census of the Population: 1970, Vol. 1, Characteristics of the 
Population, Part 1, United States Summary-Section 1, Washington, D.C., 
1972, Table 60. 
2. Data source for Y: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of the 
Population: 1970, Vol. 1, Characteristics of the Population, Part 1, United 
States Summary-Section 2, Washington, D.C., 1972, Table 345. 
3. Data source for Warm: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical 
Abstract of the United States, 1969, Washington, D. C., 1969, Table 262. 
4. Median family income, as opposed to per capita income, is used here 
for reasons stated in Graves (1976). In particular, it is felt that median fam- 
ily income is the preferred variable since variation from state to state in the 
percentage of children, retired people, and other non-workers would 
make per capita income an imperfect measure of the expected income that 
could be obtained through migration. 
5. The western states are Montana, Idaho, Wyoming, Colorado, New 
Mexico, Arizona, Utah, Nevada, Washington, Oregon, California, Alaska, 
and Hawaii. Related to this classification, see Gallaway and Cebula (1973). 
6. Data source for W, E:  U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of the 
Population: 1970, Vol. 1, Characteristics of the Population, Parts 2-52, 
Washington, D.C., 1972, Table 195. 
7. Data source for AFDC: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Ab- 
stract of the United States, 1971, Washington, D.C., 1971, Table 467. 
8. Welfare may be viewed as a form of income or as a form of long-term 
unemployment compensation. 
9. Several studies, including those by Pack (1973), Chao and Renas 
(1976), De.Jong and Donnelly (1973), K au and Sirmans (1976), and 
Sommers and Suits (1973), include both income received variables and wel- 
fare variables in the same equation. This is a technical misspecification since 
welfare payments are already embodied in income received. 
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Introduction 
A General Theory of 
Migrant Behavior 
 
The preceding chapters have basically stressed the role of current income in 
determining geographic mobility in the United States. In point of fact, most 
empirical studies and most theoretical studies of internal migration in this 
country have treated current income as the fundamental causal factor in 
migration. 
Although this approach to analyzing migration behavior has been rea- 
sonably useful in many respects, it is not sufficiently rigorous or sophis- 
ticated to forecast migration flows accurately and in depth. In other words, 
the conventional analysis of migration behavior is far too elementary to deal 
adequately with the myriad of forces that influence contemporary migration 
patterns. 
Accordingly, this chapter seeks to develop a rigorous model of the deter- 
minants of human migration. The analysis begins by developing a model of 
individual human migration. Once this model has been completely con- 
structed, a model of aggregate human migration flows is developed. A theo- 
retical application of these models is then presented in the closing section. 
 
 
A Model of Individual Human Migration 
 
This section develops a model of individual human migration. In recent 
years, it has become increasingly common to view the migration decision as 
an investment decision. This idea can be traced, at least in part, to Theodore 
W. Schultz (l961, p. 1), who argued: 
 
Much of what we call consumption constitutes investment in human capital. 
Direct expenditures on education, health, and internal migration to take 
advantage of better job opportunities are clear examples. 
 
Accordingly, following Schultz (1961), as well as Sjaastad (1962), Bowles 
(1970), Gallaway and Cebula (1972), and Riew (1973), this analysis expressly 
treats the decision to migrate as an individual investment decision. 
 
3 9  
 
In this section, the investment in migration depends upon three general 
sets of forces: 
 
1. expected real income differentials 
2. expected amenity differentials 
3. expected differential benefits and costs from state and local government 
policies 
 
 
Expected Income Differentials 
 
For simplicity, it is initially assumed here that the economic system consists 
of two regions (areas), region A and region B. It is also assumed that the 
individual (referred to as simply individual i) initially resides in area A. Let 
YAit be the money income expected in area A by individual i during period t,  
and let YBit be the money income expected in area B by individual i during 
period t. The discounted present value of the expected nominal income dif- 
ferential between areas A and B for individual i, D A B i Y , is then given by 
 
ni 
D A B i Y   =  ∑ (YBit - YAit)(1- ri)-t 
t=1 
 
where ri = the discount rate for  individual i  
ni  = individual i' s time horizon. 1 
 
(4.1) 
 
At the outset, it should be observed that rather than assuming arbitrarily 
that all persons have the same discount rate, equation 4.1 ascribes a unique 
discount rate to each individual. This procedure is predicated upon the 
empirical finding by Renas and Cebula (1972, p. 61) that ". . . the marginal 
rate of time preference is a function of a person's socioeconomic status." 
Of course, the rational individual is concerned not only with his expected 
nominal income in areas A and B, but also with the cost of living in areas A 
and B. Let the expected private cost of living during period t in areas A and B 
be represented by CAi t  an d  CBi t  respectively. Accordingly, the 
discounted present value (for individual i) of the expected living-cost 
differential between areas A and B,  D ABic , is given by 
 
                                 (4.2) 
 
The definition of private living costs in equation 4.2 is taken to exclude 
all living costs directly associated with public policy decisions. Such exclu- 
sions involve primarily the following: property taxes, state and local govern- 
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ment sales taxes, and state and local government income taxes. This defini- 
tion of living costs also excludes the actual pecuniary costs of moving and 
any non-pecuniary personal costs (or benefits) that may be incurred during 
movement. These items are to be dealt with in equation 4.4. 
If the factors dealt with in equations 4.1 and 4.2 are logically combined, 
 we obtain the discounted present value (for individual l) of the expected real  
 income differential between areas A and B for individual i, D A B i R :  
 
 
D A B i R  =∑ (YBit/ CBit- YAit/CAit)(1- ri)-t                                        (4.3) 
 . 
 
Of course, equation 4.3 is technically incomplete in the sense that it omits 
both income foregone while individual i is in transit and individual i's moving 
expenses. 3 Including these two factors in the model yields 
 
 
D A B i R  =∑ (YBit/ CBit- YAit/CAit)(1- ri)-t 
 
- Ti   - EABi         (4.4)
 (
4
.
4
where Ti = individual  i's  expected  foregone  income  while  in  transit 
                          between areas A and B and  
EABi = individual i's pecuniary and non-pecuniary moving costs  
            between areas A and B8 
 
It should be observed that EABi may be broadly interpreted to include net 
capital losses (or gains) from housing (or other asset) sales and purchases 
associated with the movement from area A to area B. 
 
Expected Differential Amenities 
 
Let FAij be the expected value to individual i of amenities in period t in area A, 
and FAij be the corresponding value for individual i in area B. The dis- 
counted e"xpected present value for individual i of the differential values of 
amenities is then given by 
 
                                                                                     n; 
D A B i F   = ∑ (FBit - FAit)(1- ri)-t                     (4.5) 
                                                                     t=1 
  
As discussed in chapters 7, 8, and 9 of this book, these amenities  
include such considerations as air pollution, climatic conditions, conges- 
tion, the availability of recreation, and many other factors. Following the 
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arguments in Cebula and Vedder (1973), Graves (1976), and Liu (1975), 
these amenities may be classified as dimensions of the quality of life. These 
amenities are integrated into this analysis because, as Perloff and Wingo 
(1964) and others have claimed, these amenities allegedly have been very sig- 
nificant determinants of the location of both individuals and private firms 
and, hence, of regional economic growth and development in the United 
States. 
 
Expected Differential Benefits and Costs from Government 
Policies 
When an individual contemplates the differences between areas A and B, he 
presumably considers the government policies in these two areas.4  Among the 
various state and local government policies that are likely to be evaluated are 
educational quality,  police protection, fire protection, public assistance, 
property tax levels, sales tax levels, and income tax levels. 
In order to relate these public policies to the individual's migration deci- 
sion, let the real values of the expected state and local government tax liabili- 
ties in areas A and B in period t for individual i be XAi t  and XBi t ,  respectively. 
Furthermore, let the real A and B values of the publicly provided educational 
facilities for individual i period t be RAi t  and RBi t , respectively. Finally, for 
individual i, let the real A and B values of all other publicly provided govern- 
ment goods and services be SAi t  and  SBi t  , respectively.5 
Thus, for this individual, it follows that the discounted present value of 
the differential expected real net benefits from state and local government 6 is 
then given by 
 
                                                                                     n; 
                           D A B i G   = ∑ [(RBit +SAit) - XBi t - (RBit +SAit)+ XAi t ]  (1- ri)-t       (4.6) 
                                  t=1 
 
 
 
The Synthesized Model 
 
The synthesis of these three classes of factors influencing the individual's 
location decision yields the total discounted present value of all the expected 
real net benefits for individual I of moving from area A to area B:7 
 
 
 
Di = ∑ [(RBit +SAit) - XBi t - (RBit +SAit)+ XAi t + 
 
   (YBit/ C
B
it- Y
A
it/C
A
it)+ (F
B
it - F
A
it)]  (1- ri)  
 
-Ti - E
AB
i        (4.7) 
 
   
         42 
 
 
 
 
  
Given the nature of the components of D; in equation 4.7, it logically 
follows that 
 
                           ∂Di/∂DABiR , ∂ Di/∂DABiF, ∂Di/∂DABiG  > 0            (4.8) 
 
 
Finally, if we let MABi represent the migration of individual i from area A 
to area B, it follows from the above that 
 
 Di > 0 implies MABi > 0    (4.9) 
 
 
Clearly, this framework can be extended to any number of regions. The                                                         
individual compares the region of current residence with each of her/his  
alternatives. She/he will choose that region with maximum net benefits.
9
 
 
 
A Model of Aggregate Migration 
 
The analysis in the preceding section implies, for the two-region case (areas A 
and B), that 
 
PABi=  P
AB
i (D
AB
iR , D
AB
iF, D
AB
iG) 
 
 
 
Where PAB
 
= the probability that the person will migrate from area A 
to area B. 
(4.10) 
For simplicity, let us assume that all persons residing in area A have 
homogenous preferences. Proceeding locally, we may then observe that the 
actual aggregate flow of migrants from area A to area B is a number such as 
 
OM AB = V. PABi  (4.11) 
 
where  OM AB = the volume of people migrating from area A to area B 
V = the total population in area A 
Substituting from equation 4.10 into equation 4.11 yields 
 
OM AB = V. PABi (DABiR , DABiF, DABiG)                                               (4.12)  
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Dividing both sides of equation 4.12 by the term V yields 10 
 
OM AB/V = PABi (DABiR , DABiF, DABiG)                                               
 (4.13) 
 
Equation 4.13 can easily be expanded to allow for more than merely two 
regions. In addition, equation 4.13 can easily be altered to reflect non-
homogeneous preferences within any given population group. Modified in 
these ways, equation 4.13 becomes a basic frame of reference for the analysis 
of gross out-migration. Since net migration is essentially the difference between 
opposing gross migration flows, equation 4.13 actually provides a conceptual 
foundation for all forms of migration studies. 
Prior to closing this section, it should be observed that, given the nature of 
the migration-determining factors that are stressed in this chapter , the 
models developed here serve as the basic framework for all five of the 
chapters in the next portion of this book. In some fashion or another, each of 
these five chapters is significantly linked to the models given in equations 
4.7 and 4.13. 
 
 
The Models Applied to Factor-Price Equalization 
 
Earlier in this chapter a model of individual migration is developed, whereas 
the preceding section develops a model of aggregate migration. This closing 
section applies these models to the theorems of factor-price equalization. 
We begin by considering a two-region (A and B) economy where the 
following conditions prevail: 
 
1. identical two-variable (capital and labor) production functions in the 
two regions 
2. perfect factor markets 
3. maximizing behavior by the owners of both productive factors 
 
As argued in Samuelson (1948) and Lerner (1952), under these three con- 
ditions, one expects interregional factor proportions to adjust (through geo- 
graphic mobility) until the returns to each of the productive factors are 
precisely equal in the two regions.11 
Naturally, in a world of spatial dimensions and risk, factor movement 
from one region to another is not costless. Given that interregional factor 
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 movement is not costless, it follows that assumption 2 above is violated and 
that interregional factor-price equalization over time may very well never 
come to pass. This raises the issue of whether or not the traditional factor- 
price equalization theorems are in fact at all relevant or significant. 
This section seeks to reinterpret the factor-price equalization theorems 
so that they still may exhibit both relevance and significance. 
To begin with, let us reconsider equation 4.7 above. As indicated in this 
equation, a positive value for the total discounted present value of the ex- 
pected real net benefits from mobility induces geographic migration. Let the 
equation now refer to any productive factor. Clearly, then, it is entirely 
possible that, for any given productive factor, a factor-price differential 
between areas A and B could exist over time without causing interregional 
migration- simply because the size of the factor-price differential was insuff- 
icient to make the total discounted present value Di positive. Thus, as 
argued in a different context in chapter l, the persistence of sizable inter- 
regional factor-price differentials does not necessarily violate the theorems 
in Samuelson (1948) and Lerner (1952). In point of fact, it might be simply a 
reflection of rational decision making by "economic man." 12 
What must be especially stressed here is that this so-called rational deci- 
sion-making is entirely consistent with the factor-price equalization 
theorems, once the latter are expanded to accommodate the myriad of con- 
siderations included in equation 4.7. In other words, in a world that includes 
all the types of benefits and costs found in equation 4.7, factor-price equali- 
zation is violated only if a positive value for D ; fails to induce movement 
from region A to region B. This conclusion analytically reaffirms the argu- 
ments in chapters 1 and 2 that there exists an interregional wage-rate 
range. 13 Of course, this conclusion also illustrates the continued vitality of 
the Samuelson (1948) and Lerner (1952) theorems. 
 
 
Notes 
 
1. In this analysis, the symbol Y expressly excludes all forms of public 
welfare. 
2. Due to its geographic uniformity, federal taxation is excluded from 
all of these calculations. 
3. See Gallaway (1967) and (1969) and Sjaastad (1962). Also see 
chapter 1 of this book. 
4. This argument can be traced back to both Buchanan (1950) and 
Tiebout (1956). 
5. The symbol S refers to the values of such items as police protection, 
fire protection, public health facilities, highways, and public recreation. It 
also includes the value of public welfare. 
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6. The "fiscal surplus" referred to and developed by Buchanan (1950) 
may be expressed as the value of R + S - X. Clearly, equation 4.6 involves 
the evaluation of two alternative fiscal surpluses. 
7. In equation 4.7, it follows that 
 
 
 
8. Technically, one could argue that equation 4.9 should read as 
D, > 0  implies MABi = 1 
9. In other words, the individual chooses that area which maximizes 
the value of Di. 
10. The formulation in equation 4.13 is quite similar in principle to that 
found in Miller (1973). 
11. This conclusion is very similar to that derived from figures 1-1 and 
1-4of this book. 
12. An alternative analysis, which stresses embodied human capital but 
which nevertheless yields very similar final conclusions to these, is found in 
the study of Gallaway and Cebula (1972). 
13. Actually, it can be argued that there exists a factor-price range, 
rather than just a wage-rate range. 
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Selected Migration 
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  Introduction 
 
This part which consists of five chapters, investigates the impact on migra- 
tion patterns of a variety of economic and noneconomic variables. In prin- 
ciple, the choice of variables examined in this portion of the book is pred- 
icated upon the migration models constructed in chapter 4. 
Chapter 5 addresses an issue that has been essentially ignored in the 
literature-the impact of geographic living-cost differentials on migration. 
In this chapter, four regressions are estimated by ordinary least squares; on 
the basis of these estimations, the chapter arrives at two very important con- 
clusions. First, the cost of living is an extremely important determinant of 
geographic mobility in the United States. Second, the omission of living costs 
from migration studies constitutes a very serious specification (omitted 
variable) error. 
Chapter 6 develops an analytical model of income expectations in which 
the expected income associated with migration depends upon several 
economic variables. The empirical analysis in this chapter establishes that 
migrants' income expectations are significantly affected by employment 
opportunities, living costs, and the annual growth rate of median income. 
Taken as a group, these various measures of income expectations appear to 
be extremely useful predictors of net migration patterns in this country. 
Chapter 7 is unique in at least three respects. First, it focuses at great 
length upon the quality of life as a determinant of human migration. Second, 
it deals strictly with the determinants of elderly migration, that is, migration 
of persons sixty-five years of age or older. Third, this chapter argues that 
since the labor force participation rate of the elderly is far below that of other 
age groups in the economy, the elderly should be essentially insensitive to 
economic factors in formulation their migration decisions. 
The empirical analysis in chapter 7 arrives at essentially three basic con- 
clusions. First, the elderly exhibit essentially no sensitivity whatsoever to 
purely economic factors when making migration decisions. Second, elderly 
migrants are effectively insensitive to interregional tax differentials. Finally, 
quality-of-life considerations explain nearly the entire pattern of elderly 
migration in this country. 
Chapter 8 develops a rigorous economic analysis of the impact of 
quality-of-life considerations on total net migration in the United States. 
The model consist of two primary sets of forces: income expectations and 
quality-of-life expectations. The empirical findings indicate, first, that 
migrants, on the average, are drawn to areas where their expected incomes 
are greater and, second, that migrants, on the average, are also attracted to 
areas having a perceived better quality of life. The latter result notwithstand- 
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ing, however, it is found that the income-expectations variables appear to 
be quantitatively far more important in the migration decision than do the 
quali ty-of-life variables. 
In chapter 9, the role of differential state and local government policies 
in determining migration is examined. The focus here is on two specific 
policies: welfare benefits (per recipient) and state plus local government non-
welfare expenditures (per capita). The migration flow is disaggregated 
according to race: white and black. The empirical findings in this chapter 
indicate that white migrants prefer to locate in areas having lower welfare 
benefit levels, whereas black migrants prefer to locate in areas with higher 
welfare benefit levels. In addition, the regression results indicate that white 
migrants are essentially insensitive to non-welfare spending, whereas black 
migrants exhibit a strong preference for areas with higher non-welfare 
expenditure levels. Overall, the empirical evidence strongly implies that diff- 
erential state and local welfare policies act to distort labor-market behavior in 
the United States. 
The policy implications of chapter 9 include a call for a standardized 
welfare system. It is argued, however, that unless welfare benefits are 
standardized in real terms, welfare reform might become a total disaster. 
In closing this set of remarks, it is observed that all of the chapters in this 
portion of the book deal with topics that are largely ignored in the existing 
migration literature. 
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Introduction 
The Migration Impact of 
Geographic Living-Cost 
Differentials 
 
Scholars have long been interested in the determinants of human migration 
patterns. Most empirical studies of migrant behavior regress migration rates 
against a variety of economic variables, such as unemployment rates, per 
capita income, and median income. More recently, the trend in the migration 
literature has been to include in these regressions various quality-of-life vari- 
ables, such as climate, pollution, and congestion. Except for Rabianski 
(1971), however, no real effort has been made in the empirical migration 
literature to account for geographic living-cost differentials (although their 
potential importance has been noted; see, for example, Riew (1973) and 
chapter 4 of this book). In the United States, such differentials are relatively 
large. Hence, ignoring geographic living-cost differentials introduces the 
distinct possibility of money illusion on the part of migrants. Accordingly, 
the objective of this chapter is to analyze empirically the impact on migration 
of explicitly including geographic living costs in the migration decision 
calculus. This analysis is directed toward an investigation of net migration to 
some thirty-six metropolitan areas in the United States for which the needed 
living-cost data are available. 
 
 
A Basic Model 
 
The basic problem this chapter must address is how precisely to introduce 
living costs into an empirical migration model. When Rabianski (1971) 
addressed this problem, he chose to use price indexes to deflate nominal 
earnings into real earnings. Rabianski then compared the results of two 
migration regressions. One regression included nominal earnings, as well as 
certain other explanatory variables; the second regression differed from the 
first by its inclusion of real rather than nominal earnings. 
His comparison of the two regressions led him to conclude (Rabianski 
1971, pp. 191-192): 
 
...in both models the T-ratios for the earnings ratios are significantly 
diffferent from zero at the 0.01 level of significance. However, the 
inclusion of the inter-regional cost-of-living deflator did not significantly 
improve the model based upon nominal earnings. 
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In view of the fact that the deflator approach did not significantly in- 
fluence the regression results, this chapter adopts an alternative approach to 
the problem at hand. In particular, this chapter examines the impact of 
geographic living-cost differentials on migration by including the cost of 
living as a separate explanatory variable. The basic model to be examined 
intitially is the following: 
 
  Mi = a0 + a1 Yi + a2 Ui + a3 DWi + u1         (5.1) 
 
where Mi  = 
a o = 
Yi = 
Ui = 
DWi = 
 
 
volume of net in-migration to area i, 1960-1970, expressed as a 
percentage of area i's 1960 population. 
constant 
1969median family income in area i 
1960 average unemployment rate in area i 
dummy variable to indicate location of the metropolitan area in 
a western state (the variable takes a value of one if the metro- 
politan area is located in a western state and a value of zero 
otherwise; related to this, see Gallaway and Cebula (1973) 
µ
1 
= error term 
This model, which contains standard migration-determining variables, 
is expected, on the basis of previous studies, to yield the following 
coefficient signs: 
 a1 > 0, a2 < 0, a3 > 0 
 
 
The ordinary least squares estimation of 4.1 is given by 
 
Mi = -1.56822 + 0.00161 Yi - 2.95482 Ui 
(+ l.23) (-3.29) 
 
+ 10.66963 DWi 
(+ 4.03) 
DF = 32 R2 = 0.39 F = 8.256 (5.2) 
where terms in parentheses are t-values. 
All three of the estimated coefficients have the expected signs. Two of 
these coefficients, a 2 and a3, are statistically significant at well beyond the 
0.01 level; only the coefficient for income a 1 fails to be significant at an 
acceptable (that is, 0.05) level.  In addition, the F-ratio is statistically 
significant at beyond the 0.01 level. 
To appreciate the role of living costs in migration, we add a new variable, 
Ci, which is the average cost of living for a four-person family in metro- 
politan area i, 1970, expressed in current dollars.2 Presumably, the higher 
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 the living costs in an area, the less attractive it should be to migrants, ceteris 
paribus, hence, we expect the coefficient for variable Ci to be negative. 
The ordinary least squares estimate for this expanded model is 
 
Mi = + 31.53623 + 0.00401 Yi - 2.58603 Ui 
(+2.95) (-3.19) 
 
+ 9 .46006 DWi - 0.0061 Ci 
(+3.95)  (-3.05) 
 
DF = 31 R 
2 
= 0.51 F = 10.133 (5.3) 
 
All of the estimated coefficients in equation 5.3 have the hypothesized signs 
and are significant at the 0.01 level or beyond. In addition, the F-ratio is 
significant at beyond the 0.01 level. 
Estimations 5.2 and 5.3 are different in a number of important ways. 
First, the coefficient for income is not significant at even the 0.10 level in 
.equation 5.2, whereas it is significant at well beyond the 0.01 level in equation 
5.3. Second, equation 5.3 has an additional variable, the cost of living, which 
is statistically significant at well beyond the 0.01 level. Finally, equation 5.3 
has a considerably higher R2  than does equation 5.2: 0.51 versus 0.39. 
In sum, then, contrasting results 5.2 and 5 .3 implies that the cost of living 
is an important determinant of migration behavior and that omission of this 
variable from migration analysis constitutes a specification omitted variable 
error (see Johnston 1972, pp. 168-169). 
 
An Alternative Model 
 
Contemporary migration models ordinarily include a number of variables 
besides those listed in equation 5.1. In an effort to deal with a more complete 
basic model, the following migration equation is postulated: 
 
 
 
+ b5 Ei + µ 2 (5.4) 
where Mi, Yi, Ui, and DWi are as above, and 
b0  = constant 
µ2 = error term 
DAi = dummy variable to indicate location of the metropolitan area in a 
warm weather state (the variable assumes a value of one if the metro- 
politan area is located in a warm weather state and a value of zero 
otherwise; see Gallaway and Cebula, 1973). 
Ei median education level of the adult population (age twenty-five 
years or older) in metropolitan area i, 1960. 
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On the basis of studies by Gallaway and Cebula (1973) and Pack (1973), 
respectively, the following signs are expected on the coefficients for the two 
additional variables, DAi and Ei: 
b4   > 0 and  b5   >  0 
Estimating equation 5 .4 by ordinary least squares yields: 
Mi = -14.25610 + 0.00108 Yi - 3.14821 Ui 
(+ 0.51) (-3.23) 
 
+ 3.478 DWi + 9.0812 DAi + 2.08104 Ei 
(+ 0.92) (+3.37) (+1.31) 
 
DF = 30 R2 = 0.42 F = 6.134 (5.5) 
 
All five of the estimated coefficients have the hypothesized signs; how- 
ever, of these five coefficients, only two-those for unemployment and warm 
weather- are statistically significant at acceptable (that is, 0.05) levels. The 
R2 is 0.42, so that the model explains somewhat over two-fifths of the net 
migration. Finally, the F-ratio is statistically significant at beyond the 0.01 
level. 
Next, we consider regression equation 5.4 with the living-cost variable 
Ci included. The ordinary least squares estimation of this modified version 
of equation 5.4 is given by 
 
Mi = + 23.08902 + 0.00301 Yi - 2.90404 Ui 
(+ 2.37) (-3.35) 
 
+ 4.22006DWi   + 7.94803 DAi + 1.55001 Ei 
(+1.25) 
 
(+ 3.30) 
 
(+1.10)  
 
- 0.007 Ci  
(-3.07) 
 
DF = 29 R2 = 0.55 F = 8.112 (5.6) 
 
In estimation 5.6, all six of the coefficients have the expected signs. In 
addition, four of these six coefficients are significant at the 0.01 level or be-   
yond; only the variables DWi and Ei fail to have coefficients that are signif- 
icant at an acceptable statistical level. Next, the R2 has a value of 0.55, so that 
over half of the net migration has been explained. Finally, the F-ratio is sig- 
nificant at beyond the 0.01 level. 
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Results 5 .5 and 5 .6 are different in a number of important respects. First, 
the coefficient for income is not statistically significant at even the 0.10 level 
in equation 5.5, whereas it is significant at the 0.01 level in equation 5.6. 
Second, equation 5 .6 has an additional variable, the cost of living, which is 
significant at well beyond the 0.01 level. Finally, the R2 in equation 5.6 is 
perceptibly greater than that in 5 .5: 0.55 versus 0.42. 
Hence, contrasting results 5.5 and 5.6 imply (as observed in the 
preceding section) that the cost of living may be an important determinant of 
migrant behavior and that omission of the living-cost variable may amount 
to significant specification (omitted variable) error. 
 
Data Profile 
 
Tables 5-1 and 5-2 are included here to aid the reader in evaluating the 
various empirical results derived in the preceding sections of this chapter. 
Table 5-1 indicates the zero-order correlation coefficients among the various 
exogenous variables. As shown, there are no consequential multicollinearity 
problems in the model. Table 5-2 in turn lists the means and standard devia- 
tions of the exogeneous variables. This should aid in evaluating the coeffi- 
cients in the regressions presented. 
 
Table 5-1 
Correlation Matrix 
 
 
Y                         U                      DW                    DA                      E 
 
 
U -0.07 
DW 
DA  
E 
C 
0.06 
-0.39 
0.29 
0.65 
0.38 
0.12 
-0.12 
0.05 
 
0.25 
0.36 
0.06 
 
 
0.07 
-0.36 0.08 
 
 
 
Table 5-2 
Means and Standard Deviations of Selected independent Variables 
 
 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation 
Y 10,582.02 995.81 
U 4.63 1.34 
DW 0.17 0.38 
DA  0.39 0.49 
E 11.24 0.86 
C     10,556.47        740.97 
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         Conclusion 
 
This chapter has argued that migrant behavior should be, assuming the 
absence of money illusion, sensitive to geographic living-cost differentials. 
An earlier study by Rabianski (1971), which deflated nominal earnings into 
real earnings, found living costs to have no real impact on migration patterns. 
The present study, however, which introduces geographic living costs into the 
migration regression as a separate variable, yields results that strongly imply 
that, ceteris paribus, migrants do in fact prefer areas with lower living costs. 
Moreover, estimations of more than a half-dozen different variations on the 
models in this analysis have yielded the same basic results,3 namely: the cost 
of living is an important determinant of migration behavior and omission of 
this variable from the migration regression constitutes a specification error.4 
Hence, future empirical migration research should, whenever possible 
(that is, whenever adequate data are available), take geographic living-cost 
differentials expressly into account. Failure to do so results in a mis-
specified model. Furthermore, inclusion of this variable in empirical 
migration analyses may markedly improve the dependability, accuracy, and 
relevance of research efforts.5 
 
 
Notes 
 
1. The metropolitan areas studied in this chapter were Atlanta, Ga.; 
Austin, Tex.; Bakersfield, Calif.; Baltimore, Md.; Baton Rouge, La.; 
Buffalo, N.Y.; Cedar Rapids, Iowa; Champaign, Ill.; Chicago, Ill.; Cin- 
cinatti, Ohio; Cleveland, Ohio; Dallas, Tex.; Dayton, Ohio; Denver, Colo.; 
Detroit, Mich.; Durham, N.C.; Greenbay, Wis.;  Honolulu,  Hawaii; 
Houston, Tex.; Indianapolis, Ind.; Kansas City, Mo.; Lancaster, Pa.; Los 
Angeles, Calif.; Milwaukee, Wis.; Nashville, Tenn.; Orlando, Fla.; Phila- 
delphia, Pa.; Pittsburgh, Pa.; St. Louis, Mo.; San Diego, Calif.; San Fran- 
cisco, Calif.; Seattle, Wash.; Washington, D.C.; Wichita, Kans.; New York, 
N.Y.; and Minneapolis, Minn. The geographically comparable living-cost 
data indicate the annual cost of a moderate living standard for a four-person 
family. 
2. The year 1966 is the earliest year for which such data are available for 
a reasonably large number of metropolitan areas. For years prior to 1966, 
living cost data are available for a maximum of twenty cities. 
3. These results will be supplied by the author upon request. 
4. This conclusion is compatible with the analysis by Renas and Kumar 
(1978). 
5. The empirical findings in subsequent chapters of this book lend 
further strength to this contention. 
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Introduction 
An Income- 
Expectations Model of 
Human Migration 
 
Income expectations have been examined at considerable length as a conse- 
quence of their central role in the permanent income hypothesis formulated 
initially by Friedman (1957) and in the life cycle hypothesis subsequently 
formulated by Ando and Modigliani (1963).1 Income expectations have also 
been investigated in terms of their impact on a number of other economic 
issues, including the investment in human capital,2 the efficacy of economic 
stabilization policies,3  and the causes of migration.4 
This chapter seeks to extend the migration literature by investigating how 
and to what extent certain income expectations proxies may influence 
internal human migration decisions in the United States. 
The following section presents the basic theoretical framework (model) 
of the chapter, while the third section provides an empirical analysis of the 
relationship between labor migration and expected income changes. 
Concluding remarks are offered in the final section of the chapter. 
 
 
Investing in Migration 
 
Following Bowles (1970), Riew (1973), and Sjaastad (1962), as well as the basic theory 
in chapter 4, the framework of this analysis is one in which the individual decides to 
migrate from one area to another if over time there are positive net benefits expected 
from such migration. In particular, we maintain here that an individual residing in area 
i will choose to migrate to area j only if the discounted present value of the expected 
net benefits associated with the migration is positive. Assuming that all of the various 
benefits and costs that can be associated with migration can be expressed in pecuniary 
terms5 we argue that the decision to migrate from area i to area j requires that his/her 
expected net discounted present value of migration from area i to area j be both (a) positive 
and (b) the maximum net discounted present value that can be expected from moving from 
area i to any other known and plausible alternative area:  
 
   Mij > 0 if DPVij = ∑Be –Ce > 0    (6.1) 
where Be = 1, . . ., m, represents the value of all the benefits associated with 
migration from area I to area j for year e; Ce = 1, . . ., n, represents the 
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value of all the costs associated with migration from area i to area j for year 
e; r is the appropriate rate of discount for the individual, and Mij 
denotes migration from area i  to areaj. 
As observed in chapter 4, the analysis of the net benefits associated with 
migration (which benefits need not be positive) involves the appraisal of all 
the various costs and of all the various benefits of the migration. As also 
observed in chapter 4, there may of course exist many diff erent sources of 
benefits and of costs from migration which may accrue over a given time 
period (year). The total gross value of the benefits accruing from the migra- 
tion in eth year, Be, may thus be represented as 
Be = ∑Bek, k=1,…,m (6.2) 
 
where Bek, k = 1, . . .,m,is the value of the kth form of benefit accruing from 
migration in year e. Similarly, the total gross value of the costs accruing in 
year e, Cem, may be represented as 
 
 
   Ce = ∑Cel, e=1,…,n 
 
  (6.3) 
where Cel , l = 1  , . . ., n, is the value of the lth form of cost experienced 
(accruing) in year e. 
It follows from equations 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3 that migration from area i to 
area j, Mij, is a function of Bek and Cel such that 
 
   Mij = Mij ( Be, Ce)                  (6.4) 
 
 
where it logically also follows that 
 
 
 
    ∂Mij/∂Be >  0           (6.4a) 
 
 
and 
 
 
∂Mij/∂Ce < 0          (6.4b)
      
 
The primary emphasis of this particular chapter is on the impact of income 
expectations on migration. Accordingly, we note that the income increase 
expected from migration in year e is represented as one of the expected x 
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 ;u , 
 
benefits accruing from migration in year e, e = 1 ,…, n. More generally, the 
income increase expected from migration in any given time period represents 
one of the benefits from migration accruing in that time period. It follows, 
then, from 6.4a that 
 
   ∂Mi/∂Y*aij > 0 for all a (6.5) 
where Y*aij is the expected increase in income in period a as a result of 
migration from area i to area j. 
Ideally, following (in principle) the analysis by Muth (1961), the income 
increase expected as a result of migration from area i to area j should be 
expressed as some weighted average of actually observed past income growth 
differentials between the two areas: 
                                           ∞ 
   Y*aij = Ṓ ∑ ƛs Yt-s        (6.6) 
                                                                 S=0 
  
 
  
where Yt-s = the observed income growth differential between areas i and j 
  during time period t-s. 
 
However, given that data limitations confine us to just cross-section 
analysis, and given that-following Liu (1975)-we feel it is in many respects 
more relevant to deal with net rather than gross migration, we are forced here 
to construct a somewhat cruder expectations function. In particular, it is 
argued here that the expected income increase over period a associated with 
migration from area i to area j is a function of the following variables: 
 
the level of median income in area j, Yj 
the growth rate of median income in area j per period a, ∆Yj 
the unemployment rate in area j, Ui 
the education level in area j, E1 
the cost of living in area j, Cj 
 
In this chapter, the expected relationship between Y*aij and these five 
exogenous variables is given by 
 
Y*aij = Y*aij (Y j ,  ∆Yj, Uj,  Ej,  Cj )     (6.7) 
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where 
             
           ∂Y*aj/∂Yj > 0 
         ∂Y*aj/∂∆Yj > 0 
         ∂Y*aj/∂Ej > 0 
  
and 
 
  ∂Y*aj/∂Uj < 0 
  ∂Y*aj/∂Cj < 0 
   
Empirical Analysis 
 
 
 
 
In order to test whether and to what extent income expectations, as they are 
being measured here (see equation 6.7), influence migration, we shall test the 
following empirical model of net migration to SMSAs: 
 
   M j =  a 0  +  a 1 Y j  +  a 2 U j  +  a 3∆Yj + a4 DAj   
     
    + a5 Ej + a6 Cj + u              (6.8) 
 
                 where     
M j  = the net number of migrants into SMSA j between 1960 and 
1970 expressed as a percentage of the total 1960 population in SMSA 
j 
Yj = 1969 median family income in SMSAj 
Uj = average unemployment rate of the civilian labor force 
in SMSA j in 1960 
∆Yj  = annual rate of change of median family income in SMSA j 
between 1959 and 1969, expressed in percentage terms 
DAj = a dummy variable to indicate location of SMSA j in a 
warm weather state 6 
Ej = median school years completed in 1960 for the 
population twenty-five years of age and over in SMSA j 
Cj = annual cost in SMSA j   of an intermediate budget for a 
four- person family, 1970 
u = error term 7 
 
For the purpose of this chapter, the annual growth rate in median family 
income in area, ∆Yj, is computed as follows: 
 ∆Yj = -1 + 10 times the square root of Y69j/Y59 j    (6.9) 
where Y69j  = median family income in area j in 1969 
Y
59 j 
= median family income in area j in 1959 
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 On the basis of our arguments in equation 6.7 and on the basis of certain 
earlier studies,8  it is expected here that 
 
a1, a3, a4, a5 > 0  
 
a2, a6 < 0      (6.10) 
Estimating regression equation 6.8 by ordinary least squares yields 
Mj = -31.85211 + 0.00202 Yj - 1.35904U
j
 
                               ( + 1.58) (- 1.48) 
 
+ 533.73512 ∆Yj + 6.90106 DA j + 3.16011Ej 
( + 2.04) (+ 2.87) (+ 2.41) 
 
- 0.00513Cj 
(-2.42) 
(6.11) 
DF = 29 R 2 = 0.66 F = 9.211 
 
where terms in parentheses are!- t-values. 
Overall, these results are most encouraging. All six of the estimated co- 
efficients have the expected signs. Moreover, four of the six coefficients are 
statistically significant at the 0.05 level or beyond. The coefficient of deter- 
mination R 2 is 0.66, so that the  model explains two-thirds of the variation in 
the rate of net in-migration to these SMSAs. Finally, the F-ratio is 
significant at the 0.01 level. 
Before interpreting the specific coefficients (results) in regression equa- 
tion 6.11, we refer to Tables 6-1 and 6-2. Table 6-1 indicates the zero-order 
correlation coefficients among the various exogenous variables. As shown 
in the table, there are no consequential multi-collinearity problems. In 
table 6-2, the change in R 2 attributable to each of the exogenous variables 
is shown. This information should aid the reader in interpreting the actual 
effects of each of the exogenous variables in equation 6-11. 
 
Table  6-1 
Correlation Coefficients 
 
 
           Y        U                        ∆Y  DA  E 
 
U -0.07 
   
Y 0.03 -0.51  
DA  -0.39           0.12           0.19 
E               0.29 -0.12 -0.11         0.07  
C               0.66           0.05 -0.20 -0.36 0.08 
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     Table 6-2 
Change in R 2, by Variable 
 
 
Variable Change in R
2
 
 
 
      Y     0.01 
         ∆Y     0.28 
          E     0.21 
          DA     0.08 
          U     0.02 
          C     0.07   
 
 
 
In equation 6.11 the climate variable, DA  is statistically significant at 
well beyond the 0.01 level, indicating that warm or mild climates, ceteris 
paribus, are a strong attraction to the migrant. This is consistent with a 
number of earlier studies, such as Cebula and Vedder (1973), Greenwood 
(1969), Liu (1975), Miller (l973), and Renas and Kumar (1978). Moreover, as 
Table 6-2 clearly indicates, this climate variable is responsible in 
equation 6.11 for an R2 contribution of 0.08. 
Observe next the coefficients for the five income-expectations variables. 
As shown in equation 6.11, although the income Y and unemployment U 
variables do not play major roles, the income growth ∆Y, education E, and 
living-cost C variables do. All three of these variables are statistically 
significant at the 0.02 level or beyond. Moreover, as shown in Table 6-2, 
the combined R 2 for ∆Y, E, and C is roughly 0.56. Hence, it appears that, 
as a group, our proxies for income expectations are extremely strong 
predictors of human migration patterns in the United States. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This model of internal labor migration maintains that the migration decision 
is basically an investment decision in which migration from one area to 
another occurs if the discounted present value of the expected future stream 
of net benefits from such migration is positive. Within this framework, this 
chapter has sought to ascertain the impact of income expectations on the 
interregional migration of labor. The present empirical findings indicate that 
income expectations, as measured by our set of proxies, Y, ∆Y, U, E, 
and C, in fact play a very significant role in explaining migration 
behavior in the United States. Moreover, it also appears that the use of 
merely a single variable, such as Y
9 to represent income expectations may 
be most inadequate and, indeed, may even constitute a serious specification 
error. 
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 Finally, we observe that one possible implication of this analysis is that 
there may exist some form of permanent income or life-cycle hypothesis of 
migration. Just as the household consumption of commodities may be part- 
ially explicable in terms of a permanent income hypothesis, or a life-cycle 
hypothesis, so might consumption of (investment in) migration be ex- 
plained. This notion would seem especially appealing if migration in fact 
can be somehow treated as a commodity. 
 
 
Notes 
1. Some of the literature dealing with these and related hypotheses 
include Arak (1978), Arak and Spiro (1971), Bewley (1977), Bodkin (1959), 
Chao and Renas (1975), Houthakker (1958), Laumas (1969), Mayer (1966), 
Peterson (l972), and Wright (1969). 
2. Renas and Cebula (1972). 
3. See, for example, the somewhat related study by Cebula (1973), 
which deals with a form of income expectations derived from the size of 
government budget deficits. 
4. There have been a few papers which deal, although only briefly, 
with income expectations per se and migration patterns. Among them are 
Bowles (1970), Cebula and Vedder (1973), Pack (1973), Riew (1973), 
Sjaastad (1962), and Vanderkamp (1968). 
5. Recall that this was done expressly in chapter 1. 
6. Related to which states are classified as warm weather states, see table 
2-1. The variable here assumes a value of one if the SMSA is located in a 
warm weather state and a value of zero otherwise. 
7. The data were gathered and computed for the following thirty-six 
metropolitan areas: Atlanta, Ga.; Austin, Tex.; Bakersfield, Calif.; Balti- 
more, Md.; Baton Rouge, La.; Buffalo, N.Y.; Cedar Rapids, Iowa; 
Champaign, Ill.; Chicago, Ill.; Cincinnati, Ohio; Cleveland, Ohio; Dallas, 
Tex.; Dayton, Ohio; Denver, Colo.; Detroit, Mich.; Durham, N.C.; Green- 
bay, Wis.; Honolulu, Hawaii; Houston, Tex.; Indianapolis, Ind.; Kansas 
City, Mo.; Lancaster, Pa.; Los Angeles, Calif.; Milwaukee, Wis.; Nashville, 
Tenn.; Orlando, Fla.; Philadelphia, Pa.; Pittsburgh, Pa.; St. Louis, Mo.; 
San Diego, Calif.; San Francisco, Calif.; Seattle, Wash.; Washington, D.C.; 
Wichita, Kans.; New York, N.Y.; and Minneapolis, Minn. 
8. See chapter 5, as well as Cebula and Vedder (1973), Greenwood 
(1969), Pack (1973), Renas and Kumar (1978), and Sommers and Suits 
(1973). Note especially that, following Pack (1973), E is  taken to indicate the 
presence of growth industries. 
9. Per capita income or median income is usually the primary variable 
used in empirical migration studies to measure expected income. 
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Introduction 
The Migration Impact of 
the Quality of Life: The 
Case of the Elderly 
 
The greatly increased interest and concern in recent years in environmental 
matters and the quality of life in the United States has manifested itself in a 
variety of ways. As Professor Robert Carson (1978, p. 54) has put it, during 
 
…the late l960's, Americans were made increasingly aware of the dangers 
of pollution by a small but growing band of environmentalists and ecolo- 
gists. School children planted trees, "Earth Days" were proclaimed, and 
more important, citizen's lobbies pressed successfully for environmental 
protection acts. The high-water mark of environmentalist activity probably 
came on December 2, 1970, when the Environmental Protection Agency was 
established as an independent regulatory agency of the federal government. 
The EPA was charged with coordinating government action to assure pro- 
ection of the environment by abating and controlling pollution. 
 
In scholarly circles, interest in the environment and the quality of life 
has manifested itself in a propagation of studies pertaining to the economic 
impact of man's social and cultural milieu (Culbertson 1972, Demsetz 1971, 
Dorfman and Dorfman 1972, Gallaway 1972, Goldman 1972, Kneese and 
Schultze 1975, Liu 1974, Livingston 1973, Ng 1978, Roos 1975, Pascal 1971, 
Ruffin 1972, and Zerbe 1970. Although most such studies have been basically 
abstract in nature, there have been a few empirical studies, some of which try 
to relate the quality of life to human migration patterns. For example, Cebula 
and Vedder (1973) and Liu (1975) both examine the effects of the quality of 
life on total migration, whereas Kohn, Vedder, and Cebula (1973) investigate 
the effects of the quality of life on migration disaggregated according to race 
(white and black). 
The present chapter seeks to add to the above literature by empirically 
investigating the effect of selected quality-of-life variables on the migration 
of the elderly. The uniqueness of this chapter rests primarily on its concentra- 
tion on one particular age grouping of migrants, the elderly. For the purposes 
of this chapter, the term elderly refers to all persons who are sixty-five years 
of age or older. 
 
 
Migration of the Elderly 
 
The first question that may arise is "Why concentrate on the migration of the 
elderly per se?" The answer is really quite simple: namely, as Table 7-1 
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Table 7-1 
Elderly Population, by Sex, as a Percentage of Total Population 
 
 
Year Male Female 
 
 
1965 8.4 10.3 
1970 8.5 11.1 
1975 8.6 11.5 
1977 8.9 11.8 
 
 
Source:   U.S.   Bureau   of   the   Census,   Statistical Abstract   of   the United States,   1978, 
Washington, D.C., 1978, Table 32. 
 
 
indicates, the elderly are a significant and growing proportion of our total 
population. In fact, given current birth-rate trends in the United States, it 
can be expected that the elderly will constitute an ever-increasing proportion 
of the total United States population, at least until the close of this century. 
Hence, our attention in this chapter is directed at an increasingly important 
component of our society. 
As stressed in chapters 1 and 4 above, the conventional analysis of the 
determinants of human migration basically treats the migration decision as 
an investment decision 1 in which the individual chooses to migrate to that 
area which maximizes his differential economic advantage over time, The 
standard migration study, then, examines the impact of variables such as 
income differentials, unemployment rates, distance, and education on the 
migration decision. The present chapter, however, since it is concerned with 
the migration of the elderly, emphasizes the role of a different set of vari- 
ables. In particular, this chapter argues that for the elderly the main 
determinants of migration are those concerned with the quality of life, and 
that purely economic variables such as income differentials have little or 
no influence on elderly migration. 
The basic rationale for arguing that purely economic (labor-market) 
variables are likely to be of relatively little concern to elderly migrants can be 
inferred from Table 7-2. As Table 7-2 indicates, the elderly have a very 
low labor force participation rate vis-a-vis any other relevant age group. 
Moreover, Table 7-2 also reveals that the labor force participation rate of 
the elderly has actually been declining rather dramatically in recent years. 
This would further attest to the likelihood that labor market conditions 
would tend to be comparatively unimportant 2 to elderly migrants. 
Thus, although this chapter includes certain purely economic variables, 
the primary focus will be on the quality of life. Of course, there are many 
possible ways to measure the quality of life. In this chapter, we have singled 
out five specific measures: the availability of medical care, the amount of 
sunshine, temperature levels, air pollution levels, and the availability of re- 
creation facilities. The argument regarding the impact of each of these vari- 
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Table 7-2 
Labor Force Participation Rate, by Age 
 
 
Year and Age Group Participation as a Percent 
 
 
1965 
20-24 
25-34 
35-44 
45-54 
55-64 
65 and over 
 
86.2 
96.0 
96.2 
94.3 
83.2 
26.9 
 
1970 
20-24 
25-34 
35-44 
45-54 
55-64 
65 and over 
 
85.1 
95.0 
95.7 
92.9 
81.5 
25.8 
 
!975 
20-24 
25-34 
35-44 
45-54 
55-64 
65 and over 
 
84.6 
94.2 
94.8 
91.1 
74.8 
20.8 
 
1977 
20-24 
25-34 
35-44 
45-54 
55-64 
65 and over 
 
85.3 
94.2 
94.9 
90.3 
73.0 
19.3 
 
 
Source:  U.S.  Bureau  of  the  Census,  Statistical  Abstract  of  the  United  States,  1978, 
Washington, D.C., 1978, Table 644. 
 
 
 
ables is quite straight-forward. For example, the more abundant the medical 
care in an area, other things held constant, the more attractive that area 
should be to elderly migrants. Next, the elderly presumably will be more 
attracted to areas that offer better climatic conditions, that is, more sunshine 
and warmer temperatures. As for pollution, it is argued that the lower the 
level of air pollution in an area, the more attractive the area should be to 
elderly migrants. Finally, since the elderly are for the most part retired or 
semiretired, the availability of recreation facilities should be of concern in a 
migration decision. It is argued here that the greater the availability of such 
facilities in an area, the more attractive the area will presumably be to the 
elderly migrant. 
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The Migration Model 
 
In order to investigate empirically the effects of the quality of life on elderly 
migration patterns, the following net migration model is hypothesized: 
 
 Mi = Mi (Di, Si. Ti, Pi, Xi, Yi)     (7.1) 
 
where Mi = the net migration rate of the elderly to state i3  
      Di = a measure of the availability of medical care in state i4  
      Si = a measure of the average amount of sunshine in state i5   
      Ti = a measure of the average amount of cold weather I state i6 
      Pi = a measure of the average amount of air pollution in state i7
      Xi = a measure of the average level of state plus local government 
taxes in state i8 
      Yi = a measure of the average income level in state i9   
 
Following Cebula and Vedder (1973) and Liu (1975), our migration data 
refer solely to net in-migration (that is, gross in-migration less gross out- 
migration). The actual data on net migration of the elderly were obtained 
from the 1970 Census of the Population. To control for variations in the 
population among the states, the variable Mi takes the form of the ratio of 
net elderly migration to state i  between 1965 and 1970 to the 1965 
population of state i. The migration data were assembled for all of the 
states except Alaska and Hawaii. Washington, D. C., was also excluded from 
this study. 
The variable Di is the number of physicians per hundred thousand pop- 
ulation in state in the year 1966. The elderly presumably should prefer to 
locate in communities where health (medical) services are relatively more 
abundant, ceteris paribus. Accordingly, we would expect a direct relation- 
ship between variables Mi and Di: 
 
    ∂Mi/∂Di > 0       (7.2)  
                                                           
The variable Si is the average of daylight periods when there is sunshine 
in state i. Clearly, the larger the value of Si, the greater the average amount of 
sunshine in the ith state. Since the elderly presumably are interested in cli- 
matic conditions, they are likely to be attracted to states where there are, 
other things held constant, greater amounts of sunshine. Thus, the relation- 
ship between Mi and Si is argued here to be: 
    
    ∂Mi/∂Si > 0       (7.3) 
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The variable Ti is the average number of days per year when the mean 
temperature in state i falls to 32° Fahrenheit or below. It is assumed here that, other 
things held the same, the elderly on average would prefer mild or warm climates to 
colder climates. Thus, the relationship between Mi and Ti is expected to be 
inverse: 
 
∂Mi/∂Ti < 0       (7.4) 
 
Somehow, no analysis of the relationship between migration and the quality 
of the environment would seem complete without explicitly considering pollution. 
As our measure of air pollution, Pi, we use the amount of suspended particulate 
matter per cubic meter of air. Suspended particulate matter consist of the more 
visible forms of pollution: smoke, soot, dust and fumes, and droplets of viscous 
liquid remaining in the air for varying periods of time. We use the mean amount 
of suspended particulate matter observed in the forty-eight states in the year 1966. 
Given that greater amounts of air pollution in an area lower the quality of the 
environment and therefore its attractiveness to migrants, we would expect an 
inverse relationship between Mi and Pi: 
 
 ∂Mi/∂Pi < 0       (7.5) 
   
Given that most elderly migrants are either retired or semiretired, it is likely 
that they would be attracted to those areas that provide the better recreation 
facilities. The variable Ri is used as a measure of the availability of such facilities. Ri 
was computed by dividing the number of state, municipal, and county parks in 
1965 in state i by the 1965 population in state i, thus yielding the number of such 
parks per capita. Since a higher value for Ri implies a greater abundance of 
recreation facilities in the ith state, we would expect a direct relationship between Mi 
and Ri: 
 
 ∂Mi/∂Ri > 0       (7.6) 
 
The variable Xi represents the per capita level of all state and local 
government taxes in the ith state for the year 1967. In a very real sense, Xi can be 
interpreted as one of the costs associated with living in state i. Presumably, then, the 
higher the per capita tax level in a state, the less attractive the state will tend to be to 
migrants, ceteris paribus. Thus, we argue the following: 
 
 ∂Mi/∂Xi < 0       (7.7) 
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The variable Yi is the per capita income level in the ith state in the year 
1965. The use of some variable to measure per capita income or wage rates is a 
standard procedure in most migration studies. The conventional argument 
in these studies is that migrants are attracted, other things held constant, to 
areas that offer higher wages. In this chapter, however, it is argued that 
income (wage-rate) differentials among states are likely to exercise little or 
no impact on the migration of the elderly since, as table 7-2 shows, the 
latter  are, by  and  large,  not  full-time  participants  in  the  labor  market. 
Therefore, it is argued here that the relationship between Mi and Yi, what- 
ever its sign, will be statistically insignificant: 
 
   ∂Mi/∂Yi ≥ 0           (7.8) 
 
The actual regression equation to be estimated in this chapter is given 
by 
 
   M i =  a 0  +  a 1 D i  +  a 2 S i  +  a 3 Ti + a4 Pi    
    
  + a5 Ri + a6 Xi + a7 Yi +  u          (7. 9) 
 
where a 0= constant term 
u = error term 
 
 
Empirical Results 
 
Estimating regression equation 7.9 by ordinary least squares yields the 
following results: 
 
Mi = -13.63262 + 0.0616 Di - 0.2995 Si 
(+2.08) (+3.51) 
 
- 0.03663Ti + 0.0092 Pi + 0.0289 Ri 
(-2.65) (-0.51)      (+ 3.05) 
 
- 0.02071Xi - 0.00215 Yi 
(-1.18) (-0.75) 
 
DF = 40 R 2 = 0.49 (7.10) 
 
where the terms in parentheses are t-values. 
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Overall, these results are extremely encouraging: by and large, they 
confirm all of our hypotheses. To begin with, the model explains nearly 50 
percent of the variation in the rate of elderly net in-migration. Qualitatively 
speaking, all of the exogenous variables behaved as expected, that is, they 
all had the correct signs. As for specific results, the sunshine Si, cold 
temperature Ti , and recreation Ri variables were all statistically significant 
with the correct signs at beyond the 0.01 level; in addition, the medical care 
variable Di had the correct sign and was statistically significant at about the 
0.05 level. Although  the pollution  Pi  and tax Xi  variables  each had the 
correct  sign,  neither  was  statistically  significant  at  an  acceptable  level. 
Finally, the coefficient for the income variable had a negative sign, but was, · 
as hypothesized, not statistically significant at any acceptable level. 
The basic argument of this chapter has been that the primary type of 
determinant of elderly migration is the quality of life and that purely 
economic variables have a comparatively small impact on elderly migration. 
As evidence of the validity of our argument, we observe that the quality-of- 
life variables (combined) accounted for an R2 in equation 7.10 of about 0.48, 
while the purely economic variables (combined) accounted for an R2 in 
equation 7.10 of merely 0.01. That is, essentially 98 percent of the explana- 
tory power of our model was attributed to the quality-of-life variables, 
whereas less than 2 percent was associated with the purely economic vari- 
ables. This is in contrast to the results that might be expected in an analysis 
of total as opposed to only elderly migration. 11 
We may now refer to the specific components of the quality of life. 
Clearly, the elderly migrant tends to be quite sensitive to the availability of 
medical care. This same basic result has been obtained elsewhere in the 
analysis of total migration (Cebula and Vedder, 1973). Elderly migrants are 
also quite sensitive to climatic conditions, as evidenced by their apparent 
strong aversion to cold weather and attraction to sunshine. This is also 
consistent with other studies.12 Elderly migrants apparently also are quite 
sensitive to the availability of recreation facilities. On the other hand, there 
was little to indicate that they were particularly concerned about pollution 
levels in making their migration decisions. This relative insensitivity to the 
pollution variable has been found elsewhere in the analysis of total migra- 
tion (Cebula and Vedder, 1973). 
We now turn to the purely economic variables, per capita state and 
local government taxes Xi and per capita income Y i . Clearly, elderly 
migrants were not particularly sensitive to either of these variables. Especi- 
ally interesting is the coefficient for the income variable: it is both statis- 
tically insignificant and negative. This statistical insignificance is consistent 
with our argument above that, since the elderly are by-and-large retired or 
semi-retired, they are not expressly concerned with wage (income) levels 
when making migration decisions. The negative value for the income coeffi- 
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cient could well be expected given the fact that climatic conditions tend to 
be superior in states where per capita income levels are, on the average, 
below the national average, and climatic conditions tend to be inferior in 
states which, on the average, have per capita income levels that are above 
the national average. For example, the states of Florida, Arizona, Texas, 
and New Mexico combined to attract a preponderant majority (over 75 
percent) of all elderly net migration during 1965-1970 period; yet, the per 
capita income in each of these states was perceptibly below the national 
level. On the other hand, the states of New York and Illinois combined to 
experience a net loss of nearly fifty percent of all the elderly net migration; 
however, both of these states had per capita income levels well above the 
national average.13  
 
Conclusion 
 
In their study of total migration, Cebula and Vedder (1973, pp. 209-210) 
conclude that, empirically speaking, most 
 
…migrants seem to be interested in both explicit economic 
considerations, such as income, job opportunities, and potential 
growth in earnings (human capital gains), and in the more implicit 
(economic) considerations of an environmental nature. 
 
Liu (1975) has arrived at very similar conclusions in his more elaborate 
study of total migration. 
This chapter, by contrast, has argued that the elderly migrant, on the 
average, is primarily interested in noneconomic (that is, quality-of-life) 
considerations. Given the relatively low (and declining) labor force 
participation rate of the elderly, this hypothesis seems most reasonable. 
The strong empirical support for this hypothesis thus implies that elderly 
migrants do have primarily quality-of-life arguments in their location deci- 
sion calculus. The quality of life, therefore, should be a fine guide to fore- 
casting future migration patterns of the elderly in the United States. 
 
 
Notes 
 
1. See especially Sjaastad (1962) or Riew (1973). 
2. At the very least, labor-market conditions should be relatively less 
important to the elderly than to other pertinent age groups. 
3. Data source for Mi: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of the 
Population: 1970, Migration between State Economic Areas, Final Report 
PC(2) -E, Washington, D.C., 1972, Tables 2 and 3. 
4. Data source for Di: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract 
of the United States, 1968, Washington, D.C., 1968, Table 88. 
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5. Data source for Si: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract 
of the United States, 1968, Washington, D.C., 1968, Table 273. 
6. Data source for Ti: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract 
of the United States, 1968, Washington, D.C., 1968, Table 263. 
7. Data source for Pi: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract 
of the United States, 1968, Washington, D.C., 1968, Table 262. 
8. Data source for Ri: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract 
of the United States, 1968, Washington, D.C., 1968, Tables 291-292. 
9. Data source for Xi: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract 
of the United States, 1969, Washington, D.C., 1969, Table 594. 
10. Data source for Yi : U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract 
-of the United States, 1969, Washington, D.C., 1969, Table 469. 
11. Related to the analysis of total migration,  see Cebula and Vedder 
(1973) or Liu (1975). 
12. See Cebula and Vedder (1973), Liu (1975), and Kohn, Vedder, and 
Cebula (1973). 
13. Before this section is closed, it should be noted that there was no 
significant multi-collinearity among the independent variables in this study. 
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Introduction 
The Quality of Life and 
Migration:  A 
Generalized Model 
 
To some degree or in some fashion, the role of the quality of life in human 
migration decisions has been acknowledged in nearly all of the preceding 
chapters of this book. These chapters have found the quality of life to be at 
least a reasonably significant determinant of migration patterns in the 
United States. This finding is consistent with a number of already published 
studies, including those by Cebula and Vedder (1973), Chao and Renas 
(1976), Graves (1976), Greenwood (1969), Jones and Zannaras (1976), Kau 
and Sirmans (1976), Liu (1975), Miller (1973), Renas and Kumar (1978), 
and Vedder and Cooper (1974). 
The objective of this chapter is to develop a rigorous analysis of the 
migration impact of the quality of life in the United States. The present 
chapter seeks to deal with this issue more thoroughly and more directly than 
does the presently existing literature. 1 Hopefully, by thoroughly analyzing 
this topic, improved insight into the patterns of regional economic growth 
in the United States can ultimately be generated. 
2
 
 
 
A Basic Framework 
 
The basic framework of this chapter is one wherein the individual will 
migrate from one area to another area only if there are positive net benefits 
expected from the migration. As noted in chapter 4, the analysis of the 
expected net benefits from any migration requires the appraisal of both the 
costs and benefits expected as a result of the migration. 
As chapter 4 indicates, the costs and benefits associated with geo- 
graphic mobility may assume a large number of different forms. For the 
purposes of this chapter, it is assumed that all of the basic benefits and costs 
associated with geographic mobility can be classified into either of two 
distinct categories: (1) economic considerations and (2) quality-of-life 
considerations. 
In this chapter, economic considerations consist of those factors that 
affect the migrant's expected income. As chapter 6 illustrates, in the 
absence of money illusion, the expected income changes associated with 
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migration depend upon such factors as current income levels, the growth 
rate of current income, employment opportunities, and the cost of living. 
Next, quality-of-life considerations essentially consist of those aspects 
of human existence which af fect utility levels but which are not expressly 
economic in nature. The expected utility of the quality of life in any given 
geographic area is assumed, in this analysis, to be a function of two primary 
variables: climatic conditions and the perceived availability of amenities. 
Thus, the migrant is portrayed here as evaluating both differential 
income expectations and differential quality-of-life considerations in 
deciding where to reside. Given two areas, area A and area B, the flow (net 
or gross) of migrants from A to B, MAB, is then a function of economic 
considerations and quality-of-life considerations: 
 
MAB   = MAB (economic and quality of life considerations) (8.l ) 
 
Within this very general framework, the subsequent sections of this chapter 
develop an in-depth theoretical and empirical analysis of the relationship 
between migration patterns and the quality of life in the United States. 
 
A Generalized Theoretical Model 
 
In order to examine empirically the migration impact of the quality of life 
within a generalized model, the following migration equation is 
hypothesized: 
 
  Mi = Mi(Yi,  ∆Yi, Ci, Ui, Ei, DAi, DWi)            (8.2) 
 
 
where Mi = the net number of migrants into SMSA i between 1960 and 
1970, expressed a percentage of the 1960 population in 
SMSA i 
Yi = 
   ∆Yi = 
 
Ci = 
 
Ui = 
 
Ei = 
 
DAi = 
 
DWi = 
 
median family income in SMSA i, 1969 
annual rate of change of median family income in SMSA i, 
between 1959 and 1969, expressed in percentage terms 
average annual cost of living in SMSA i, 1970, for a four- 
person family with an intermediate budget 
average unemployment  rate of the civilian labor  force in 
SMSA i, 1960 
median school years completed, in 1960 , for the popula- 
tion twenty-five years of age and over, in SMSA i 
a dummy variable to indicate location of an SMSA in a 
warm weather state 
a dummy variable to indicate location of an SMSA in the 
western portion of the United States 
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Certain specific comments pertaining to this model and to the variables 
it embodies are in order. To begin with, in computing the variable Mi, the 
net number of in-migrants to SMSA i is divided by the total population in 
SMSA i. This is done to control for the population-size differentials that 
exist among the various SMSAs studied. There are actually some thirty- 
nine metropolitan areas for which adequate (appropriate) living-cost data 
are available; however, because of deficiencies in the migration data, only 
thirty-six of these metropolitan areas are studied here.3 Next, the two 
income variables, Yi and ∆Yi, both refer to median income rather than to 
per capita income. This specification follows the reasoning found in Graves 
(1976) that median family income is the preferred variable since the 
variation from state to state in the percentage of children, retired people, 
and other non-workers would make per capita income an imperfect measure 
of the expected income that could be obtained through migration. Finally, 
as in chapter 6, the annual rate of change of median family income, ∆Yi, is 
given by 
 
∆Yi = -1 + 10 times the square root of Y69i/Y59 i                                   (8.3) 
where Y
69
i = median family income in area i in 1969 
Y
59 
i   = median family income in area  i   in 1959 
In this model, the expected real income gain associated with net in- 
migration to SMSA i is treated as a function of  a set of  five independent 
variables: Yi, ∆Yi, Ci, Ui, and Ei . Following the reasoning in chapter 6 and 
in the studies by Pack (1973) and Pursell (1977), it is argued here that 
 
 ∂Mi/∂Yi, ∂Mi/∂∆Yi, ∂Mi/∂Ei > 0 
 
∂Mi/∂Ci, ∂Mi/∂Ui < 0     (8.4) 
 
For the migrant, these five variables, taken as a group, reflect the expected 
probability of obtaining gainful employment in area i and the expected real 
income which that employment would yield. 
In this analysis, the quality of life in an SMSA is thought to be basically 
reflected by two variables DAi and DWi: 
 
where DAi  =   a dummy variable used to indicate location of an SMSA in 
a warm weather state; if the SMSA is located in a warm 
weather state, the variable assumes a value of one, and if 
the SMSA is not located in a warm weather  state, the 
variable takes on a value of zero. 
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DWi = a dummy variable used to indicate location of an SMSA in a 
western state; if the SMSA is located in a western state, the 
variable assumes a value of one, and if the SMSA is not lo- 
cated in a western state, the variable takes on a value of zero. 
 
Table 2-1 of chapter 2 lists both the warm weather states and the western 
states. 
Following, Liu (1975), Greenwood (1969), and Cebula and Vedder 
(1973), it is argued here that, on the average, people prefer location in 
warmer or more moderate climates to location in relatively colder climates. 
Hence, it is expected here that 
 
  ∂Mi/∂DAi > 0      (8.5)  
In addition, as Liu (1975) notes, people generally view the western portion 
of the United States as being relatively more amenity rich than elsewhere in 
the nation. Hence, it is also argued here that 
   
 
∂Mi/∂DWi > 0      (8.6) 
 
Before proceeding to the actual empirical estimation, it is worth noting 
that the present analysis differs from other related studies in that it deals 
with the migration impact of the quality of life at the same time that it 
introduces a set of several explicitly economic variables, all of which are 
aimed at measuring income expectations. In other words, this analysis deals 
with a relatively more complete set of explicitly economic variables than do 
most other studies dealing with migration and the quality of life. 
 
The Empirical Analysis 
 
The actual migration equation to be estimated here is given by 
 
  Mi = ao + a1 Yi + a2 ∆Yi + a3 Ci + a4 Yi 
    + a5 Ei + a6 Dai + a7 DWi + u   (8.7) 
 
          where ao = constant 
   u = error term 
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 Estimating equation 8.7 by ordinary least squares yields the following set 
of results: 
Mi = -35.294 + 0.000207 Yi + 909.828 ∆Yi - 0.004 Ci – 1.66512 Ui 
(1.38)       (11.73)          (6.24)  (4.09) 
  + 21.193 Ei + 4.08004 DAi + 9.64375 DWi,  
  (3.11) (3.02) (8.62) 
DF = 28, R2 = 0.74, F= 11.202    (8.8) 
 
where terms in parentheses are unsigned t- values.4 
Overall, these results are quite encouraging. To begin with, all seven of the 
exogenous variables exhibit the correct signs. Next, with the exception of the 
coefficient for the income variable, all of the estimated coefficients are 
statistically significant at the 0.09 level or better. The coefficient of 
determination has a value of 0.74, so that the model explains nearly three-fourths 
of the total net migration to these SMSAs. Finally, the F-ratio is statistically 
significant at well beyond the 0.01 level. 
Before making an in-depth evaluation of the regression results in equation 
8.8, it will be helpful to refer to Tables 8-1 and 8-2. In Table 8-1, the change 
in R2 attributable to each of the exogenous variables in equation 8.8 is shown. 
This information indicates how each of these variables contributes to the overall 
explanatory power of the model. In Table 8-2, the means and standard 
deviations of the exogenous variables are presented. This permits the reader to 
evaluate more precisely the regression coefficients shown in equation 8.8. 
Let us now consider the results in equation 8.8 in somewhat greater depth. 
To begin, except for the income variable Yi, all of the variables used to measure 
income expectations are statistically significant determinants of net migration to 
the thirty-six SMSAs studied. In fact, as Table 8-1 indicates, these five 
variables (combined) contribute over 0.56 to the R2 of the equation. This result 
lends further empirical support to the argument of Sjaastad (1962) that the 
expected economic benefits from migration are extremely important 
components of a migrant's location-decision calculus. 
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Table 8-1 
Change in R 2 Attributable to Exogenous Variables 
 
 
Variable Change in R' 
 
 
Yi 
∆Yi 
Ci 
                            Ui 
Ei 
DAi 
DWi 
0.001 
0.276 
0.059 
0.022 
0.205 
0.083 
0.092 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8-2 
Means and Standard Deviations of Exogenous Variables 
 
Variable 
 
Yi 
∆
Y
i 
Ci 
                            
Ui 
Ei 
DAi 
DWi 
 
Mean 
 
I0.582.03 
Standard Deviation 
 
995.54 
∆Yi 
 
0.05 0.01 
Ci 
 
10,566.47 740.97 
Ui 
 
4.64 1.34 
Ei 11.24 0.86 
DAi 0.39 0.49 
DWi 0.17 0.38 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8-3 
Correlation 
Matrix 
 
 
Yi Ui DWi DAi, Ei Ci 
Ui -0.07 
DWi 0.06 0.38 
DAi  -0.39 0.12 0.25 
E; 0.29   -0.12 0.36              0.07 
Ci 0.65 0.05 0.06 -0.36 0.08 
  ∆Yi           0.03 -0.51       -0.51           0.19        0.l l          -0.20 
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We turn now to the two quality-of-life variables in the model. The 
dummy variable for warm weather, DAi, is statistically significant at the 
0.09 level with the correct sign. The dummy variable for western location, 
DWi, is statistically significant at well beyond the 0.01 level with the correct 
sign. Moreover, as shown in Table 8-1, the variables DAi and DWi con- 
tribute R2
 
values of 0.083 and 0.092, respectively, to the total explanatory 
power of the model.5 From these results, we conclude that, as argued by Liu 
(1975) and Cebula and Vedder (1973), the quality of life exercises a very 
important impact on geographic mobility in the United States. 
Before proceeding to the concluding section of this chapter, it is 
appropriate to refer to Table 8-3, which lists the zero-order correlation 
coefficients for the exogenous variables in this analysis. As shown in this 
table, there appear to be no major problems of multi-collinearity in this 
system.6 
 
 
Summary and Observations 
 
The empirical findings in this chapter indicate that both economic variables 
and quality-of-life variables enter as significant arguments in the migrant's 
location decision. Migrants are found, on the average, to be drawn to areas 
where their expected incomes are likely to be greater, ceteris paribus. In 
addition, migrants are attracted to areas having a perceived better quality of 
life, ceteris paribus. The latter fact notwithstanding, however, it should be 
stressed that, as shown in table 8-1, the income-expectations variables 
appear to be quantitatively far more important in the migration decision of 
the average migrant than do the quality-of-life variables. 7 
One question that arises from this analysis concerns the possible roles 
of migration and the quality of life in determining the pattern of regional 
growth rates. For instance, it might by hypothesized that the rate of average 
income growth over time in a geographic area may be profoundly affected 
by such factors as the rate of net in-migration to the area and the nature of 
the quality of life in the area. 
To examine this possibility, we estimate the following regression: 
 
 ∆Yi = b0 + b1 Mi + b2 DWi + b3 DAi + b4 Ei + u   (8.9) 
 
where  b0 = constant 
u = stochastic error term 
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Estimating equation 8.9 by ordinary least squares yields the following 
empirical results: 
∆Yi = + 0.06214 + 0.0004 Mi 
(+ 26.54) 
 
- 0.00802 DWi - 0.00133 Ei 
(+ 25 .54) (+1.32) 
 
+ 0.00044 DAi, 
(+0.16) 
 
DF = 31 R 
2 
= 0.67 F = 15.397 (8 .10) 
 
where terms in parentheses are t-statistics. 
This very elementary analysis confirms the notion that net migration 
and quality-of-life considerations may each play a very significant role in 
determining the annual growth rate of median income in a region.8 Never- 
theless, given the simplicity of equation 8.9 and given the complexity of the 
issue at hand, the estimation in equation 8.10 should merely serve to open 
the door to further investigations.9 Such investigations would seem especi- 
ally pertinent in this era of the energy-crisis, where the future long-term 
prosperity of the sunbelt states appears to be very promising. 
 
 
Notes 
 
1. Liu (1975) examines the effects on total net interstate migration of 
the quality of life by constructing indexes of the quality of life and of other 
factors. In all, he uses well over one hundred variables in his analysis. Given 
such a large number of variables, it is very difficult to develop an adequate 
way in which to interpret and apply his various empirical results. Most other 
related studies deal with only one quality-of-life variable, usually a climate 
variable such as cold weather. 
2. Although the issue of regional economic growth is briefly addressed 
at the end of this chapter, there is no attempt made in this book to develop a 
rigorous and formal theoretical or empirical model of regional economic 
growth processes. Such an effort would lie far beyond the scope of this 
book. 
3. The three SMSAs having adequate living-cost data but lacking other 
needed data were Boston, Mass., Hartford, Conn., and Portland, Maine. 
For a complete list of the thirty-six SMSAs studied here, see the first end 
note in chapter 5 of this book. 
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4. Recall that the F-statistic is the square of the t-value; hence, it is 
always a positive value. 
5. Thus, the variables DA; and DW; combined provide approximately 
24 percent of the actual explanatory power of the model. 
6. Extensions of this migration model might include such variables as 
the rate of change of the cost of living (as in Renas and Kumar, 1978 and 
Werthwein, 1978), pollution levels (as in Cebula and Vedder, 1973 and 
chapters 7 and 9 of this book), and congestion. 
7. This conclusion contrasts sharply with the findings in chapter 7, 
where the emphasis is strictly on the migration of the elderly. 
8. Dropping off the statistically insignificant variables from equation 
8.10 and re-estimating by ordinary least squares yields 
 
∆Yi = + 0.05312 + 0.00042 Mi - 0.00804 DWi 
(+ 36.13) (+34.65) 
 
DF = 33 R2 = 0.65 F = 30.178 
 
where terms in parentheses are t-statistics. 
Clearly, these results are entirely compatible with those in equation 
8.10. 
9. Such investigations would necessarily involve the development of 
multi-equation systems to be estimated by the two-stage least squares 
method or by some similar alternative method. Pertaining to this and 
related issues, see Gallaway and Cebula (1972), Hartman and Seckler 
(1967), and Richardson (1973) and (1974). 
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Introduction 
Government Policies 
and Migration Patterns 
in the United States 
 
Government policies influence society in a wide variety of ways through 
taxation, transfer, and expenditure activities. As taxation, transfers, and 
expenditures are carried out, income redistribution and variations in the 
levels of burdens and benefits from governmental action are experienced. 
For instance, when a governmental unit increases the level of welfare bene- 
fits, it further redistributes income through a taxation-transfer process. 
Alternatively, whenever a governmental unit raises the levels of, say, educa- 
tional spending and of taxes, there will likely result a myriad of additional 
benefits and costs for the various members of the society. 
Considerations such as these were to lead Professor Charles M. Tiebout 
(1956, p. 418) to hypothesize: 
 
. . . the consumer-voter may be viewed as picking that community which 
best satisfies his preference pattern for public goods . . . the consumer- 
voter moves to that community whose local government best satisfies his 
set of preferences. 
 
Professor Tiebout was essentially arguing that diff erences among local gov- 
ernments in the mix and amounts of various public goods and services pro- 
vided will, other things being held the same, influence the pattern of human 
migration. 
More recently, within a somewhat different context, Gordon Tullock 
(1971, p. 917) has made a rather similar statement: “The individual decid- 
ing where to live will take into account the private effects upon him of the 
bundle of government services and taxes…” Tullock's statement differs 
slightly from Tiebout's in that it explicitly introduces the notion that differ- 
ential local government tax systems (that is, both methods and levels of 
taxation) also may influence human locations decisions. 
The idea that, other things held the same, people move in order to 
express effectively their preferences for publicly provided goods and ser- 
vices may be referred to as voting with one's feet. Consumers, as indepen- 
dent individuals, usually can do little by themselves to change local govern- 
ment policies. On the other hand, individuals potentially can to a large 
degree consume the public goods they desire by locating in the area most 
compatible with their preference pattern. 
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1 
 
In order to illustrate in succinct, formal terms the idea of voting with 
one's feet, let us assume for simplicity that an individual can move to either 
of two areas (regions), area A or area B. Associated with residing in area A, 
the consumer can expect to receive a certain gross income, say YA. Likewise, 
in area B, his expected gross income would be YB. . Going further, residence 
in area A would presumably mean a tax liability for the consumer of value 
TA, whereas residence in area B would involve a tax liability of T8. Hence, 
the consumer's expected disposable money income in area A, YdA, would 
be:  
      
     YdA = YA - TA                                            (9.1) 
Similarly, his expected disposable money income in area B, YdB , would be 
     YdB = YB- TB                                             (9.2) 
In figure 9-1, the consumer is shown, if he resides in area A, to be con- 
suming CA units of public goods. His disposable money income in area A is 
YdA; hence, given the price of private goods x in area A as PxA , he can con- 
sume YdA/PxA units of x and CA units of public goods while residing in area 
A. Observe that the budget constraint is now perfectly vertical, unlike con- 
ventional consumer theory, where it is negatively sloped. 
In figure 9-2, the consumer is shown, if he decides to reside in area B, 
to be consuming CB units of public goods. His disposable money income in 
area B is YdB; therefore, given the price of private goods in area B as value 
PxB, the individual then can consume YdB/PxB units of x and CB units of 
public goods when residing in area B. As in figure 9-1, the consumer's 
budget constraint is perfectly vertical. 
In figures 9-1 and 9-2, the highest attainable utility levels for the con- 
sumer are IA and IB, respectively. The consumer presumably will move to 
whichever of these two particular areas places him at the higher utility level 
(that is, on the higher indifference curve). 
Clearly, if real income differentials between areas are small, then com- 
parison of the real tax burden and the real expenditures on public goods in 
each community with those of other communities determines the location 
decision. Other things equal, the individual prefers communities with lower 
real tax burdens, since with a lower real tax burden his disposable real 
income for purchasing private-sector commodities is greater and hence so is 
his utility level. Moreover, other things equal, the individual prefers com- 
munities providing higher real levels of public expenditures, so long as those 
expenditures are of a variety he can directly consume or vicariously benefit 
from in a meaningful way. 
There are two possible interpretations of the Tiebout-Tullock hypothe- 
sis of voting with one's feet. On the one hand, areas A and B may be inter- 
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C (Public Goods)  
| 
| 
| 
| 
|                               IA 
|                               . 
|           . 
|                                  .      
|__________________. CA 
|     | .  
|     |   . 
|__________________ |__________________________________X (Private Goods) 
   YdA/PxA 
 
Figure 9-1. Maximum Utility in Area A 
 
C (Public Goods) 
|                IB 
|                 . 
|                  . 
|                     . 
|                       . 
|____________ . CB 
|    |  . 
|    |     . 
|    |         . 
|    |              . 
|    |                    
|    | 
|    | 
|    | 
|    |  
|___________ _|______________________________________X (Private Goods) 
  YdB/PxB 
 
Figure 9-2. Maximum Utility in Area B 
 
preted as being relatively close to one another, perhaps in the very same 
metropolitan area. This is indeed the precise context of Tullock's argument, 
and, moreover, it is the original interpretation of Tiebout's argument (see, 
for example, (Oates, 1969; Schmalensee, 1976). On the other hand, a more 
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recent interpretation has been that areas A and B may alternatively be geo- 
graphically quite distant from one another. In point of fact, recent years 
have witnessed a proliferation of studies adopting the latter interpretation 
(see, for example, Barsby and Cox, 1975; Chao and Renas, 1976; DeJong 
and Donnelly, 1973; Glantz, 1974; Kau and Sirmans, 1976; Kleiner and 
McWilliams, 1977; Pack, 1973; Riew, 1973; and Sommers and Suits, 1973). 
The simple framework developed here is flexible enough to accommodate 
either of the above two interpretations; among other things, it also explicitly 
allows for the following sets of measurable factors in the location decision 
calculus: 
 
1. differential income levels 
2. differential local government policies 
 
Clearly, both of these sets of factors may vary greatly if areas A and B 
are geographically distant. In addition, although these factors may differ to a 
lesser degree within a given metropolitan area, they nevertheless can 
(potentially) vary by a good bit even then. 
Obviously, this analytical framework can be easily applied (expanded) 
to any number of areas (regions). In the many-area case, the consumer 
logically would choose that area from among his various alternatives which 
maximizes his utility level. 
 
 
Two Hypotheses Relating Government Policies 
to Migration 
 
The basic objective of this chapter is to investigate, in principle, the impact 
on human migration of state and local government expenditure and income 
redistribution policies. This analysis is directed at two specific policies: the 
per capita level of state and local government non-welfare expenditures 
and the average level, per recipient, of welfare benefits. By empirically 
investigating the two hypotheses (A and B) formulated below, this chapter 
seeks to test the validity of the Tiebout (-Tullock) hypothesis of voting 
with one's feet. 
In order to carry out the analysis, attention will be focused upon two 
types of migrants: white migrants and black migrants. A much larger pro- 
portion of blacks than of whites is eligible for welfare benefits. Thus, it may 
be expected that the level of welfare benefits will act as a stronger attraction 
to black would-be migrants 2 than to their white counterparts. In addition, 
by virtue of the fact that welfare benefits represent a redistribution of 
income from the economically better off to the economically worse off, 
whites may tend to view areas with higher welfare benefits as areas that, on 
average, redistribute income from themselves to others. Thus, ceteris pari- 
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bus, the would-be white migrants may be expected to gravitate to areas with 
lower levels of welfare benefits. The present chapter in part investigates 
whether in fact welfare benefits tend to have these opposing effects on white 
and black migrants. This will be referred to as hypothesis A. 
On the other hand, the higher the per capita level of combined state 
plus local government non-welfare spending, presumably the higher the level 
of general benefits per capita derived from such spending. In turn, the 
higher the level of such spending in an area, the more attractive the area will 
tend to be to would-be migrants, black and white. However, to the extent 
that higher per capita state-local government expenditure levels imply 
higher levels of local tax burdens per capita and that whites view their share 
of the tax burden as relatively greater per capita than that of blacks, higher 
levels of per capita local government spending may be expected to be more 
potent an attracting influence on black migrants than on white migrants. In 
point of fact, higher levels of per capita non-welfare public spending 
may even act as a net deterrent to white migrants. The present chapter in 
part, then, seeks to investigate whether in fact the level of per capita local 
government spending is a more potent positive attraction to black migrants 
than to white migrants. This is referred to as hypothesis B. 
Aside from the presence of hypotheses A and B above, this study dif- 
fers from other related studies in at least two ways. First, the models exam- 
ined here are more complete than in other studies. Specifically, this study 
simultaneously includes (1) multiple purely economic variables, (2) a quality 
of life variable, and (3) multiple public-policy variables. Second, the 
models examined here are not in pure linear form; that is, unlike other 
related studies, the present study allows the dependent variable (migration) 
to be related in a nonlinear fashion to the various exogenous variables in the 
analysis. 
 
 
The Basic Migration Model 
 
In order to investigate hypotheses A and B empirically, the following net 
migration model is postulated: 
 
(9.3) 
 
where Mi = 
Yi = 
Ui  =  
Wi = 
Ei = 
Pi  = 
a measure of net in-migration to state i  
a measure of the average income level in state i 
a measure of the average unemployment rate in state i 
a measure of average welfare benefit levels in state i 
a measure of the average level of state plus local government 
nonwelfare expenditures in state i 
a measure of the level (degree) of air pollution in state i 
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 The variable Mi is used to measure migration of whites on the one hand 
and migration of blacks on the other. Mi is defined then as the ratio of the 
net migration of whites or blacks to state i between 1960 and 1970 to the 
total population of state i in 1960. Mi is formulated thus in order to control 
for variations in the population among the states considered. The migration 
data were obtained for forty-eight states (Alaska and Hawaii were excluded 
from the study). 
The variable Yi refers to the per capita personal income level of whites 
or blacks for the year 1960. In accord with conventional economic theory, it 
is assumed that white and black migration should each be directly related to 
white and black income, respectively, so that: 
 
 
     ∂Mi/∂Yi > 0    (9.4) 
 
 
The variable Ui measures the average unemployment rate for whites on 
the one hand and for blacks on the other hand. The variable Ui was 
obtained by averaging the 1960 and 1970 unemployment rates for whites 
and for blacks, respectively. The expected relationship between migration 
(white or black) and the unemployment rate is 
 
 
     ∂Mi/∂Ui < 0    (9.5) 
 
The reasoning here is quite simple. In particular, for those whose movement 
between states is not merely of the job-transfer variety, the higher the 
unemployment rate in a state, the greater the uncertainty (risk) associated 
with obtaining employment in that state tends to be. 
To measure welfare benefits, Wi , data on monthly payments in the year 
1971 to welfare recipients in the form of aid to families with dependent chil- 
dren (AFDC) by state were gathered. Since our proxy for welfare levels 
effectively may represent a form of benefit (that is, unemployment benefit 
and/or income) for those eligible for such payments, the following 
relationship may be expected: 
 
 
     ∂Mi/∂Wi > 0    (9.6a) 
 
 
 
In accord with our earlier comments, however, we would expect blacks to 
be differentially more responsive to welfare benefits than whites. In particu- 
lar, since a larger proportion of blacks is eligible for welfare benefits, blacks 
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can be expected to be more attracted by welfare benefits than whites. In 
addition, since whites may view higher welfare benefits in an area as imply- 
ing a higher degree of unfavorable net income redistribution, they can be 
expected to be less attracted to areas with higher welfare benefits than 
blacks. In fact, it is entirely possible that, ceteris paribus, they may prefer to 
move to areas with lower welfare benefits; thus, while blacks may be argued 
to conform to 9.6, for whites it may well be that 
 
   ∂Mi/∂Wi < 0     (9.6b) 
 
The measure Ei, data were assembled on total (non-welfare) direct per 
capita expenditures of state and local governments in 1970. These expendi- 
tures include spending for education, highways, and health and hospitals. 
In accord with our earlier arguments, Ei presumably may represent, for 
blacks, a form of benefit, so that the higher the level of Ei in a state, the 
more attractive residence in that state. Thus, for black migrants, it is 
hypothesized that 
 
   ∂Mi/∂Ei > 0     (9.7a) 
 
 
The impact of Ei on white migration may not be quite so clear-cut, 
however. As argued above, while higher levels of Ei may imply greater 
benefits for whites, they may also imply higher levels of local taxation and 
on average an increased degree of unfavorable income redistribution. Thus, 
the relationship between M i  (for whites) and the variable Ei is not a priori 
determinate: 
 
  ∂Mi/∂Ei > 0 or < 0     (9.7b) 
 
 
 
To measure air pollution, Pi, data were assembled measuring sus- 
pended particulate matter by state for the year 1966. Presumably, higher 
pollution rates impose greater disutility on individuals, ceteris paribus. 
Thus, the following relationship would be expected for whites and blacks 
alike: 
 
 
 
  ∂Mi/∂Pi > 0      (9.8) 
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Profile of the Welfare Data 
 
The welfare system in the United States has come under fire from many 
different quarters in recent years (see, for example, Cebula 1976). The most 
common criticism of the system pertains to its benefit structure. As Orr 
(1976, p. 359) has stated: 
 
One of the dominant features of the U.S. income transfer system is the 
great disparity in benefits available to similarly situated persons in differ- 
ent political jurisdictions. 
 
Given this feature of our welfare system, it may be of interest and 
utility to examine the raw welfare data used in the estimations presented in 
the next section of this chapter. As noted earlier, the models to be estimated 
in this study utilize the AFDC level for 1971. These data, along with AFDC 
data for the years 1965 and 1975, are provided in Table 9-1. As shown, 
the interstate disparities are enormous; in 1965, the ratio of the highest 
AFDC level to the lowest is over 6:1. Moreover, the extreme AFDC 
disparities persist from one year to the next: there is absolutely no sign of a 
trend toward relative uniformity (that is, less disparity). It is little wonder 
we hypothesize that low-income persons residing in low-welfare areas 
may be strongly attracted by the prospects of much higher welfare benefits 
elsewhere.4 
 
Table 9-l 
Average Monthly Aid to Families with Dependent Children, per Family, by 
State 
 
State 1965 1971 1975  
Alabama 48 59 95  
Alaska 130 216 283  
Arizona 121 120 134  
Arkansas 65 97 123  
California 179 204 264  
Colorado 138 174 207  
Connecticut 177 245 263  
Delaware 128 123 194  
Florida 59 92 124  
Georgia 89 102 100  
Hawaii 172 285 339  
Idaho 152 205 250  
Illinois 186 238 279  
Indiana 110 148 168  
Iowa 156 194 276  
Kansas 15l 168 222  
Kentucky 88 1 19 179  
Louisiana 101 88 122  
Maine 109 147 172  
Maryland 142 161 184  
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Table 9-1 continued  
State 1965 1971  1975  
Massachusetts 170 252 
 
382 
 
Michigan 141 228  287  
Minnesota 162 236  266  
Mississippi 33 55  49  
Missouri 98 110  140  
Montana 144 153  165  
Nebraska 118 152  206  
Nevada 123 110  150  
New Hampshire 156 210  230  
New Jersey 195 256  275  
New Mexico 122 116  139  
New York 197 288  357  
North Carolina 97 118  155  
North Dakota 164 206  247  
Ohio 124 161  204  
Oklahoma 130 136  189  
Oregon 152 174  247  
Pennsylvania 141 239  286  
Rhode Island 148 229  247  
South Carolina 60 76  90  
South Dakota 122 160  205  
Tennessee 95 105  105  
Texas 91 116  109  
Utah 138 186  239  
Vermont 113 232  273  
Virginia 104 175  193  
Washington 145 197  257  
West Virginia 107 118  167  
Wisconsin 174 245  298  
Wyoming 136 147  176  
Sources:  U.S.  Bureau  of  the  Census, Statistical  Abstract of   the United  States, 1973, 
Washington, D.C., 1973, Table 490; U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the 
United States, 1977, Washington, D.C., 1977, Table 492. 
 
 
Empirical Findings 
 
Conceptually, what is proposed in this chapter is the estimation for white 
migration and for black migration of log-linear regression equations of the 
following form: 
 
log Mi  = a + b log Yi  + c log Ui 
+ d log Wi + e log Ei + f log Pi + µ (9.9) 
 
where a = constant 
µ = error term 
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The ordinary least squares estimations of regression 9.9 for white 
migration and for black migration are given in equations 9.10 and 9.11, 
respectively: 
 
log Mi = -0.75953 + 0.34686 log Yi 
(+ 3.31) 
- 0.04180 log Wi - 0.12585 log Ui 
(-0.76) ( -2.88) 
 
- 0.01661 log E; - 0.0682 log Pi 
   (-0.14) (-1.68) 
 
       DF = 42     R2 = 0.54                                         (9.10) 
 
log Mi = - 2.04582 + 0.00528 log Yi 
(+ 0.04) 
 
- 0.11868 log Ui + 0.29580 log Wi 
(-1.13) (+2.49) 
 
+ 0.54669 log Ei - 0.00661 log Pi 
(+ 2.37) (-0.07) 
 
  DF = 42 R2 = 0.67                                        (9.11) 
 
where the terms in parentheses are t-values. We first analyze the regression 
results for white migration in equation 9.10. The income variable worked as 
hypothesized and was statistically significant at the one percent level. This 
conforms to the conventional wisdom. The unemployment variable had the 
hypothesized sign but was not statistically significant at even the 10 percent 
level. The welfare variable showed up with a negative coefficient and was 
statistically significant at the one percent level. This confirms the hypothesis in 
equation 9.6b that whites view a higher welfare level as implying, on average, a 
more unfavorable net income redistribution. Thus, they tend to gravitate to states 
where the welfare benefits per recipient are lower, ceteris paribus. The 
expenditures variable, Ei turned up with a negative coefficient, but was not 
statistically significant at even the 10 percent level. The possibility of a negative 
coefficient was indicated by 9.7b above, where it was suggested that whites on 
the average may view a higher level of Ei not only as implying higher benefits 
from the public sector but also higher taxation and a higher degree of unfavor- 
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 able income redistribution as well. Finally, the pollution variable showed up 
with the hypothesized sign and was statistically significant at the 5 percent 
level. Apparently, white migrants prefer lower pollution rates to higher 
pollution rates, ceteris paribus. The statistical significance for Pi is contrary 
to that of an earlier study of total migration between metropolitan areas in 
the United States for the 1960-68 period (see Cebula and Vedder, 1973). 
We next interpret the regression results on black migration in 9.11. The 
income variable here had the hypothesized sign but was not statistically 
significant at even the 10 percent level. This apparent insensitivity of 
migrants to wage differentials has been found elsewhere, but it has been 
shown to be compatible with conventional wage theory under certain condi- 
tions (see chapters l and 4). The unemployment variable Ui had the hypoth- 
esized sign but, as in the case of white migration, this variable was not 
statistically significant at even the 10 percent level. The welfare variable, 
Wi here had the hypothesized sign (see 9.6) and was statistically significant 
at the 1 percent level. This is in sharp contrast to the results on white migra- 
tion in regression 9.10. Next, as hypothesized in 9.7a, the public expendi- 
tures variable Ei had a positive coefficient. In addition, Ei was a statistically 
significant determinant of black interstate net migration. Thus, the level of 
public non-welfare expenditures, as a proxy for public benefits, apparently 
acts as a potent lure to black migrants. Finally, although the pollution vari- 
able, Pi had the expected sign, it was not significant at even the 10 percent 
level. This is in contrast to the results in 9.10 on white migration but is 
consistent with another recent study, that by Cebula and Vedder (1973).5 
 
 
Concluding Remarks and Implications 
 
We may now proceed to comment on the validity of hypotheses A and B. As 
formulated in this chapter and summarized in equations 9.6 and 9.6a. 
Hypothesis A argues that white migrants and black migrants will have 
opposing reactions to the level of welfare benefits in an area, that is, whites 
will be attracted to areas with lower welfare benefits and blacks will be 
attracted to areas with higher welfare benefits. As equations 9.10 and 9.11 
and the discussions thereof indicate, the interstate migration patterns of 
whites and blacks strongly support hypothesis A. One may thus infer that 
state-local income redistribution policies may be significant determinants 
of human migration, with higher levels of welfare deterring whites on the 
one hand and attracting blacks on the other. 
As our equations 9.7a and 9.7b indicate, hypothesis B holds that blacks 
seeking benefits will be attracted to areas of higher per capita (nonwelfare) 
public expenditures, whereas whites, because higher per capita public 
expenditures imply higher taxation and a higher average degree of unfavor- 
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able net income redistribution, may be expected to be less responsive to, and 
perhaps even deterred by, higher per capita public (nonwelfare) spending. 
Regression result 9.11 clearly lends support to hypothesis B, with blacks 
being attracted to areas with higher public (nonwelfare) expenditures. Re- 
gression result 9.10, by contrast, indicates that the level of public (nonwel- 
fare) spending was not a potent net influence on white migrants. This is con- 
sistent with hypothesis B, as represented in equation 9.7b. 
It appears, from the results summarized in equations 9.10 and 9.11, that 
there is considerable empirical support for the Tiebout (-Tullock) hypoth- 
esis that state and local government policies have had a significant impact 
on the interstate allocation of human resources in the United States. To a 
large degree, welfare levels and nonwelfare state-plus-local government 
expenditures in the United States are determined by essentially independent 
political bodies, bodies that are not coordinated to influence geographic 
population distribution in a socially optimal fashion. Consequently, the 
fact that such policies influence the spatial allocation of human resources 
leads one to infer that the policies in question probably act significantly to 
distort resource allocation. 6 
Hence, the idea of establishing uniform welfare (and other) policies 
throughout the United States is intuitively attractive.7 Welfare uniformity 
should, in theory, act to remove welfare considerations from the locational 
decision calculus. 8 Nevertheless, since living-cost differentials also influ- 
ence migration patterns (see chapter 5), welfare-benefit levels should 
probably be made to approximate uniformity in real terms. A uniform real 
welfare system-which is feasible, given currently available geographic 
living-cost data-seems most appealing indeed; moreover, failure to 
provide living-cost allowances within the system may well render welfare 
reform a potential disaster. 
 
Notes 
 
1. "Income" includes earned income plus public welfare, as well as 
other income sources. Note that, if an individual is a would-be welfare 
recipient, his income can vary (very substantially, in some cases) from one 
area to the next. 
2. This is suggested in the papers by DeJong and Donnelly (1973), Kau 
and Sirmans (1976), Kleiner and McWilliams (1977), Pack (1973), and 
Sommers and Suits (1973). 
3. This consists of micrograms per cubic meter of air of particles of 
smoke, dust and fumes and droplets of viscous liquid remaining in the air 
for varying periods of time. 
4. Similar disparities among the states in the level of nonwelfare 
expenditures, especially education, also exist. 
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5. Observe here that the results presented in regressions 9.10 and 9.11 
involve elasticities, not coefficients per se. 
6. Ultimately,  such  distortions  are  reflected  by  diminished  output 
growth or higher prices or other higher costs in the economy. 
7. Related to such a welfare scheme, see the comments by Orr (1976). 
8. This would theoretically then eliminate the labor market distortions 
of the current welfare system. 
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Part III 
Needs for Change in Future 
Migration Research 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
         
Introduction 
 
The first part of this book develops a rigorous model of geographic mobil- 
ity, while the second part of this book both theoretically and empirically 
examines the impact on migration of a number of significant variables. This 
third section consists of two chapters which help to isolate basic changes that 
are necessary for the improvement of future migration research. 
Chapter 10 serves essentially three basic functions. First, it summarizes 
the principal findings of empirical studies that have investigated the impact 
on migration of geographically different state and local public policies. 
Among the many public policies examined by this particular literature are 
welfare benefit levels, property tax levels, and levels of spending on public 
education. Second, this chapter examines some of the possible economic 
implications of this literature to date. Among other things, it concludes that 
the existing structure of geographically different state and local public 
policies leads to severe factor-market distortions. Furthermore, these factor-
market distortions are alleged both to distort patterns of regional economic 
growth in the United States and to contribute significantly to the financial 
problems of many state and local governments. Third, this chapter points 
out the basic shortcomings of the migration literature in question and then 
offers a number of specific suggestions for improving the quality of 
future research in the area of migration. 
Unlike chapter 10, chapter 11 does not summarize the findings of 
specific empirical studies. Instead, chapter 11 concentrates on certain rather 
widespread problems and deficiencies of the non-policy migration 
literature as a whole. 
The first issue addressed in this chapter is that of properly specifying 
the migration variable. By expanding the scope of the migration models 
developed in chapter 4, chapter 11 indicates how to specify properly the 
migration variable in models of either gross migration or net migration. 
The next issue addressed in this chapter is that of properly specifying 
exogenous variables. It is pointed out that, for the most part, the migration 
literature has failed to deal adequately with geographical living-cost differ- 
entials and variables that measure the quality of life. It is also argued that 
the literature has failed to specify income variables properly and to distin- 
guish appropriately between total income received and earned income. 
The last major issue raised in this chapter concerns theoretical models 
of migration behavior. It is argued that most studies of migration fail alto- 
gether to develop a rigorous theoretical behavioral model. It is pointed out 
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that, typically, migration studies contain only very cursory analytical models; 
most such studies rely very largely on merely ad hoc, intuitive arguments. 
In the final analysis, while chapter 11 identifies certain very common 
problems in the migration literature, it also indicates reasonable ways in 
which to eliminate, or at least to lessen, the existing problems in this 
literature. In fact, chapters l0 and 11 both are aimed at identifying ways in 
which to improve the quality, and hence the usefulness, of future migration 
research. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Migration Impact of 
Public Policies: A 
Critique of the 
Literature 
 
 
Introduction 
 
As West, Hamilton, and Loomis (1976) have observed, the United States 
Commission on Population Growth and the American Future (Population 
and the American Future, 1972, Vol. 5) has focused attention on population 
distribution as a major national policy issue and concern. In the United 
States, both birth rates and death rates are comparatively stable; conse- 
quently, internal migration is presently the major short-run determinant of 
changes in population distribution. This migration occurs largely as a result 
of voluntary decisions made by individuals in response to economic, social, 
and political factors. Policies that modify the political, social, and 
economic environment may induce or discourage these population 
movements. Consequently, it is extremely important that we try to under- 
stand, in pragmatic terms, precisely how current types of government 
policies affect geographic mobility. 
Recent years have witnessed the proliferation of numerous research 
projects seeking to ascertain the relationship between state and local 
government policies and human migration patterns. The specific policies 
considered, the empirical techniques adopted, the specification of models, 
and the data bases used have all been very diverse. Given the extremely 
important policy implications that may be derived from this type of 
research, it is essential for us to have a sound basic knowledge of the 
research findings obtained to date; moreover, it is essential for us to under- 
stand the shortcomings of this research so that future research may produce 
more relevant and more fruitful insights. Accordingly, this chapter surveys 
the principal research contributions on the migration impact of state and 
local government policies and then offers a number of suggestions for 
improved research efforts for this area in the future. 
The following section surveys the literature pertaining to the relation- 
ship between public assistance (welfare) levels and migration patterns. Then 
the next section surveys the relationship between migration and nonwelfare 
state and local government policies, that is, tax levels and levels of nonwel- 
fare spending. After this, some general economic implications of the main 
findings in the survey sections are considered. Finally, a plea for some 
specific, basic changes in the research undertaken in this general area is 
made. 
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The Literature on Welfare and Migration 
 
Although there are potentially several different public policy variables that 
could have been analyzed by researchers, it turns out that the impact of geo- 
graphic welfare level differentials was in fact to receive the first attention 
and by far the most extensive attention. 
At the outset, it should be stressed that there exist enormous geographic 
welfare differentials in the United States. This has been observed by 
numerous authors, such as Heilbrun (1974), Steiner (1971), Wohlenberg 
(1976), Grumm (1972), and Orr (1976). It was also exemplified in chapter 9 
of this book (see Table 9-1). 
 
 
Why Should Welfare Differentials Affect Migration? 
 
Given the existence of these enormous geographic welfare differentials in 
the United States, it would seem reasonable to inquire "Why should welfare 
differentials affect migration?" 
In response to this question, there appear to exist at least two rather dif- 
ferent views. One view is suggested in research by Brehm and Saving (1964), 
who argue (p. 1003) that the "…demand for government assistance pro- 
grams…may be looked upon as a special case of the demand for lei- 
sure…" After a theoretical and empirical analysis, they conclude (1964, 
p. 1018) that welfare "…recipients are like the remainder of consumers in 
that they react to economic incentives." 
Traditionally, the migration literature has argued that income differen- 
tials are to be viewed as a (the) critical determinant of location decisions. 
What Brehm and Saving in effect are suggesting is that, at least for would- 
be or actual welfare recipients, welfare benefits are an extension of or form 
of income; hence, given that there exist large geographical welfare differen- 
tials, we would expect would-be or actual welfare recipients to respond to 
such differentials, ceteris paribus. 
In point of fact, much of the literature dealing with migration and wel- 
fare either implicitly or explicitly takes the view that welfare is seen by the 
poor as being a form of income per se or as being a form of long-term 
unemployment compensation. In reality, the literature abounds with state- 
ments, such as that found in Greenwood and Sweetland (1972, p. 669), 
which claim that “…the real income aspects of…(welfare) programs 
should be greater for persons with lower incomes…” and with statements 
such as that found in Ostrosky and Jensen (1978, p. 68), which refer to the 
alleged “ … fact… that most welfare recipients- would-be or actual- take 
the view that welfare is, in effect, either an income form or a form of 
longer-term unemployment benefit.'' Studies that adopt such a view postu- 
late welfare as a primary cause of migration of the poor. 
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There is an alternative view of the alleged migration-welfare relation- 
ship. This view argues that welfare benefits are not seen as an income form 
per se. Rather, when the poor migrate in search of employment, they seek 
areas where they feel employment opportunities are likely to be the best. 
Very often this leads them to larger, non-southern areas, where 
expected adverse discrimination is presumably less (see Cebula and 
Schaffer 1975 or Greenwood and Gormely 1971). Statistically speaking, 
however, these same areas are most often those where welfare tends to be 
the highest. But this does not mean that these migrants moved basically to 
get on welfare. Quite the contrary is argued to be true. For example, Long 
(1974, p. 55) argues that these migrants overall “…are distinguished by 
their attitudes towards life and work." In fact, Long (1974, p. 55) 
claims that among these migrants there exists “…the absence of an 
ideology to justify the 'right' of welfare…" 
Thus, while these migrants are in fact gravitating towards high-welfare 
areas, they are not as a group in search of welfare per se. They merely are 
seeking employment in areas which just happen (coincidentally) to have 
high welfare benefits. Furthermore, this argument is supported by certain 
studies (de Ferranti, 1974 and Ostow and Dutlea, 1975) which have found 
new in-migrants very slow to enroll on welfare if they failed to find employ- 
ment. In fact, it also is argued by Long (1974, p. 54) that, for some 
migrants, there in fact is “…difficulty adjusting initially to big-city liv- 
ing…” In such cases, however, welfare merely helps these new in- 
migrants to weather the crisis; it was not the primary objective of or 
primary cause of their mobility. 
 
 
Gross versus Net Migration 
 
Before surveying the literature dealing with welfare and migration, or the 
literature considered in other parts of this chapter, we should briefly 
address the problem of migration analysis that uses net rather than gross 
migration. 1 In the present context, when gross in-migration to an area is 
being discussed, it would seem that the attractiveness of the area's welfare 
level to migrants is being examined in a clear and straightforward fashion. 
The results should help indicate to what degree (if at all) welfare acts to 
attract, that is, to stimulate, in-migration. When gross out-migration is 
under consideration, we are really addressing the issue of how much high 
welfare merely tends to reduce out-migration, particularly among those who 
have been unsuccessful in gaining employment. Thus, when net in- 
migration is being examined, it seems unclear whether the attraction of high 
welfare basically influences in-migration or basically influences out-migra- 
tion or actually influences both. In fact, there is evidence to indicate, at 
least in some cases, that high welfare benefits actually act less to stimulate 
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in-migration than merely to reduce out-migration among those who have 
been unsuccessful in securing employment.  For example, studies by Abt 
Associates (1970), de Ferranti (1974), Ostow and Dutlea (1975), Long 
(1974), Reischauer (1971), and Podell (1967) all find that new migrants have 
usually been quite slow to enroll on welfare if they failed to find employ- 
ment. Hence, we conclude that one must be extremely cautious when inter- 
preting regression results; furthermore, given the possible problems associ- 
ated with net migration analysis, it would seem that results on net migration 
must be especially well scrutinized. 
 
 
Welfare Levels and the Flow of Total Migration 
 
The first study to examine formally the possible effect of geographically 
different welfare benefit levels on migration was a 1967 article by Gallaway, 
Gilbert, and Smith. In this article, they examine patterns of total interstate 
migration in the United States over the period 1955-1960. They examine 
both gross and net in-migration determinants by ordinary least squares. 
Their analysis fails in either case to find a significant relationship between 
migration and welfare benefit levels. 
Several other studies of the impact of welfare on total net in-migration 
have been conducted in a similar vein and have yielded similar results. For 
example, a detailed study by Gallaway (1967) of 1950-1960 net interstate 
total in-migration, published by the Social Security Administration, comes 
to the same essential conclusions as the study by Gallaway, Gilbert, and 
Smith (1967). In addition, Sommers and Suits (1973) have found total net 
interstate in-migration over the 1950-1960 period to be insensitive to wel- 
fare differentials, whereas Kohn and Gallaway (1973) have found AFDC 
levels to be an insignificant determinant of total net in-migration to SMSAs 
over the 1960-1970 time period. 
In view of the remarks in the section above, it is interesting to observe 
that the one study involving total migration which did come to an at least 
somewhat different conclusion from these other four studies was an article 
by Greenwood and Anderson (1974) which dealt expressly and solely with 
gross (as opposed to net) migration. Greenwood and Anderson examine 
patterns of gross migration for rural state economic areas (SEAs) in the 
South Census Region of the United States. A total of 131 SEAs is consid- 
ered for the time period 1960-1970. Their model consists of a seven-equa- 
tion system, of which five are structural and two are identities. Both gross 
in-migration and gross out-migration are studied, with the model being 
estimated by the three-stage least squares method.2 The welfare variable is 
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the percentage of total income that is directly attributable to welfare and 
assistance payments. Welfare so defined is found to be only slightly signifi- 
cant in determining both gross total in-migration to and gross total out- 
migration from SEAs in the South. 
All of these studies of the migration impact of differential welfare levels 
suffer a common shortcoming. Namely, they all fail to disaggregate 
migrants according to race, income class, age, or some other such criterion 
which would have helped to separate actual or potential welfare recipients 
from the rest of the general flow of migrants. This shortcoming of merely 
analyzing total migration is anticipated by at least one of these studies. Spe- 
cifically, Gallaway, Gilbert, and Smith (1967, p. 223) acknowledge that 
“… need exists for greater disaggregation of the data…” 
 
 
Welfare Benefits and Disaggregated Migration 
 
It should be noted that, except for the five studies cited above, the migra- 
tion impact of welfare has generally been investigated by researchers who 
have chosen to disaggregate migration flows, usually according to race (white 
versus nonwhite). This particular disaggregation has been suggested by a 
number of authors. Rogers (1968, chapter 7), for example, has borrowed 
concepts from Markov chain theory and analyzed 1955-1960 migration by 
race in California. Among other things, he finds that the factors influencing 
nonwhite migration patterns are strikingly different from those influencing 
white migration patterns. Similar observations are found in Greenwood and 
Gormely (1971), Ostrosky and Jensen (1978), Sommers and Suits (1973), and 
elsewhere. 
More recently, specific hypotheses regarding differential white-non- white 
migrant behavior have been offered. Cebula (1974b, p. 86), for example, has 
argued: 
 
. . . a much larger proportion of blacks than of whites is eligible for welfare 
benefits. Consequently, it may be expected that the level of welfare bene- 
fits will act as a stronger attraction to black would-be migrants than to 
their white counterparts. In addition, by virtue of the fact that welfare 
benefits represent a redistribution of income from the economically better- 
off to the economically worse-off, whites may tend to view areas with 
higher welfare benefits as areas which on average redistribute income from 
themselves to others. Thus, ceteris paribus, the would-be white migrants 
may be on average expected to gravitate to areas with lower levels of wel- 
fare benefits. 3 
 
This view of welfare as it applies to nonwhite migration is essentially 
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echoed in a more recent paper by Kleiner and McWilliams (1977, p. 77), 
who hypothesize AFDC 
 
. . . payments in a state . . . as being a significant attraction or retention 
variable for nonwhites because the percentage of nonwhites who have 
received welfare payments has been over four times as large as that for 
whites. 
 
The hypothesis that higher welfare areas are more attractive to non- 
whites than lower welfare areas has been investigated by several studies. 
These studies all operate, either implicitly or explicitly, under the assump- 
tion that race, i.e., being nonwhite or black, is a reasonable proxy for the 
probability of being poor. Conversely, being white is generally viewed as a 
proxy for being on average economically better off, that is, not poor. 
 
Gross Migration Studies by Race. Given the discussion of the preceding 
section, we survey studies of gross migration separately from those of net 
migration. 
One of the first studies of the determinants of solely black gross in- 
migration was by Cebula, Kohn, and Vedder (1973). They examine the 
determinants of black gross interstate in-migration over the 1965-1970 time 
period. They argue that black migration depends upon such variables as dis- 
tance, income, racial composition of the destination, and AFDC levels. 
With respect to the AFDC variable, they hypothesize states “…offering 
higher levels of welfare benefits…” are likely to be the more attractive 
ones to black migrants (1973, p. 500). Their findings lead them to conclude 
that (1973, p. 505) “…welfare- as one specific form of income-may be a 
very important determinant of black migration…” 
In a comment on the paper by Cebula, Kohn, and Vedder (1973), Zieg- 
ler (1976) also empirically analyzes gross black interstate in-migration for 
the period 1965-1970. Using somewhat different migration data from that 
of Cebula, Kohn, and Vedder (1973), Ziegler also hypothesizes that black 
migration depends upon AFDC levels, as well as upon other variables. Zieg- 
ler finds welfare differentials to be only a moderately strong determinant 
of black migration patterns, with blacks being attracted to high welfare 
states. Thus, Ziegler's results are basically but not entirely compatible with 
those in the study by Cebula, Kohn, and Vedder (1973). 
In yet another study concerned solely with gross nonwhite in-migra- 
tion, Kleiner and McWilliams (1977) argue that nonwhites should be 
strongly attracted to high welfare states. Examining gross migration of non- 
whites to states over the 1955-1960 and 1965-1970 time periods, they find 
the prospect of higher welfare to be a relatively strong attraction for non- 
white migrants. 
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In a study of nonwhite gross in-migration to SMSAs (rather than to 
states), Kau and Sirmans (1976) estimate a simultaneous-equations system 
by the two-stage least squares method. They classif y black migrants in the 
United States into three different categories: (1) migrants returning to their 
state of birth; and non-return migrants separated into (2) migrants moving 
for the first time (new migrants), and (3) migrants making at least their sec- 
ond move (repeat migrants). They allege (1976, p. 1144) that “…this sep- 
aration of migrants corrects possible differences in the propensity to 
migrate and thus reduces specification bias." The paper analyzes the deter- 
minants of mobility for each category of black migrants. Welfare (in the 
form of AFDC) is found to be a highly significant determinant of migration 
for all three migrant categories. Thus, in this multi-equation system 
attempting to minimize specification bias, further evidence of a distinct 
migration impact of government welfare policy is revealed. 
The studies just cited above are all concerned solely with nonwhite 
migration and all find that, statistically speaking, high welfare areas are 
relatively more attractive to nonwhite migrants than low welfare areas are, 
that is, welfare is a significant determinant of nonwhite migration. 4 
Other studies have been concerned with the impact of welfare benefits 
on gross white migration as well as on gross nonwhite migration. For exam- 
ple, Pack (1973) has examined the determinants of both white and nonwhite 
gross in-migration to central cities for the 1955-1960 period. Gross white 
in-migration and gross nonwhite in-migration are both hypothesized to 
depend upon AFDC levels, as well as upon other factors (for example, 
median income, median income growth, and unemployment rates).5 She 
adopts single-equation models, which are estimated by ordinary least 
squares. One model is estimated for white migrants; two are estimated for 
nonwhite migrants. 
Her regression results indicate that higher levels of AFDC payments 
apparently act strongly to inhibit white in-migration. The reasoning offered 
for this result is that areas with higher welfare levels are viewed by whites 
(on the average) as more adversely redistributing income away from them to 
nonwhites than do areas with lower welfare levels. In her analysis of non- 
white migration, her results appear to indicate that (1973, p. 254) “…high 
AFDC levels act as a strong attraction to nonwhites…” She argues that this 
is attributable to the fact that welfare is an important source of income for 
many non-white families. 6 
 
Net Migration Studies by Race. The first net migration study of welfare 
and migration by race was a paper by DeJong and Donnelly (1973). Delong 
and Donnelly examine the net in-migration of nonwhites, ages twenty-five 
to twenty-nine between the years 1950 and 1960, to counties in SMSAs of 
the contiguous United States. Welfare is defined as the level in each county 
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of aid to families with dependent children (AFDC) in the year 1960. Four 
single-equation regressions are estimated by ordinary least squares. The 
basic overall statistical result is that differential AFDC levels exercise an 
important attraction for nonwhite migrants. 
Delong and Donnelly (1973, p. 341) conclude that public welfare 
“…is a community resource for income support which migrants…can 
fall back on if necessary." They proceed to argue (pp. 341-342) that to 
“…interpret this resource . . . as the primary cause of net in-migration 
seems questionable…” They resort (p. 344) to various field studies (Abt 
Associates 1970 and Podell 1967) to reject the argument “…that the dif- 
ferential level of welfare payment is a direct cause of nonwhite migration to 
cities." Thus, they seemingly accept the basic arguments (cited in an earlier 
section by Long (1974). 
Two subsequent studies of net in-migration to SMSAs, one by Cebula 
(1974b) and the other by Kohn (1976), find results qualitatively very similar 
to those obtained for gross migration by Pack (1973). Cebula estimates 
single-equation models of net in-migration by race (white and nonwhite) 
over the 1965-1970 period. He finds that white in-migrants strongly prefer 
low welfare areas, whereas nonwhite in-migrants strongly prefer high 
welfare areas. Kohn (1976) obtains very similar findings in alternative 
single-equation estimates of net in-migration by race over the 1965-1970 
period. 
In another study, Sommers and Suits (1973) examine net in-migration, 
to states, of white families and black families over both the 1950-1960 and 
1960-1970 decades. The model is single-equation and is estimated by ordi- 
nary least squares. It basically relates white and black net in-migration each 
to total income, the total unemployment rate, and welfare levels per recipi- 
ent in the form of AFDC. It finds that, over the 1950-1960 decade, the level 
of AFDC payments exercised a strong impact on net black in-migration 
patterns. In particular, higher AFDC payments acted as a strong attraction 
to black families. On the other hand, the pattern of net white in-migration 
was basically unaffected by differential AFDC levels. 
During the 1960-1970 decade, net white in-migration was found to be 
strongly and negatively influenced by AFDC levels. In particular, the higher 
the level of AFDC payments, the less attractive a state was to white 
migrants. In this period, by contrast, net black in-migration was found to 
be relatively insensitive to AFDC levels, a result contrary to that obtained 
for the 1950-1960 period. 
In a comment on the Sommers and Suits paper (1973), Cebula and 
Schaffer (1975) criticized the use of total income and total unemployment 
data in examining migration by race. Arguing that color specific income 
and unemployment figures were logicall y superior, Cebula and Schaffer 
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re-estimated the Sommers and Suits model for the 1960-1970 period for 
both white migrants and nonwhite migrants. Use of color specific data 
resulted in changing the signs of and significance levels of a number 
(three of six) of variables. From a public policy viewpoint, the most 
important change was that AFDC differentials were found significantly to 
influence net white in- migration for the period, with higher welfare 
states being found the less attractive ones to such migrants. Nevertheless, 
it should be noted  that Cebula and Schaffer did confirm one of the 
Sommers and Suits results pertaining to interstate welfare differentials, 
namely, the higher the AFDC level in a state, the less attractive the state 
was for white migrants. 
 
Some Additional Observations. It was observed earlier that, in most of 
the literature, race (that is, being nonwhite or being black) is taken as a 
surrogate for poverty (or for a related population trait, such as relatively 
low levels of education or training or human capital). Thus, nonwhite 
migration is effectively taken as a proxy for migration of the poor (or of 
persons who are relatively uneducated or untrained). Along these lines, it 
is interesting to refer to two additional recent studies, one by Glantz (1975) 
and the other by Vedder and Cooper (1974). 
Glantz (1975) attempts to identify some of the key factors affecting 
the gross in-migration of the poor per se into and among large 
metropolitan areas in the United States over the 1965-1970 time period. 
He argues on a priori grounds that poor migrants logically should be 
attracted by higher welfare benefits (per recipient). He argues (1975, p. 
30) that “…race alone is not a good surrogate for a migrant's economic 
status." This represents a definite departure from previous studies. He 
argues (p. 30): 
 
For the poor, expected welfare payments is a viable alternative . . . 
to labor income and hence may be expected to play a vital role 
in the migration decision. 
His empirical results (obtained by ordinary least squares) strongly 
support his hypothesis that the poor (per se) migrate to areas offering 
higher welfare benefits. 
Also stressing the importance of welfare benefits to the poor per se, 
Vedder and Cooper (1974) have examined net in-migration to counties 
in nineteenth century England and Wales. Although they obtain welfare 
coefficients that differ significantly from Glantz's, Vedder and Cooper 
nevertheless derive results qualitatively similar to those of Glantz in that 
they find counties with higher welfare benefits to be very attractive to the 
migrating poor. Thus, both Glantz (1975) and Vedder and Cooper 
(1974) choose an alternative to the use of race as a surrogate for poverty; 
they instead resort to examination of the behavior of the poor per se. 
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Welfare and Migration: The Bidirectional Hypothesis 
 
The studies discussed above are all concerned with whether geographically 
different welfare benefit levels exercise an important impact on migration 
patterns. It should be noted that, in point of fact, several studies (for exam- 
ple, Cloward and Piven 1968, Goolsby 1974, Sommers and Suits 1973, 
West, Hamilton, and Loomis 1976, and Ziegler 1976) have argued that, 
with regard to welfare and nonwhite migration, causality may run in both 
directions, that is, nonwhite migration depends upon welfare levels, but wel- 
fare levels may also be dependent upon nonwhite migration patterns. Som- 
mers and Suits, for example (1973, p. 197), argue specifically that while 
higher welfare benefits attract black migrants, we should also be aware that 
these black migrants modify the environment of which they become a part. 
Going further, Sommers and Suits (p. 197) argue: 
 
Negroes who were disenfranchised in the South became voters in the 
North. Although welfare rolls were not large to begin with, a growing 
black electorate manifested itself in a number of changes in public policies, 
some of which had the consequence of enlarging . . . welfare . . . . 
 
Thus, these studies are hypothesizing that while welfare payments 
directly influence the locational decisions of black families, these same fam- 
ilies over time form a growing electorate which manifests itself in political 
pressures (the vote) for more and higher welfare benefit levels. 
In this section we review five articles which to date have attempted to 
ascertain the true nature of cause and effect between migration and welfare. 
In so doing, we hope better to appreciate the essence of and relevance of the 
migration impact of state and local government policies. 7 
The first empirical effort to test this possible bidirectional relationship 
between welfare and migration was a paper by Cebula (1974a). Cebula con- 
structs a two-equation model of welfare and migration. The welfare equa- 
tion treats welfare as a function of migration and various exogenous forces. 
The migration equation in turn treats migration as a function of welfare and 
various exogenous factors. 
The migration data are disaggregated according to race (white and non- 
white), sex (male and female), and age (age categories twenty to thirty-nine, 
forty to sixty-four, and sixty-five and over). Thus, twelve migrant groups 
were examined. Moreover, "migration" refers solely to net in-migration to 
the various  states over the  1965-1970 time period.  The welfare  variable 
takes the form of AFDC payments (in 1965) for all persons in the twenty to 
thirty-nine  and  forty to  sixty-four  age  groups  and  the  form  of  old-age 
assistance (in 1965) for the remaining age category (age sixty-five and over) . 
In all of the six sets of regressions pertaining to whites, net white in- 
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migration was strongly and negatively influenced by welfare: white 
migrants showed a strong preference for low welfare states. On the other 
hand, net white in-migration was shown in all six cases to have no conse- 
quential impact on welfare levels. Thus, at least in terms of white net in- 
migration, the relationship between migration and welfare is not found to 
be bi-directional. 
In the net nonwhite in-migration regressions, high welfare levels were 
shown to exercise an important attraction for nonelderly nonwhite 
migrants, a result completely in contrast to that obtained in the regression 
for whites. Moreover, in all four of the regression sets for nonelderly non- 
whites, welfare levels are shown to be significantly and directly influenced 
by migration; the greater the net influx of nonwhite migrants, the greater 
the welfare level tends to be. Thus, the two-pronged (bidirectional) hypo- 
thesis referred to above receives strong empirical support for the 1965-1970 
period. 
Southwick (1976) has examined the bidirectional hypothesis by using 
the maximum level of welfare benefits obtainable in an area as a surrogate 
for welfare benefits. This use of the maximum welfare level possible thus 
far appears to be unique in this literature. His two-stage least squares anal- 
ysis  of  interstate migration  finds that while net in-migration  of  welfare 
recipients is an increasing  function  of welfare  benefits,  welfare benefits 
themselves are not significantly affected by the migration pattern in ques- 
tion. Thus, the bidirectional hypothesis per se fails to generate support here. 
Somewhat more recently, Cebula (1976) has used the two-stage least 
squares method to examine the possibility  of  a bidirectional  relationship 
between nonwhite migration and welfare levels. His two-equation  model 
analyzes net nonwhite interstate in-migration for the period  1960-1970. In 
this study, the welfare variable is the change in AFDC payments per recipi- 
ent over the  1960-1970 time period;  this  differs  from the other studies, 
which have all used some measure of the actual or maximum potential level 
of AFDC per recipient as a surrogate for welfare. Cebula' s results strongly 
support  the  bidirectional   hypothesis  that  nonwhite  migration  and  the 
growth in welfare levels are interdependent. 
Commenting on Cebula's study, Kumar (1977) argues three major 
points. First, he challenges the use of the change in welfare benefits and 
argues instead for the use of welfare benefit levels per se. Second, he argues 
the need to include taxes (as a measure of costs) in the analysis. Finally, he 
argues the need to adjust for geographic living-cost differentials. 
Kumar then proceeds to estimate a two-equation system of net inter- 
state nonwhite in-migration by the two-stage  least squares method. This 
system, which takes Kumar's three basic arguments into account, yields 
empirical results which support the bidirectional hypothesis and which are 
qualitatively compatible with Cebula's estimates. 
 
 
 
          119 
 
Yet another study of this bidirectional hypothesis has been recently 
published by Ostrosky and Jensen (1978). Their study is very similar to the 
one by Cebula (1976). In fact, the only major difference between the Cebula 
study and that by Ostrosky and Jensen is that the latter deals with net non- 
white in-migration to SMSAs (rather than to states). The findings of the 
Ostrosky and Jensen paper add further empirical support to the bi-
directional hypothesis. 
In sum, then, four of these five studies have found empirical support 
for the bi-directional welfare-nonwhite migration hypothesis. Thus, in 
addition to the studies in the preceding section, most of which provided 
support for the argument that nonwhite in-migration (net and gross) is 
significantly affected by geographically different welfare benefit levels, it 
also appears highly plausible that the pattern of net nonwhite in-migration 
may influence welfare levels. 
Before proceeding to the next section of this chapter, it is interesting to 
note a recent, modified version of the bi-directional hypothesis noted above. 
Specifically, Chao and Renas (1976) examine the relationship between 
AFDC levels and net white in-migration to SMSAs over the 1960-1970 time 
period. They estimate a three-equation system by two-stage least squares. 
They find that white migration is not significantly affected by welfare level 
differentials. However, they find that welfare levels are negatively and sig- 
nificantly influenced by white in-migration patterns. Thus, in examining 
the direction of causality between welfare and migration, they arrive at the 
rather novel conclusion that, when white migrants enter an area, they effect- 
ively act to inhibit the growth of welfare programs in that area. This hypo- 
thesis is not to f ound elsewhere in the migration literature. 
In closing here, we must lament the failure of all of these studies to con- 
sider the possible role of the percent of an area's total population that is 
poor as a welfare policy determinant. Logically, it would seem that this 
variable, which encompasses so many more people than net nonwhite in- 
migration, would be even more likely to influence welfare policy. Similarly, 
it is unfortunate that there is no mention in any of these studies of median 
voter theories of local public-goods provision. 
 
 
Migration and Nonwelfare Fiscal Variables 
 
In point of fact, most of the studies of the migration impact of state and 
local government policies have dealt with welfare. Nonetheless, there have 
been a number of published studies dealing with the migration effects of 
other, that is, nonwelfare, policies. Accordingly, in order to make this sur- 
vey more complete and more informative, this section of the chapter deals 
specifically with those studies which have investigated the migration effects 
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 of state and local government (1) tax policies, (2) educational spending poli- 
cies, and (3) nonwelfare spending policies. 
In a general sense, as implied in chapter 9, the conceptual base of these 
various studies can be traced back to Charles M. Tiebout (1956, p. 418) who 
argued: 
 
. . . the consumer-voter may be viewed as picking that community which 
best satisfies his preference pattern for public goods . . . the consumer- 
voter moves to that community whose local government best satisfies his 
set of preferences. 
 
As Tullock (1971, p. 917) observes, this hypothesis effectively holds that, 
ceteris paribus, the “…individual deciding where to live will take into 
account the private effects upon himself of the bundle of government ser- 
vices and taxes…” Expressed somewhat differently, migrants will exam- ine 
and appraise 'the value to themselves of the government services and 
taxes (negative values) in communities. As Riew (1973) argues, other things 
equal, migrants will prefer areas where they can obtain the greatest fiscal 
surplus, that is, where they can get the most in services for their tax pay- 
ments, and also get the quantity of local government services that is most 
compatible with their tastes. With this as background, our survey cont- 
inues. 
 
 
Migration and Property Tax Considerations 
 
A number of studies have dealt with the possible migration impact of our 
system of large geographic property tax differentials. With respect to the 
possible impact of such differentials, it is argued that the higher the prop- 
erty tax level in an area, the higher the cost of living in that area. Since 
migrants are apparently quite sensitive to living-cost differentials (Renas 
and Kumar 1978 or Fields 1976), it is argued in the literature that, ceteris 
paribus, migrants should prefer areas with lower property taxes. 
It should be observed at the outset that there is a weakness in this entire 
argument. In particular, as noted by Aaron (1970, p. 802), "the . . . Internal 
Revenue Code contains massive subsidies for housing." Clearly, this is 
likely to create a less pronounced sensitivity of migrants to property tax dif- 
ferentials than would be the case in the absence of such subsidies. This 
weakness in the above argument notwithstanding, the enormous geographic 
property tax differentials in the United States have stimulated a number of 
research efforts. 
The first study to examine the possible migration impact of state and 
local government tax policies was a paper by Cebula (1974b). Cebula exam- 
ines net in-migration to SMSAs over the 1965-1970 time period. Migration 
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patterns are disaggregated by race: white and nonwhite. Following certain 
earlier studies (see Rogers 1968), he argues that white and nonwhite 
migrants should in certain respects be expected to behave quite differently. 
In particular, with regard to the property tax, which he measures on a per 
capita basis, Cebula (1974b, p. 86) argues that a 
 
. . . relatively small portion of blacks own property as compared with their 
white counterparts . . . white migrants are likely to be sensitive to property 
tax levels, whereas black migrants are likely to be relatively insensitive to 
property tax levels. 
 
Cebula' s single-equation, ordinary least squares estimates of net in-migra- 
tion to SMSAs find white migrants preferring low property tax areas and 
black migrants essentially insensitive to property tax differentials. 
Further empirical support for the sensitivity (insensitivity) of white 
(black) migrants to property tax differentials is provided in a two-equation, 
two-stage least squares analysis of net interstate in-migration by Cebula 
(1974a). Disaggregating migration according to race, age, and sex, Cebula 
finds that higher property taxes appear strongly to discourage nonelderly, 
white in-migration and to exercise no perceptible impact on black net in- 
migration (or elderly white net in-migration). 
Ostrosky (1978) has also found that per capita property taxes exercise at 
least a moderate impact on net white in-migration patterns. Ostrosky's 
(1978, p. 56) three-equation, two-stage least squares analysis of SMSA 
migration over the 1960-1970 time period suggests that “…to some 
extent, migrants do seem to express a preference for areas with lower prop- 
erty tax levels…” 
Results that are qualitatively compatible with the above three papers 
are found in the analysis by Pack (1973) of gross in-migration (by race) to 
SMSAs over the 1955-1960 time period. For white migrants, Pack (1973) 
finds that  higher levels of per capita property  taxes act significantly  to 
inhibit in-migration; black migrants, on the other hand, appear (according 
to Pack's study) to be essentially unaffected by property tax considerations. 
The four studies discussed above all have found that, at least for some 
(that is, white) migrants, geographic property tax differentials are a reason- 
ably important migration determinant. Nevertheless, it should be noted that 
there have been, to date, at least three studies which in certain respects have 
derived quite different findings. For example, in a study stressing the causes 
of elderly migration, Barsby and Cox (1975) consider the impact of various 
tax variables, including the property tax. They examine net interstate in- 
migration of persons age sixty-five or older during the 1950-1960 decade. 
Their ordinary least squares results 8 suggest that elderly migrants are essen- 
tially insensitive to special tax treatment and per capita property tax levels. 
Cebula's (1974c) analysis of net interstate in-migration of the elderly (per- 
 
 
 
 
 
122 
 
sons age sixty-five or older) over the 1965-1970 period produces the same 
essential results as those in Barsby and Cox (1975). Specifically, there was 
no significant relationship found between elderly migration patterns and per 
capita property tax levels. 
Next, we note that Liu (1977) has estimated a four-equation model by 
the two-stage least squares method. In this model, "migration" refers to 
differential rates of total net in-migration to SMSAs for the period 1960- 
1967. Liu actually includes three fiscal variables in his analysis: (1) the aver- 
age tax rate, expressed as the ratio of total tax (including property tax) reve- 
nues to total personal income; (2) per capita local government expenditures 
(excluding welfare); and (3) changes in the average tax rate, 1960-1967. Liu 
(1977, p. 1384) observes that “…the extremely high correlation between 
the average tax rate and per capita local government current expenditures 
…presents an empirically difficult, multicollinearity problem." (The exis- 
tence of such a problem has been observed elsewhere, for example, by Kohn 
1976.) 
Lui finds that the average state tax rate has no consequential effect on 
total migration; similarly (1977, p. 1384), "The variable changes in the 
average tax rate…is shown with no…effect upon…migrant locational 
decisions." 
In closing, we note that the possible migration effects of geographically 
different property tax (or overall tax) levels have been formally investigated 
by at least seven studies. Of these, three-those by Cebula (1974c), Barsby 
and Cox (1975), and Liu (1977)-all cast certain doubts upon the migration 
impact of property tax differentials. The other four studies-those by 
Cebula (1974a), (1974b), Pack (1973), and Ostrosky (1978)-find that, at 
least for certain population groups, property taxes did influence (nega- 
tively) migration patterns. Although it would seem that as a whole there is 
sufficient evidence to infer that, ceteris paribus, nonelderly, white migrants 
probably do prefer lower property tax areas, the results otherwise are over- 
all sufficiently mixed so that we probably should not as yet make any other 
further judgments on the issue. Perhaps future research will permit us to do 
so, especially if that research includes ef ficient and dependable means 
whereby to separate property taxes from gross rental payments and per- 
sonal property taxes from business property taxes. 
 
 
Migration and Other Fiscal Variables 
 
Aside from the provision of public assistance, state and local governments 
provide a wide array of impure public goods, including public education, 
health and hospital services, highways, police and fire protection, and 
recreation. Since these public goods are presumably of importance to con- 
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sumers and since there are enormous geographic differentals in the levels 
(amounts) of these commodities provided by state and local governments, 
certain studies have investigated the possible migration impact of nonwel- 
fare state and local government spending. 
The first study to investigate the possible migration impact of differen- 
tial nonwelfare state and local government expenditures was by Greenwood 
and Sweetland (1972). Greenwood and Sweetland deal with total gross 
migration between SMSAs over the 1955-1960 time period. The authors (p. 
699) argue: 
 
In-migration rates will be higher and out-migration rates will be lower the 
higher the SMSA's level of government expenditures per capita, ceteris 
paribus. This…holds for a variety of reasons…  
 
For one thing, they argue (p. 669) that superior educational opportunities 
are likely to be available in communities where per capita government 
expenditures are comparatively higher. They also argue that better educated 
people will be more likely to move to such areas than elsewhere, and less 
likely to move away from such areas, because the demand for educated per- 
sons is likely to be greater, because the educational opportunities for their 
children are likely to be better, and because they are likely to find certain 
amenities in such areas that are deemed important. Similarly, it is argued 
that many less-educated individuals would also tend to move to such locali- 
ties, or not move away therefrom, in order to improve their own or their 
children's prospects by taking advantage of the better educational oppor- 
tunities. Furthermore, SMSAs that have relatively high per capita govern- 
ment expenditures are likely to afford relatively high per capita welfare 
benefits of various sorts. Thus, they argue that such areas are likely to be 
very attractive to low-income persons. 
Greenwood and Sweetland (1972) examine the one hundred SMSAs in 
the continental United States that had a 1960 population in excess of two 
hundred fifty thousand. From these one hundred SMSAs, a random sample 
of fifty was chosen. The authors then pool the information on migration 
from each of these fifty SMSAs to each of the other forty-nine. This proce- 
dure results in 2,450 (that is, 50 x 49) total observations. Their ordinary least 
squares results indicate that the greater the per capita government expendi- 
ture differential between SMSAs, the greater the migration rate between 
them. 
The next study to investigate the possible migration impact of differen- 
tial nonwelfare state and local government spending was by Pack (1973). 
Considering the impact on gross white in-migration to SMSAs (1955-1960), 
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Pack finds that higher per capita public expenditures on education exert a 
relatively strong attraction. Moreover, she also finds (1973, p.  256) that 
“…higher levels of nonwelfare (including education) public spending 
exert a strong positive influence on gross nonwhite in-migration.'' 
Four other studies have delved into the issue at hand, those by Cebula 
(1974b), Kohn (1976), Liu (1977), and Ostrosky (1978). All four studies 
examine patterns of net in-migration. 
Cebula (1974b) deals with net in-migration to SMSAs, 1965-1970, by 
race. His ordinary least squares analysis (1974b, p. 91) finds that both white 
migrants and black migrants “…appear…to prefer…high nonwelfare 
spending areas, ceteris paribus.” Furthermore, a subsequent comment on 
the Cebula paper by Kohn (1976), which also examines net in-migration by 
race to SMSAs, 1965-1970, offers further substantiation of these findings 
by Cebula. 
In yet another study of migration to SMSAs (this time, over the 1960- 
1970 period), Liu (1977) finds that per capita local government expenditures 
have a very significant positive influence upon total net in-migration with 
migrants showing a very strong preference for high expenditure areas. 
Shifting the emphasis from SMSAs to states, a recent study by Ostrosky 
(1978, p. 49) has observed that, in the United States, “…education far 
and away receives the largest share of state plus local government expendi- 
tures." Estimating a two-equation model of total net interstate in-migra- 
tion (1960-1970) by the two-stage least squares method, he finds (p. 56) 
that “…s tate and local government commitments to public education 
appear to significantly influence spatial resource allocation (migration)." 
The six studies just discussed all stress the migration impact of state and 
local government spending commitments to public education or to total 
nonwelfare public spending (education included). It should be noted that 
very recently Greene (1977) has found educational spending to be signifi- 
cantly influenced by migration patterns. 9 In particular, Greene (p. 91) finds 
total net in-migration to cities to have “…a positive and significant 
impact on local school expenditures (per full-time student)." 
In sum, then, Greene finds that the level of public education commit- 
ment (per full-time student) is an increasing function of the rate of net in- 
migration, whereas Greenwood and Sweetland (1972), Pack (1973), Cebula 
(1974b), Kohn (1976), Liu (1977), and Ostrosky (1978) all find that higher 
levels of educational commitment (or of total nonwelfare public spending, 
including education) are attractive to migrants. Thus, a question may arise 
as to the true nature of cause and effect between, say, public education 
spending and migration. It appears that causality conceivably could even 
run both ways, that is, the causality could be bidirectional. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
          125 
 
Along these lines, Cebula (1977, p. 113) has argued that differential 
local government commitments to public education may exercise a very sig- 
nificant influence on household locational decisions, ceteris paribus. More- 
over, he (p. 114) hypothesizes: 
 
By the same token, it would seem reasonable to argue that if public educa- 
tional "quality" were important in the location decision, then the nature 
(quality) of public educational commitment should continue as well to be 
of concern . . . after the move has been made. This continued concern in 
turn might then be reflected in household actions (the "vote," parent- 
teacher organizations, etc.) to further influence ("improve") the educa- 
tional system in the household's new community of residence. Thus, not 
only is local government policy toward public education likely to be a pos- 
sible influence on migration, but the public educational policy itself may be 
influenced by migration. 
 
That is, with respect to local government policy toward (commitment to) 
public education on the one hand and migration patterns on the other, 
causality may run both ways. 
Estimating a two-equation system of total net in-migration  to SMSAs 
(1965-1970), Cebula finds empirical support for this bidirectional hypothe- 
sis. ln particular,  his two-stage least squares results indicate that total net 
in-migration  is an  increasing  function  of  public  education  expenditure 
levels (per full-time student) and that public education levels (per full-time 
student) are also an increasing function of the rate of total net in-migration. 
Overall, then, the literature specific to this discussion seems to substan- 
tiate the idea that, ceteris paribus, differential public education (or total 
nonwelf are) spending levels exercise an important effect on migration. 
Moreover, there appears to be some evidence (Greene 1977 and Cebula 
1977) that, ceteris paribus, public education spending per full-time student 
may be positively related to migration patterns as well. 
 
 
A Concluding Remark on Nonwelfare Policies 
 
The idea of a fiscal surplus (or fiscal residue) was first introduced by 
Buchanan (1950), who defined it as the value of public expenditure benefits 
minus tax payments. The evidence in the preceding section, and to a lesser 
degree, the evidence in the section before that tend somewhat to substanti- 
ate the idea that people include differences in fiscal residue in their calcula- 
tion of where to live. Unfortunately, the literature to date has certain short- 
comings (to be discussed in a following section) which, when coupled with 
the somewhat inconsistent findings summarized above, make it impractical 
for us to accept totally the migration role of the fiscal surplus without at 
least some reservations. 
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 Some Possible Implications of the 
Literature to Date 
 
The body of literature with which this survey deals has a variety of short- 
comings; a number of these are discussed in the next section. Nevertheless, 
there are a number of tentative observations that might be made. For exam- 
ple, most of the literature seems to indicate that geographic welfare level 
differentials may well exercise a perceptible impact on various groups of 
migrants, particularly on the poor (both white and nonwhite). 10 Although a 
few studies argue to the contrary, the general finding seems to be that, 
ceteris paribus, such groups are strongly attracted by the prospect of higher 
welfare benefits. Many authors argue that this should be expected in view of 
the enormous geographical differentials in welfare benefits (especially 
AFDC) in the United States. Various studies of white migration also indicate 
that welfare differentials may be important, although in the opposite way 
found for the poor. In particular, higher welfare benefits appear to repre- 
sent a form of economic disincentive (on the average) to white migrants; 
consequently, white migrants appear, ceteris paribus, to be attracted to low 
welfare areas and to be discouraged from locating in high welfare areas. 
On the average, the poor migrant is endowed with relatively less human 
capital than the economically better- off migrant. Hence, the factor-market 
distortions resulting from large geographic welfare differentials may act to 
create problems of economic inefficiency in spatial resource allocation. 
Over time, high welfare regions tend, on balance, to experience a net loss in 
the average level of embodied human capital. Among other things, over the 
long run this may imply an increasing interregional divergence of economic 
growth in the United States. 
A number of the studies examined above find certain migration 
patterns quite sensitive to geographic differentials in property tax levels. 
In particular, it seems that at least one group, the economically 
advantaged nonelderly, tends (on the average) to prefer low property tax 
areas. 
These apparent effects of property tax differentials, when combined 
with those of welfare differentials, may create severe financial problems for 
certain state or local governments. In particular, as welfare rolls in high 
welfare areas increase in size, the levels of state and local government 
spending must rise. To the extent that state and local governments try to pay 
for growing welfare costs with, increased taxes (higher property taxes), they 
very well may induce at least some economically better off persons, as well 
as some private firms (see Goolsby 1974 and Harriss 1974), to relocate else- 
where. This clearly erodes their tax base-the core of the community they 
tap to generate tax receipts. Some state and local governments may then be 
confronted by a financial dilemma: rising expenditures on the one hand and 
depressed capacity to elevate taxes on the other. The only options open to 
them are increased federal grants or increased borrowing; in the latter case, 
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fiscal crises such as that experienced by New York City in recent years may 
in many cases be (or become) inevitable. Given the broad, adverse effects of 
such crises, this is a problem we definitely would do best to prevent if at all 
reasonably possible. 
 
 
Need for More Directed Research on the Migration 
Impact of State and Local Government Policies 
 
Regarding local governments in the areas around major cities, Gordon 
Tullock (1971, p. 917) has argued, "The individual deciding where to live 
will take into account the private effects upon him of the bundle of govern- 
ment services and taxes in each suburb." Judging from the studies reviewed 
here, the individual apparently applies a similar decision calculus in 
comparing areas geographically distant from one another as well. 
Having now reviewed the basic empirical literature on the migration 
impact of state and local government policies, it would seem appropriate 
formally to indicate some of the basic shortcomings of this literature and 
the directions future research might take. 
First, most of the literature considered here has concentrated exclu- 
sively on a single public policy variable-welfare. Thus, with few excep- 
tions, analyses of the impact of local government policies have ignored the 
possible impact of such factors as public education expenditures, property 
tax levels, highway and health expenditures, the general (average) level of 
state plus local taxes, and so forth. In the case of public education expendi- 
tures, we are dealing with the single largest component of all state and local 
spending and hence potentially the most important source of benefits to the 
average migrant. Similarly, in the case of the property tax, we are dealing 
with the typically most important source of local government revenue and 
hence a potentially very important dimension of the cost of living in a 
locality. Moreover, concentration solely on the welfare variable precludes 
the possibility of a systematic benefit/ cost analysis of the impact of state 
plus local government policies, an analysis that is essential to a rational re- 
location decision (see, for example, Brennen 1965, Riew 1973, and Sjaastad 
1962). Hence, to the extent that data permits, we suggest that future re- 
search should endeavor to include variables reflecting both the costs and the 
benefits associated with state and local government units. 
A shortcoming common to nearly all this published research is the 
failure to account for cost-of-living differentials among geographic areas. 
Such a failing leads to the very distinct possibility of money illusion on the 
part of migrants, especially in view of the enormity of the geographic cost- 
of-living differentials in the United States. Future research should, to the 
extent possible, attempt to use cost-of-living (family budget) and inflation 
data, which are available for many metropolitan areas and states.11 
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Next, there is the problem of disaggregation of the migration flows 
between areas. It is essential for migration studies to disaggregate to an 
appropriate degree for at least two reasons: 
 
1. There are distinct differences in the propensity of various  population 
cohorts to migrate. 
2. Various population groups/cohorts (for a variety of reasons) respond 
to different sets of stimuli. 
 
We observe that in terms of the variables crucial to this literature, disaggre- 
gation could potentially be made along such lines as education, race, age, 
sex, income level of migrants, and whether the migrants being studied are 
new migrants, repeat migrants, or return migrants. We strongly suggest that 
future research in this area should attempt to ascertain the most relevant of 
such options in order to reach the most useful and valid policy conclusions. 
In closing this chapter, we wish to stress the need for continued research 
in this area. The public policy implications involved are enormous, for, as 
West, Hamilton, and Loomis (1976, p. 66) have observed ". . . policies with 
indirect effects (on migration) have been formulated without regard to their 
consequences on population distribution." Moreover, important economic 
and political ramifications can be derived from such research. For example, 
it has already been proposed (see Orr 1976, p. 359), due to the enormous 
welfare differentials among political jurisdictions in the United States, that 
our nation ". . . establish a uniform benefit schedule in all states." 12 Thus, 
the significance of research in this area cannot be easily understated. Hope- 
fully, this review has provided sufficient information on the state of 
research in this area to be of benefit to future research efforts. 
 
 
Notes 
 
1. The nature of some of these problems can be seen in the discussion 
by Alperovich, Bergsman, and Ehemann (1977). See also Greenwood 
(1975a, esp. pp. 397, 408, and 409). 
2. The use of multiequation systems, estimated by the two-stage least 
squares method or by the three-stage least squares method, has become 
rather widespread in recent years. Essentially, this is because researchers 
have become increasingly interested in learning the true direction of 
cause-and-eff ect in migration. Related to this, see, for example, Muth 
(1971) or Greenwood (1975a) or (1975b). 
3. Related to Cebula's argument concerning the impact of welfare on 
white migration, see also Aronson and Schwartz (1973) and von 
Furstenberg and Mueller (1971). 
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4. Although it is not necessarily found to be the primary cause of or 
determinant of nonwhite migration. 
5. In addition, public policy variables other than welfare are consid- 
ered in Pack's model. These are to be discussed in a later section of this 
chapter. 
6. Pack's analysis has been attacked by Cebula and Curran (1974) on 
several points. Among the criticisms, it is argued by Cebula and Curran that 
simultaneity bias may be quite severe in her study. Her use of end of period 
variables and of "percentage change in median family income, 1950-1960" 
implies a very probable simultaneity problem. 
7. It should be noted that all of the studies considered in this part of the 
chapter have estimated multi-equation systems by the two-stage least 
squares method. This allows one to account for simultaneity among 
variables under analysis, as between welfare and migration, for example. 
8. Barsby and Cox (1975) also find elderly migration essentially 
unaffected by levels of old age benefits and by the availability of public 
health and hospital care. 
9. Greene (1977) basically repeats an experiment performed initially by 
Weisbrod (1964). Related to Greene's results, see also Lyons (1978). 
10. Recall that, as noted above, in most of the literature race is taken as 
a surrogate for poverty (or relatively low levels of education of training), 
that is, nonwhite migration is taken as a proxy from migration of the poor 
(or of persons who are relatively uneducated or untrained). 
11. Kumar (1977), Rabianski (1971), Renas and Kumar (1978), and 
Fields (1976) have all considered living costs in analyzing the determinants 
of migration. R elated to this issue, see also chapter 5 of this book. 
12. Related to welfare reform, see the conclusions in chapter 9 of this 
book. 
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Introduction 
General Shortcomings 
of the Non-policy 
Migration Literature 
 
During the past two decades, there has been a proliferation of studies deal- 
ing with the causes, and to a lesser degree, the effects, of human migration. 
This literature has been especially rich in American scholarly journals, 
where economists, political scientists, demographers, sociologists, and 
historians have examined internal geographic mobility in the United States. 
As a consequence of this diversity of researchers, the migration literature is 
characterized by enormous differences in the variables examined, the 
hypotheses tested, the data bases used, and the empirical techniques 
adopted. 
Chapter 10 of this book constitutes an in-depth critique of the migra- 
tion literature dealing with state and local government policies. Although 
the literature examined in chapter 10 is rather extensive, it nevertheless 
comprises less than one-third of all the migration literature that has been 
published during the last twenty years. 
Accordingly, the present chapter of this book seeks to present an 
overview of the general shortcomings of the vast migration literature not 
covered in chapter 10. Unlike chapter 10, however, this analysis is not par- 
ticularly concerned with summarizing the actual results of specific empirical 
studies. In point of fact, to a large degree, this task has already been 
accomplished in the well-known survey article by Greenwood (1975). 
Instead, this chapter concentrates on certain widespread problems and 
deficiencies of the migration literature as a whole. I t is hoped that the 
observations and recommendations of the present chapter may help to 
improve the quality of future migration research. 
 
 
Proper Specification of the Migration Variable 
 
In empirically examining the determinants (or effects) of human migration, 
it is essential properly to specify the migration variable. In this section the 
analytics of properly specifying the migration variable are presented. Hope- 
fully, insight derived from this exposition can prevent unnecessary errors in 
future empirical research dealing with migration. 
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For simplicity, let the economy initially consist of just two regions 
(areas), area A and area B. On the basis of the analysis in chapter 4, an 
individual (simply referred to as "individual i) residing in area A chooses to migrate 
to area B only if the discounted present value expected from the move is positive:  
 
 
Di = ∑ [(RBit +SAit) - XBi t - (RBit +SAit)+ XAi t + 
 
   (YBit/ C
B
it- Y
A
it/C
A
it)+ (F
B
it - F
A
it)]  (1- ri)-Ti - E
AB
i > 0 (11.1) 
 
        
1 
It follows from equation 11.1 that 
 
 
PABi = PABi (RBi, SBi, XBi, RAi , SAi, XAi, YBi, CBi,YAi, CAi, FBi,  
 
FAi,Ti, Ei, ri)      (11.2) 
 
 
 
where PABi = the probability that individual i  will migrate from area A to 
area B. 
 
As most empirical migration studies indicate, an economic system ordi- 
narily is viewed as consisting of more than merely two regions. Accordingly, 
consider now an economy consisting of H regions, where H > 2. If the 
symbol OMAB represents the total gross flow of migrants out of area A, it 
logically follows that 
 
 
                     H 
OMAB = VA ∑ PAB      (11.3) 
                     B=1 
      B≠A 
 
 
 
where VA = area A's total population 
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* 
 
 
Dividing both sides of equation 11.3 by the population size of area A 
yields                                                                                                                                         
 
 
 H 
OMAB/VA = ∑ PABi      (11.4) 
                     B=1 
      B≠A 
 Substituting from equation 11.2 into equation 11.4 for PABi  yields: 
 
 
                                       H 
OMAB/VA = ∑ PABi (RBi, SBi, XBi, RAi , SAi, XAi, YBi, CBi,YAi, CAi, FBi,  
                     B=1 
      B≠A 
  FAi,Ti, Ei, ri)    (11.5) 
Equation 11.5 provides the proper specification of the migration 
variable in a model of total gross out-migration from area A to all other 
areas in the economy. The form of equation 11.5 is entirely amenable to 
empirical testing through the use of standard regression techniques. 
Of course, rather than studying patterns of gross out-migration, many 
researchers choose to examine patterns of gross in-migration. To derive a 
model for gross in-migration, let the symbol represent the number of 
migrants flowing into area A from area B, B = l,...,H ≠ A. In the H-
region case, the migration equation will then become 
 
H       H 
∑ IMBA = ∑ VB PBAi       (11.6) 
B=1       B=1 
B≠A       B≠A     
 
 
 
Dividing equation 11.6 through by the population variable and substi- 
tuting from equation 11.2 for PAB properly specifies for the migration vari- 
able a general model of gross in-migration 
 
                                       H 
IMBA/VB = ∑ PABi (RBi, SBi, XBi, RAi , SAi, XAi, YBi, CBi,YAi, CAi, FBi,  
                     B=1 
      B≠A 
    FAi,Ti, Ei, ri)      (11.7) 
 
The model shown in equation 11.7 is suitable for direct empirical testing 
with conventional regression analysis. 
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As the survey in chapter 10 indicates, many research efforts have been 
directed toward the study of net rather than gross migration. Accordingly, 
it is appropriate now to develop an explicit model of net migration. From 
the analysis in equation 11.3 and l l .6, it follows that 
 
 
              H     H 
∑ OMAB - ∑ IMBA = NOA                                     (11.8)
 B=1       B=1 
               B≠A       B≠A     
 
 
where NOA = net number of out-migrants from A to all other areas            
combined. 
Substituting appropriately into equation 11.8 for OM AB and IMAB 
yields the following: 
 
  NOA = VA ∑ PAB - ∑ VB X PBA    (11.9) 
 
Finally, dividing both sides of equation 11.9 by the population in area A 
yields the proper specification of the migration variable for a model of net 
out-migration. 2 
   
  NOA/VA = ∑ PAB - VA-1  X ∑ VB X PBA   (11.10) 
 
Equations 11.5. 11.7, and 11.9 are basic models for the proper 
specification of a migration variable. A trait common to all three of these 
models is the division of the number of migrants by a population 
scalar. This implies that studies that do not divide the migrant flow by 
a population scalar are very likely to be mis-specified. Although certain 
studies attempt to compensate for not scaling by using "population 
size" as a separate independent variable, these efforts generally result in 
very crude empirical estimations. If the migration literature is to be 
accurate and dependable and hence useful in predicting regional economic 
growth patterns, it is essential that future researchers endeavor to specify 
the migration variable much more meticulously than has been done in 
the past. Future research must resort to formulations such as those in 
equations 11.5, l l.7, and 11.10. 3 
 
 
Specifying the Independent Variables 
 
The preceding section of this chapter indicates that too much of the empiri- 
cal migration literature fails to address the problem of how to specify the 
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migration variable properly. Naturally, the researcher must also deal with 
the problem of deciding which exogenous variables are to be included in an 
empirical analysis. Unless this problem is suitably handled, the efforts of 
the researcher are likely to provide very few, if any, meaningful insights into 
the migration process. 
Perhaps the most common problem in specifying migration models is 
that of the "omitted variable." As stressed in chapter 5 of this book, the 
most frequently omitted variable from migration analyses is the cost of 
living. In point of fact, there is strong empirical evidence indicating that the 
omission of this particular variable amounts to a very significant error. 
Given the fact that, until relatively recently, geographically comparable 
living-cost data were not readily available for a large number of geographic 
areas, it is understandable that this variable has been so neglected. Never- 
theless, the fact that such data now are available for both SMSAs and states 
virtually obligates future research efforts to take this variable expressly into 
account. Failure to account somehow for this variable threatens the rele- 
vance of all contemporary migration research. 
Aside from the cost of living the most commonly neglected variables in 
the empirical migration literature are those which deal with geographically 
different state and local government policies and those which measure the 
quality of life. 
As chapter 10 indicates, the literature dealing with the effects on 
migration of state and local government policies has grown enormously, 
especially since 1973. As also pointed out in chapter 10, this body of 
literature suffers from a number of basic shortcomings. Nevertheless, there 
is a very rapidly growing interest in this aspect of the migration process. 
This accelerating interest greatly increases the likelihood that future 
research efforts will ultimately deal quite adequately and properly with this 
set of variables. Thus, the outlook here is quite optimistic. 
On the other hand, the migration literature has made only a compara- 
tively small eff ort to include quality-of-life variables in empirical analyses. 
Aside from this book and the studies by Liu (1975), Cebula and Vedder 
(1973), and Kau and Sirmans (1976), only very modest efforts have been 
made to account for the quality of life in the migration decision. This 
neglect of the quality of life is unfortunate, especially in view of findings 
such as those by Kau and Sirmans (1976, p. 85) that “…all migration 
flows tended to be toward destinations with a ‘higher’ quality of life.” 
In the interest of increased relevance, it is strongly suggested here that 
future research efforts in the migration area endeavor to a greater 
degree to include quality-of-life considerations. Given the abundance of 
appropriate data this task should not be excessively difficult. 
Two additional comments regarding the choice of exogenous variables 
to be included in migration analyses are now in order. First, whenever 
migration flows are disaggregated, whether it is according to race, age, sex, 
educational attainment, or by some  other  criterion,  the  researcher  should 
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endeavor to choose variables that are appropriate to the migrant type being 
examined. For example, if a migrant is black and between the ages of 
twenty and fifty years, the relevant income variable to adopt is median or 
per capita black income. In this country, there exist enormous differentials 
between the median income of the entire population and black median 
income; there are also great differentials between the per capita income of 
the entire population and black per capita income. Hence, it would be an 
altogether inappropriate procedure to use either the median income level or 
the per capita income level of the entire population as a measure of the 
income opportunities of blacks. Nevertheless, this is a procedure quite 
common in the migration literature.4 In the interest of increased relevance 
and increased empirical accuracy, however, it is a procedure that should be 
ended. 
The final comment pertaining to the choice of exogenous variables to 
be included in migration studies concerns the distinction between income 
received and income earned. Many recent studies, including Chao and 
Renas (1976), Delong and Donnelly (1973), Glantz (1975), Pack (1973), and 
Sommers and Suits (1973), have empirically examined the impact of welfare 
benefits on migration patterns. In each of these studies, the regression equa- 
tion includes not only welfare benefits but also some measure of the total 
income received. This is a misspecification in the model since income 
received already includes welfare benefits.5Consequently, in those studies 
that are concerned with the effects on migration of both welfare and 
income, it is appropriate to measure income only in terms of earned income. 
Clearly, specifying the model in this fashion helps to improve forecasting 
accuracy.6 
 
 
The Need for Theoretical Foundations 
 
The two preceding sections of this chapter have stressed certain very 
common problems in the empirical migration literature. This section of the 
chapter addresses perhaps the most fundamental of all the shortcomings of 
the migration literature: the lack of rigorous theoretical foundations. 
It has long been recognized that the migration decision is fundamentally 
an investment decision. It has been nearly two full decades since Schultz 
(1961, p. 4) observed that "...the costs of...migration are a form of human 
investment." Unfortunately, the theoretical base of the migration literature 
has grown relatively little beyond this initial contribution; aside from the 
contribution by Sjaastad (1962), there has been essentially no major new 
theoretical development in the entire body of the migration literature since 
the paper by Schultz (1961). 
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In point of fact, most studies of migration altogether fail to develop a 
rigorous theoretical behavioral model. Typically, empirical migration 
studies contain only a very cursory analytical model. Rarely does such a 
model even attempt to relate migration behavior to maximizing behavior. 
At best, such models rely merely upon superficial, intuitive arguments. 
This is unfortunate for at least two important reasons. First, unless 
there is some type of formal analytical model, there is no genuinely logical 
way in which to hypothesize the appropriate types of variables that belong 
in the migration decision calculus. As a result, in the absence of a rigorous 
theoretical model, the choice of variables to be included in a migration 
regression equation becomes an entirely arbitrary decision. Second, in the 
absence of a formal analytical migration model, there may be no logical 
way in which to decide the appropriate form of regression equation that is 
to be estimated. Once again, the decision to use a linear regression or to use 
some alternative (for example, log-linear) regression form becomes entirely 
arbitrary. 
Chapter 4 of this book presents a rigorous model of migrant behavior 
in which the migration decision is treated as an investment decision.7 Three 
sets of forces influencing this investment are isolated: expected net income 
benefits, expected net amenity benefits, and expected net benefits from state 
and local public policies. The common denominator of all these sets of 
forces is the term "expectations." Although the model developed in chapter 
4 has identified several types of expectations, the issue of how such expecta- 
tions are actually formed has been left unresolved. 
In point of fact, there exists a very extensive literature dealing with the 
formation of economic expectations. Unfortunately, very little of this 
literature extends expressly into the realm of migrant behavior. Hence, 
there is a pressing need to develop formal analytical models to explain the 
formation of migrants' expectations; this is a need which must ultimately be 
satisfied if genuinely sophisticated migration research is ever to become a 
reality. 
In closing this section, it must be emphasized that migration models 
must be constructed with an acute awareness of the possibility of economic 
interdependence. For example, if the flow of migration is argued on theore- 
tical grounds to be a function of the annual growth rate of per capita 
income, then there must exist an awareness of the possibility that the annual 
rate of growth of per capita income may itself be a function of the migra- 
tion flow. In cases where economic interdependence can reasonably be 
expected to exist, the migration model ultimately must take the form of a 
system of simultaneous equations. To test such a system empirically would 
then require a regression method such as two-stage least squares. The 
computer software for such empirical techniques is now quite widespread; 
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hopefully, the analytical tools needed to apply the two-stage least squares 
method properly to migration studies are soon to become widespread as 
well. 
 
 
Summary 
 
This chapter has singled out certain basic shortcomings of the literature 
dealing with the relationship between migration and non-policy variables. 
Among other things, it has been observed that there is a pressing need to 
measure the migration variable much more meticulously than does current 
research, that there is a need to specify models which do not neglect impor- 
tant exogenous variables, and that there is a need to develop more analytic- 
ally rigorous models of migration behavior. Hopefully, these observations 
can help future research efforts to produce more accurate results and thus 
more useful insight into contemporary real-world problems. 
 
 
Notes 
 
1. Following Schultz (1961), Sjaastad (1962), Riew (1973), and others, 
the migration decision is viewed strictly as an investment decision. 
2. Of course, it is possible to rewrite equation 11.10 after substituting 
functional forms for PAB and PBA; however, to do so here may make 
equation 11.10 more cumbersome than necessary for the purposes of the 
present analysis. 
3. Several studies have addressed the issue of properly specifying the 
migration variable. Among these, the studies by Glantz (1975) and 
Davanzo (1978) are especially worth noting. 
4. Two examples of recent studies guilty of this practice are Pack 
(1973) and Sommers and Suits (1973). Related to this problem see also the 
comments in Cebula and Curran (1974). 
5. See chapter 3 of this book. 
6. The issue of simultaneity bias is not discussed here because Green- 
wood (1975b) has already dealt at length with this topic. It is sufficient 
simply to observe that a number of studies, including Cebula and Vedder 
(1973), Greenwood (1969), Laber and Chase (1971), Pack (1973), Pursell 
(1972), and Rabianski (1971), suffer from simultaneity bias because of 
improperly chosen exogenous variables. 
7. The theoretical model developed by Alperovich, Bergsman, and 
Ehemann (1977) is a less rigorous but nevertheless quite useful alternative to 
that developed in chapter 4 of this book. 
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